The Untold Story of Zhou Enlai:The Face Behind the Political Paragon (Part 2)

This article explores key events and figures of the Cultural Revolution, including Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, and Mao Zedong’s ideologies. It reveals the impact and experiences of Zhou Enlai and his family during this historical period.

Author: Er Ye

Here is the translation of the text:

This article explores major events and figures of the Cultural Revolution, including Zhou Enlai, Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong Thought, and related political movements, revealing the influence and experiences of Zhou Enlai and his family during this historical period.

Author | Er Ye

To facilitate reading, the editors of this website have made appropriate modifications without changing the original meaning! It is also stated that this article represents the author’s viewpoint only, and this website is for presentation purposes only, so that readers can have a comprehensive understanding of historical facts!

Carry the Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the end!

Long live the great Proletarian Cultural Revolution!

Long live the great Proletarian Dictatorship!

Long live the great Communist Party of China!

Long live the great Communist Party of China!

Long live the great invincible Mao Zedong Thought!

Long live our great leader Chairman Mao!

Long live! Long, long live!

The Fate of Sun Weishi During the Cultural Revolution

If we say that it was somewhat unexpected for old comrades and old wartime friends to inflict pain on others, it is truly astonishing that Zhou Enlai personally approved the arrest of his adopted daughter Sun Weishi, leading to her tragic death.

Sun Weishi was a well-known talented woman in the CCP, with a high talent in the arts. Her father, Sun Bingwen, was an early martyr of the CCP and had a very good relationship with Zhou Enlai. After Sun Bingwen’s death in 1927, his wife and children struggled to survive in Shanghai. By 1935, the 15-year-old Sun Weishi participated in film company training in Shanghai. Among her teachers was Jiang Qing, who was also active in the Shanghai film industry at the time. Because of this connection, Sun Weishi was very familiar with Jiang Qing’s background.

In 1937, 17-year-old Sun Weishi and her brother went to the Eighth Route Army office in Wuhan and sought Zhou Enlai to join the Eighth Route Army. As the daughter of an old comrade, Zhou Enlai took Sun Weishi in. Although there was no formal adoption, most people saw Sun Weishi as Zhou Enlai’s adopted daughter. Zhou Enlai even sent Sun Weishi to study at Yan’an and the Moscow Theater Institute.

During her time in the Soviet Union, the talented and beautiful Sun Weishi was pursued by Lin Biao and Liu Yalou. Lin Biao married Ye Qun only after being rejected by Sun Weishi. After 1949, with Zhou Enlai as a powerful patron and her own talents, Sun Weishi quickly became the artistic director of the China Youth Art Theater and even accompanied Mao Zedong on a visit to Russia as Mao’s personal translator. At that time, there were rumors that she had an affair with Mao, which also fueled Jiang Qing’s jealousy and sowed seeds of hatred.

Sun Weishi’s marriage also planted a larger landmine. Her husband, Jin Shan, was a famous actor who had a dispute with Jiang Qing when he was in the Shanghai film industry. Moreover, he was not very scrupulous. While filming in Korea, he became involved with a female secretary of Kim Il Sung, leading to the secretary’s execution by Kim Il Sung. After returning, Jin Shan also faced trouble. When the Cultural Revolution began, Jiang Qing, who had immense power as the deputy head of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, sought revenge on Jin Shan and soon imprisoned him.

Sun Weishi, already envied by Jiang Qing due to her rumored affair with Mao, was now even more vulnerable. She misjudged the situation and, after her husband’s imprisonment, thought that as Zhou Enlai’s adopted daughter, others would not dare to harm her. Thus, she refused to divorce her husband or sever ties, even writing five letters of appeal to the central leadership to plead her case. Upon receiving these letters, Jiang Qing went directly to Zhou Enlai and accused him of condoning his adopted daughter’s opposition to the Cultural Revolution.

In 1968, Jiang Qing included Sun Weishi in the “Li Lisan Anti-Party Group” and sent materials to Zhou Enlai, requesting her arrest. To avoid suspicion, Zhou Enlai personally signed the arrest warrant. By October 1968, just a few months after her imprisonment, Sun Weishi died in a Beijing detention center at the age of 48. She was found dead, naked, and disfigured, and was immediately cremated with her ashes disappearing.

Half a month after Sun Weishi’s death, Zhou Enlai nonchalantly issued a directive: “The cause of death should be investigated, and an autopsy should be conducted to determine the cause of death.” By then, Sun Weishi’s body had already decomposed beyond recognition. If she knew in the afterlife, she might find it hard to accept that the “Daddy Zhou” she called out every day was the one who approved her arrest.

Zhou Enlai and His Family’s Fate

Along with Sun Weishi, Zhou Enlai’s biological brother Zhou Enshou was also arrested. Zhou Enlai personally signed the arrest warrant for him. Zhou Enshou was even more unfortunate. Having followed his brother in underground work since childhood and suffered greatly, he was targeted after Liu Shaoqi’s downfall because of his close relationship with Liu’s brother-in-law Wang Guangqi, who had eaten a few meals with him. Jiang Qing, after taking power, included him in the purge.

Zhou Enshou’s son, Zhou Bingjun, later wrote a memoir. He said that his uncle Zhou Enlai, to show his impartiality, specially wrote a report to Mao Zedong regarding Zhou Enshou’s arrest, suggesting two options: “First, handle it by the Red Guards; second, first control it by the garrison troops, and then let the organization investigate.” Poor Zhou Enshou was kept in unknown confinement for seven years and was only released in May 1975 after Mao’s direct order.

With his adopted daughter and brother treated this way, one can imagine how Zhou Enlai dealt with those around him. Cheng Yuangong, who was Zhou Enlai’s chief bodyguard from the age of 19 in 1945 until 1968, was sent to labor reform in Jiangxi after offending the petty Jiang Qing over trivial meeting details during the Cultural Revolution. Even Wang Dongxing of the Central Security Bureau was appalled, thinking it excessive to arrest someone close to him over such minor issues.

Mr. Li Zhizui wrote in “Memoirs of Mao Zedong’s Personal Doctor”: “Mrs. Deng Yingchao, representing Zhou Enlai, told Wang Dongxing that Cheng Yuangong must be arrested, to show that we have no personal interest.” Wang Dongxing still did not agree. Later, Wang told me that Cheng Yuangong had been with them for a lifetime, and they were willing to sacrifice him to protect themselves.

The “One Strike, Three Anti” Campaign in the Cultural Revolution

Here, I will explain why Zhou Enlai was so afraid of Jiang Qing. Lin Biao’s subordinate Qiu Huizuo wrote a book called “Memoirs of Qiu Huizuo,” which recorded Zhou Enlai saying: “The central politics is to manage the relationship between the Chairman, Vice Chairman Lin, and Jiang Qing.” In other words, Zhou Enlai viewed Mao as the emperor, Jiang Qing as the empress, Lin Biao as the crown prince, and himself as the housekeeper. He knew Jiang Qing was a pawn Mao put on the stage, so he dared not offend Jiang Qing and followed her every order, even actively nominating Jiang Qing for the Politburo Standing Committee, primarily to show loyalty to Mao.

On March 24, 1968, at a Cultural Revolution rally held in the Great Hall of the People, Zhou Enlai even led the chant: “Whoever opposes Comrade Jiang Qing must be overthrown! Vow to defend Comrade Jiang Qing to the death!” As a prime minister, Zhou Enlai praised Jiang Qing to an undignified and shameless extent to protect himself. In fact, Zhou Enlai was sycophantic to every woman around Mao. For instance, Zhang Yufeng, a nameless secretary, was flattered by Zhou Enlai with notes such as: “Hello, Comrade Yufeng, I am sending you a report on the 16th night for Chairman. Please read it to the Chairman when he is in good spirits, eating well, and sleeping well. Do not read it when he is tired. Please, please.” Such behavior is akin to groveling. He even intended to nominate Zhang Yufeng to the Politburo according to Mao’s wishes but died before he could do so. Such conduct is far from the stature of a major country’s prime minister and more comparable to palace eunuchs of the past.

Many people now attribute the sins of the Cultural Revolution to Mao and the so-called Gang of Four, with Zhou Enlai being merely an accomplice. In fact, some major political movements with severe consequences were not initiated by Mao but were driven by Zhou Enlai himself. For example, the little-known “One Strike, Three Anti” campaign during the Cultural Revolution. The well-known Cultural Revolution thinker Yu Luoke, author of the famous “On the Origin of Social Classes,” was executed during this campaign.

A large number of political prisoners were also executed during this campaign, including the talented students Shen Yuan from Peking University, Feng Yuanchun from Sichuan University, and Huang Lizhong, who led a party rebellion in Anhui. These people, though arrested and sentenced before the Cultural Revolution, were not sentenced to death. If they could survive the Cultural Revolution, they would have lived. But during the “One Strike, Three Anti” movement, these people were retried and re-sentenced, with most of them receiving death sentences.

So why did Zhou Enlai initiate this political movement? The so-called “One Strike, Three Anti” movement began in January 1970. At that time, Zhou Enlai issued three notices: “Instructions on Combating Counter-Revolutionary Destruction Activities,” “Instructions on Opposing Corruption, Theft, and Speculation,” and “Notice on Opposing Extravagance and Waste.” These three documents were combined into one, abbreviated as “One Strike, Three Anti.” The focus was on combating counter-revolutionaries.

In the early 1970s, relations between the Communist Party of China and the two major powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were very poor, especially with the Soviet Union, with sharp contradictions. In this situation, Zhou Enlai believed that “stability at home must precede stability abroad.” To consolidate the Communist Party’s rule, it was necessary to use dictatorial means to eliminate a group of people. In January 1970, he sent a report to Chairman Mao, stating, “To implement combat readiness and strengthen national defense, all counter-revolutionary destructive activities must be resolutely attacked. After much discussion, we believe it is necessary to issue such an instruction to address the destructive activities of a small group of counter-revolutionaries in the mobilization for war.”

To achieve the desired effect of severity and speed, Zhou Enlai delegated the power to review death sentences from the Supreme Court to the provincial level, meaning provinces had the authority to impose death sentences. Some provinces further delegated this power down to the county level. This meant that revolutionary committees at the county level had the authority to sentence people to death, and executions were to be carried out immediately. Not only were executions immediate, but there were also quotas for executions. Some provinces, in order to meet these quotas, competed to use political prisoners who had originally not been sentenced to death.

How many people were killed in the “One Strike, Three Anti” movement? The late Cultural Revolution scholar Wang Nianyi made a statistic in his book “The Era of Great Chaos.” From February to November 1970, during these 10 months, 1.84 million counter-revolutionaries were uncovered nationwide, 284,800 were arrested, and the number of people executed was at least in the thousands. The exact number of deaths may only be revealed when the files are declassified in the future.

This movement quickly made even Mao, who was known for his bloodthirstiness, dissatisfied. On February 26, 1971, Mao issued a directive: “We do not govern by killing people.” After receiving this directive, Zhou Enlai stopped the killing spree.

Mao did indeed cause many deaths, but realistically speaking, he had a certain dictator’s confidence. He was vengeful towards political opponents and wanted to eliminate them. However, for the lower-level insignificant people and ordinary citizens, he looked down on them and could not be bothered. At most, he would humiliate, harass, or imprison them. But Zhou Enlai was completely different; he was actually more ruthless in this regard than Mao. The “One Strike, Three Anti” movement was entirely orchestrated by him, targeting political prisoners at the grassroots level and leaving them no way to survive. These intellectuals were merely writing articles and complaining, posing no threat to the Communist Party’s rule. Yet Zhou Enlai sought to exterminate them completely, similar to how he once killed the entire family of Gu Shunzhang. It is hard to understand his motives and purposes, which seem less like those of a normal politician and more like those of a pathological paranoid. There are indeed very few within the Communist Party who were more ruthless than him.

Let me give another example. Liao Chengzhi, the head of the State Council’s Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, was criticized and attacked by the rebels. Liao Chengzhi was a confidant of Zhou Enlai. To save him, Zhou Enlai deliberately framed another leader of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Fang Fang. Zhou Enlai told the rebels, “The representative figure you uncovered is indeed Fang Fang. I am now providing you with a piece of material, which was already exposed during last year’s Cultural Revolution, that Fang Fang, in contact with Hong Kong’s bourgeois agents, sent large quantities of what were supposedly scenic postcards to our country. In reality, they photographed many of our landscapes and buildings, practically selling our mountains and rivers to foreign reactionaries.” Fang Fang, as someone involved in overseas Chinese affairs, having some correspondence with Hong Kong guests and sending postcards, was quite normal. Zhou Enlai, with his eyes open, was lying, fabricating charges against innocent people to protect his subordinate. This truly reveals a despicable character.

After all these stories, how should we evaluate Zhou Enlai? Actually, those who knew Zhou Enlai best were his old comrades and fellow veterans. During the Lushan Conference in 1959, Peng Dehuai, dissatisfied with the “Great Leap Forward,” wrote a long letter to Mao Zedong. He originally hoped that Zhou Enlai, as the Premier, would also speak the truth. However, Zhou Enlai completely sided with Mao and did not say a word in support of Peng, even publicly criticizing Peng Dehuai: “You are indeed rebellious.” This angered Peng Dehuai, who scolded him to his face: “Too deep in worldly affairs, cunning and sly.”

Deng Xiaoping, who had followed Zhou Enlai from his days studying in France, knew Zhou Enlai very well. During an interview with Italian journalist Faracci in August 1980, Deng Xiaoping commented on Zhou Enlai, saying: “During the Cultural Revolution, his position was extremely difficult, and he said and did many things against his conscience, but the people forgave him because if he had not done these things or said these things, he could not have protected himself.” Deng Xiaoping was relatively polite and tactful in his public comments, but he was more direct internally. In March 1980, during the discussion of the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” Deng Xiaoping stated: “On the Liu Shaoqi issue, and on the issues of Peng Dehuai, He Long, Tao Zhu, and others, Zhou Enlai also had faults.” At this meeting, Hu Yaobang and Chen Yun also expressed their views on Zhou Enlai, believing that Zhou Enlai had responsibilities for the initiation of the Cultural Revolution and other major issues, and could not solely blame the political environment and climate of the time.

Zhou Enlai’s Personal Traits and Evaluation

In fact, Deng Xiaoping had a more famous statement about Zhou Enlai: “Without the Premier, the situation during the Cultural Revolution might have been even worse; without the Premier, the Cultural Revolution would not have lasted so long.” The latter half of this statement is key. So, if Deng Xiaoping’s true evaluation of Zhou Enlai is not high, why did Deng Xiaoping, after the reform and opening up, create a public image of Zhou Enlai as a virtuous, self-sacrificing, and politically astute leader?

I have mentioned in many videos that Deng Xiaoping’s policies, including the starting point of reform and opening up, were about two words: “Preserve the Party.” In other words, to maintain the party’s ruling position. He implemented reform and opening up, which inevitably broke the myth of Mao, abandoned his class struggle line, and inevitably cast the defectors like Lin Biao and the overthrown Jiang Qing as negative figures to be discarded. With so many former party symbols and leaders being toppled and discredited, the impression would be that the Communist Party still had good people. Therefore, the Communist Party urgently needed to establish a positive figure to show that the party still had good people. And this person, undoubtedly, was Zhou Enlai. After 1949, he had long stayed behind the leader, never stepping forward, always using the phrase “I came late,” which made many people have fantasies and goodwill towards him.

The famous philosopher Li Shenzhi, who had worked directly under Zhou Enlai and had a personal relationship with him, once lamented: “Premier Zhou was the last moral banner of the Chinese Communist Party. If this banner collapses, then the sanctity of the Communist Party will be gone.” This is the truth. Therefore, Deng Xiaoping, in the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the People’s Republic of China,” portrayed Zhou Enlai as a bright spot in the dark years, the positive energy within the party, not because Deng Xiaoping truly admired Zhou Enlai, but because it was necessary to preserve the party. The party needed this false covering to say that past troubles were due to the leader’s mistakes and the machinations of traitors, while loyal officials had been silently working hard. The mainstream of the party was still good. In fact, Deng Xiaoping’s strategy succeeded. Today, many Chinese people are more or less aware of Mao’s evils, with mixed opinions about him. But for Zhou Enlai, most domestic people basically hold a positive evaluation. This shows that Zhou Enlai’s public persona has been very successful. His unknown side has been almost completely covered up.

On June 18, 1951, Zhou Enlai appeared on the cover of the American magazine “Time” for the first time. At that time, the American evaluation of him was: “Politically a brutal ruler, diplomatically a submissive servant, and economically an incompetent leader.” Realistically, the American view was not very accurate. In the political movements within the Communist Party, Zhou Enlai was not usually the one actively targeting people, nor was he considered brutal. But every time, he always had his part, and it was always significant. Zhou Enlai’s performance was actually related to his personality and also to the political traditions of the CCP.

In the early days of the CCP, most of the party leaders—Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, Li Lisan, Zhang Wentian, Wang Ming, Bo Gu, etc.—did not fare well. Whenever the party faced setbacks, these leaders would be cast aside to take the blame. In this environment, Zhou Enlai, as a high-ranking official, although protected by his background with the Comintern and not purged, was aware of the dangers of being in the forefront. So he always strived to avoid being the top leader and chose to be the second-in-command instead, even if it meant giving up easily attainable highest power. For example, during the Zunyi Conference, he betrayed Wang Ming and Bo Gu to stand by Mao Zedong’s side.

Before the CCP reached Yan’an, Zhou Enlai’s position within the party was always higher than Mao Zedong’s. His faction within the party was also the most powerful. However, he willingly stood behind Mao Zedong, embodying the so-called “Mao plots, Zhou accomplishes.” This long-standing self-preservation strategy in internal party struggles not only allowed Zhou Enlai to smoothly weather various storms but also inevitably made him cautious and obedient in his political conduct. Internally, he did not view himself as a responsible and proactive politician, and could even be said not to see himself as an independent person, but rather as a mere tool of the party, as a minister in the imperial court. He had strong party loyalty and was willing to unconditionally obey the party leader, even to the extent of forsaking his humanity in the process.

To put it bluntly, sometimes he was as humble as a political concubine to Mao Zedong. For scholars, Zhou Enlai was the best assistant, understanding the leader’s intentions and handling dirty and tiring work for the leader. But for comrades and ordinary people, he was a disaster. In his position, there was no other option but to follow. He neither served the country nor the people. The real tragedy was that even though Zhou Enlai was extremely subservient to Mao and Jiang Qing, Mao still used him while constantly keeping an eye on him.

For example, Wu Jieping, former central chairman of the 93 Society and dual academician of the Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Chinese Academy of Engineering, served as Zhou Enlai’s medical team leader during the Cultural Revolution. In March 2011, Sanlian Life Weekly published an article commemorating him, “The National Doctor Wu Jieping,” which quoted Wu Jieping’s original words and revealed some inside information. Zhou Enlai had been diagnosed with bladder cancer as early as May 1972. After his medical team reported the treatment plan to the central authorities, Mao Zedong specifically issued a directive: “Do not examine, do not operate, keep it confidential from Zhou Enlai and Deng Yingchao.” The matter was delayed until October 1973 when Zhou Enlai was terminally ill, and he wrote a letter to Mao requesting permission for surgery. Only then did Mao approve, but by then it was too late, and no one could save him.

Consider why Mao did not allow Zhou Enlai to have surgery. The reason is simple: Mao did not want Zhou Enlai to die behind him. If that happened, there would be no one within the party to check Zhou Enlai, and after Mao’s death, it would certainly be Zhou Enlai’s world, which Mao was most unwilling to see. Mao’s wariness of Zhou Enlai is illustrated by another example. After Lin Biao’s death, Mao reactivated the defeated Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier to counterbalance Zhou Enlai. After Nixon’s visit to China in 1973, Mao was dissatisfied with Zhou Enlai’s performance and instructed the Politburo to hold a meeting to criticize Zhou Enlai’s “right-leaning surrenderism” in diplomacy with the U.S.

At this meeting, Mao specifically asked Deng Xiaoping to attend and speak. Deng Xiaoping, knowing Mao’s intention, made a blunt and piercing remark: “Premier, others can only admire the Chairman from afar, but you are close enough to the Chairman, only a step away. I hope you pay attention to this issue in the future.” Deng Xiaoping’s words were actually Mao’s way of reprimanding Zhou Enlai. Although Deng Xiaoping had later allied with Liu Shaoqi, he still maintained a friendship with Zhou Enlai. Thus, Deng Xiaoping publicly stabbing Zhou Enlai in the back must have been a heavy blow. However, Zhou Enlai had also acted as Mao’s knife, using the same method to attack Liu Shaoqi and Zhu De. Today, with roles reversed, it seems like poetic justice.

Mao was very pleased after hearing Deng Xiaoping’s speech and immediately arranged for Deng Xiaoping to re-enter the Politburo, also making him Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. This was Deng Xiaoping’s second entry into the highest decision-making circle. I do not know how Zhou Enlai felt after hearing Deng Xiaoping’s words, but it must have been heart-wrenching. After decades of cleaning up after the leader, he ended up with the same despised stench.

Objectively speaking, from an observer’s perspective, Zhou Enlai was undoubtedly a very capable person within the CCP. Whether in doing things or in personal conduct, he was exceptional, particularly in intelligence and diplomatic work, and can be said to be the primary contributor to the CCP’s success. In governance, compared to Mao’s reckless approach, Zhou Enlai appeared much more rational. But a capable person, especially a powerful politician, if they do not realize their responsibilities and merely serve as a slave to the highest power, such ability becomes a dark magic, causing harm. Zhou Enlai’s tragedy lies in this.

To some extent, he might be less significant than the other two giants in the party—Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao. Liu Shaoqi had the courage to offend Mao during the “Great Leap Forward,” saying and doing some human things. Lin Biao, though high-profile during the Cultural Revolution, rarely actually participated in persecuting others and often spoke well of others. After breaking with Mao, Lin Biao resolutely refused to make self-criticisms or admit mistakes, preferring to flee rather than be a prisoner, maintaining the dignity of a soldier. Compared to these two, what is there to commend about Zhou Enlai? Always enduring humiliation and bearing heavy burdens, constantly acting as a lackey. We see a perfect tool but not the so-called human. With the mask on, he is a god; with the mask off, he is a ghost.

When I talked about Zhou Enlai in other videos, I liked to use the term “Zhou Gonggong.” Some readers did not understand and asked whether “Zhou Gonggong” was a deliberate insult. Actually, it is not. It is a humorous term for Zhou Enlai’s true position and role in the CCP’s higher echelons. Externally, he was the top assistant in the cabinet; internally, he was essentially the chief eunuch of the Imperial Rituals Bureau. I think if Chinese history is rewritten in the future, many evaluations of modern figures will be overturned, and the contrast with Zhou Enlai will be the most striking. If only he had died earlier, who could truly know the truth of his life? The previous turmoil was all due to the leader’s mistakes and the treachery of ministers, while the loyal ones were working silently. The party’s mainstream remains good. In fact, Deng Xiaoping’s strategy succeeded. Today, many Chinese people are more or less aware of Mao’s evil, with mixed opinions about him. But for Zhou Enlai, most domestic people have a generally positive evaluation. This shows that Zhou Enlai’s propaganda persona was very successful. His hidden side has been almost completely covered up.