Deng Xiaoping:The Architect of Modern China (Part 2)
Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) was the core figure of China’s reform and opening up, leading the economic reforms and modernization process after 1978. He proposed the “one country, two systems” policy and adjusted policy directions after the June Fourth Incident. He is hailed as the architect of China’s modernization.
Author ｜ Wikipedia
For ease of reading, this website’s editor has made appropriate modifications without deviating from the original meaning! Also, this article represents only the author’s views, and this website serves merely to present them, allowing readers to fully understand the historical truth!
After the Founding of the People’s Republic of China
Early Years of the Republic
On October 1, 1949, the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed. As the First Secretary of the Central China Bureau and a representative of the Second Field Army, Deng attended the founding ceremony of the People’s Republic of China at Tiananmen Square and was elected as a member of the Central People’s Government, a member of the Political Consultative Conference, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association. On October 19, the People’s Revolutionary Military Committee was formed with Mao Zedong as Chairman, and Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, and Cheng Qian as Vice Chairmen, while He Long, Liu Bocheng, Chen Yi, Lin Biao, Xu Xiangqian, Ye Jianying, Nie Rongzhen, Gao Gang, Su Yu, Zhang Yunyi, Deng, Li Xiannian, Rao Shushi, Deng Zihui, Xi Zhongxun, Luo Ruiqing, Sa Zhenbing, Zhang Zhizhong, Fu Zuoyi, Cai Tingkai, Long Yun, and Liu Fei were members. Subsequently, Deng and Liu Bocheng led the army to capture Yunnan, Guizhou, and Xikang. On December 2, 1949, Deng was appointed Vice Chairman of the Southwest Military and Political Committee. At the end of 1949, Deng took on roles as the Political Commissar of the Southwest Military Region and the Director of the Southwest Finance and Economic Committee. During his tenure, he thoroughly eradicated opium dens in Yunnan, balanced relations between ethnic minorities and Han people, and implemented land reforms.
On January 8, 1950, the Second Field Army reported to the Central Committee and Mao Zedong, confirming the 18th Army’s mission to enter Tibet. Deng and Zhou Enlai firmly stood with Mao Zedong. In 1951, Deng withdrew troops from the Southwest and Northwest Military Regions to control Tibet and establish order.
Before returning to Beijing for his new post, Deng attended the completion ceremony of the Chengdu-Chongqing Railway. In July 1952, Deng was transferred to central work, first serving as Vice Premier of the State Council and Deputy Director of the Financial and Economic Committee, and also holding roles as Director of the State Council’s Transportation Office and Minister of Finance. Mao Zedong issued a written order: all government documents submitted to the Central Committee must first be reviewed by Deng. In July, Zhou Enlai proposed that Deng start overseeing daily work at the State Council in Beijing from August, and Liu Shaoqi suggested that Deng should move to central work after arranging matters in the Southwest. On August 7, Zhu De chaired the 17th meeting of the Central People’s Government Committee, appointing Deng as Vice Premier of the State Council. In August, Deng was transferred to Beijing, and his family moved into Zhongnanhai. On August 10, Zhou Enlai proposed renaming the State Council Party Group to the Central People’s Government Party Group Administrative Committee, with Zhou as the Government Party Group Secretary and Chen Yun and Deng as First and Second Secretaries. On August 13, Deng formally took office, presiding over the 148th meeting of the State Council. At the meeting, Zhou announced that Deng would act as Premier during Mao Zedong’s absence in the Soviet Union. Deng, together with Mao Zedong, attended meetings to formulate the First Five-Year Plan, including the “socialist transformation” plan to collectivize individual agriculture and small industries and nationalize large industries. On October 22, Deng wrote to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, proposing that the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns could be concluded. After review by Mao and Zhou, the “Three Anti” and “Five Anti” campaigns were officially ended on October 25. Through attending meetings with Mao and Zhou, Deng learned how the leaders assessed national affairs; he also understood the reasons behind major decisions and contemplated the framework for fundamental reforms.
From 1953 to 1954, Deng not only served as a member of the Constitution Drafting Committee but also as a member of the Election Law Drafting Committee and the Central Election Committee, later being appointed Secretary-General of the committee. On February 28, 1953, the Southwest Military and Political Committee was restructured into the Southwest Administrative Committee, with Deng as Vice Chairman. On March 3, Mao Zedong designated Deng to oversee matters requiring central approval. On April 18, the Central Committee decided to adjust responsibilities, clarifying that Deng would lead railways, transportation, and postal services. On August 17, the Central Politburo decided that Deng would concurrently serve as First Deputy Director of the State Council’s Financial and Economic Committee and Minister of Finance. Deng led negotiations with provinces to determine how much grain and taxes each province should contribute and how much the central government should allocate to each province. From September 18, 1953, Deng served as Minister of Finance for one year, overseeing central financial work. Deng had to make significant judgments and report to Mao Zedong and Zhou on each province’s capacity to meet grain quotas and tax contributions. On April 27, 1954, the expanded meeting of the Central Politburo decided to abolish regional-level party and government institutions, with Deng serving as Secretary-General of the Central Committee for the third time and Minister of the Central Organization Department. From September 15 to 28, 1954, Deng attended the First Session of the First National People’s Congress held in Beijing. Based on Zhou Enlai’s nomination, the congress appointed Chen Yun, Peng Dehuai, Deng, and eight others as Vice Premiers of the State Council; based on Mao Zedong’s nomination, the congress appointed Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Deng, and thirteen others as Vice Chairmen of the National Defense Committee. On September 29, Mao Zedong appointed Deng as Vice Premier of the State Council. Until the regional party and government institutions were abolished in December, Deng continued to serve as the First Secretary of the Southwest Bureau. On December 28, Deng submitted a written report to the Central Committee based on the opinions discussed in meetings he chaired, proposing the abolition of the Central Regional Work Department and the establishment of four offices in the Central Secretariat to assist central work. Mao Zedong told Deng: “The central affairs are handled by you, and everything externally should be done in the name of the Central Committee, not in the name of the Secretary-General or Deputy Secretary-General.”
In 1953, Chen Yun and Deng reported Gao Gang’s activities to Mao Zedong, raising Mao’s vigilance. At the end of the year, Deng and Chen Yun secretly reported to Mao Zedong that Gao Gang posed a danger of splitting the party; Mao Zedong took the warning seriously. In 1954, the “Gao Gang and Rao Shushi Incident” occurred, where Gao Gang and Rao Shushi attempted to seize power from Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. According to Mao Zedong’s instructions, on January 25 and February 5, Deng, along with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou, had two talks with Gao Gang to point out his issues; on February 3, Deng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou, Zhu De, and Chen Yun had another talk with Rao Shushi to point out his issues. After the Fourth Plenary Session, from February 15 to 25, the meetings on the Gao Gang issue were chaired by Zhou, and the meetings on the Rao Shushi issue were chaired by Deng, Chen Yi, and Tan Zhenlin. On February 23, Deng and Chen Yi spoke, with Deng hoping Rao Shushi would adopt an attitude of abandoning mistakes and thoroughly report to the Central Committee after the meeting to correct errors. Deng was responsible for investigating Rao Shushi and reported on the “Anti-Party Alliance of Gao Gang and Rao Shushi” at a party meeting in March 1955. In April 1955, at the Seventh Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Deng and Lin Biao were added to the Central Politburo (replacing the vacancies of Bi Shih and Gao Gang), entering the party’s highest leadership.
Deng was the head of the Chinese Communist Party delegation attending the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev denounced Stalin. On February 11, 1956, Deng, along with Tan Zhenlin and Wang Jiaxiang, arrived in Moscow and met with Zhu De and Liu Shaoqi. Deng and Zhu De participated in the CPSU’s 20th Congress in Moscow, and Deng and Tan Zhenlin returned to Beijing on March 3. In May, Chairman Mao Zedong of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced the launch of the “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom, Let a Hundred Schools of Thought Contend” campaign. Deng was not very supportive, believing it might trigger an anti-Communist mass movement.
On August 30, 1956, during the first meeting of the preparatory conference for the 8th National Congress, Mao Zedong proposed that the 8th Congress address the styles of subjectivism, bureaucratism, and sectarianism. In September, during the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng presented a report on amending the Party’s constitution. It pointed out that the Communist Party of China had become a ruling party, which could lead to detachment from the masses and reality, and emphasized the need to adhere to the mass line, democratic centralism, and collective leadership, develop intra-Party democracy and people’s democracy, oppose bureaucratism, oppose personality cults, and strengthen the Party’s connection with the masses. However, this report was only an abstract critique of personality cults and did not touch upon Mao Zedong’s authority and power. At the opening ceremony, Deng was elected as a member of the Congress Presidium, a member of the Standing Committee of the Presidium, and Secretary-General of the Congress. The 8th Congress proposed that the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in our country had been basically resolved. On September 27, the 12th session of the 8th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held, and Deng was elected as a Central Committee member. On September 28, the 1st Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held at Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai, where Deng was elected as a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and General Secretary of the Central Secretariat, becoming the sixth-ranking leader in the Party, starting to handle daily work along with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai. Deng held a weekly meeting of the Central Secretariat to address Party and government work issues, with major issues submitted to the Politburo and the Standing Committee of the Politburo for discussion. The heads of various departments of the Central Committee and the State Council were all under Deng’s leadership. From November 10 to November 15, the 8th Central Committee’s Second Plenary Session was held, deciding to launch a new rectification campaign across the Party in 1957.
Anti-Rightist Movement
During the “Hundred Flowers” movement, Deng advised local cadres to be open to criticism and not retaliate. In May, Deng chaired two meetings of the Central Secretariat to discuss preparations to counter the Rightist attacks; on May 23, the Central Committee held an enlarged meeting of the Politburo, where Deng reported on the recent state of the rectification movement and its deployment. On June 5, Deng left Beijing to guide the rectification movement in various places; Deng gave four reports in Shenyang, Xi’an, Chengdu, and Jinan at the onset of the anti-Rightist struggle. From these reports, it can be seen that Deng, like Mao Zedong and other central leaders, overestimated the situation in the ideological and political fields and the anti-Rightist struggle.
In the summer of 1957, Mao Zedong launched the “Anti-Rightist Movement,” humiliating all those who severely criticized the Communist Party. Between 1957 and 1958, the Communist Party of China conducted the Anti-Rightist Movement, with Deng serving as the head of the Central Committee’s Anti-Rightist Leadership Group, presiding over and actively advancing the movement. Mao Zedong led the campaign to label about 550,000 intellectuals as Rightists and instructed Deng to manage the movement. In September 1957, the 3rd Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held, and Deng presented a report on the rectification movement, identifying the anti-Rightist campaign as the second phase of the rectification movement. During the Anti-Rightist Movement, some intellectuals who were arrogant and unfairly criticized officials caused Deng to become angry. Deng supported Mao Zedong in the Anti-Rightist Movement, upheld the Party’s authority, and attacked outspoken intellectuals. Deng later told his daughter that he regretted not doing more to stop Mao Zedong from committing serious mistakes. On October 15, the Central Committee officially issued the “Criteria for Classifying Rightists,” stipulating: “Those who do not oppose socialism and the Party’s leadership fundamentally but merely express dissatisfaction or criticism regarding specific work systems, partial policies that do not belong to fundamental principles, issues in work, academic matters, or individual organizations or staff of the Communist Party, even if their opinions are incorrect or their language is sharp, should not be classified as Rightists; similarly, those who do not fundamentally oppose socialism and the Party’s leadership but have certain errors in ideological consciousness should also not be classified as Rightists.” Later, Deng admitted his responsibility for the expansion of the Anti-Rightist Movement but maintained that initiating the movement was not wrong, only that it was wrongly expanded. Due to the widespread use of percentage quotas in the work, with insufficient proportions being forcibly adjusted, a large number of people were mistakenly classified as Rightists; many honest and talented intellectuals, outstanding Party members and officials who dared to speak the truth, and patriotic individuals who had long cooperated with the Communist Party were unjustly oppressed and unable to contribute to the socialist construction, which was a painful lesson. The Anti-Rightist Movement resulted in 550,000 people being classified as “Rightists,” more than 100 times the initial estimate of Rightists by Mao Zedong. Under Deng’s direct concern and guidance, by the end of 1981, all those wrongly classified as Rightists were corrected, and the errors of the serious expansion of the Anti-Rightist struggle were thoroughly corrected.
Tibet Unrest
On March 8, 1957, Deng presided over a Central Secretariat meeting to hear a report from Zhang Jingwu, Secretary of the Tibet Work Committee and First Political Commissar of the Tibet Military District, on the situation in Tibet; Deng Xiaoping required active work on uniting Tibet’s upper-class figures, stating:
“In Tibet, distinguish between left, middle, and right based on patriotism, not on land reform. We rely on the left and strive for the middle. The rightists are separatists; as long as they are not traitors, we should also work with them.”
On September 8, Deng presided over a Central Secretariat meeting to hear Zhang Guohua’s report on the partial rebellion instigated by reactionary groups in Tibet, instructing the Tibet Work Committee and the Tibet Military District to handle the situation calmly and rationally:
“Only fight when the bandits threaten Party and government agencies and major transportation routes; if you are confident, fight; if not, do not fight.”
Great Leap Forward
At the Nanning Conference, the Central Committee decided that Deng would handle the petroleum industry. As the “Great Leap Forward” emerged, revolutionary war and political struggle methods, typically used in mass movements, were widely applied to economic construction, severely deviating from reality and violating the objective laws of economic development, which dampened the enthusiasm of the masses and caused significant damage to socialist construction. From May 5 to May 23, 1958, the 2nd Plenary Session of the 8th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held. The session approved Mao Zedong’s proposed “Three Red Banners” general line, fully launching the “Great Leap Forward” movement, which Deng supported. After the meeting, Deng, as Secretary-General, actively promoted various aspects of the “Great Leap Forward,” with Chen Yun later saying, “Some people came to the Secretariat looking for energy, while others reported difficulties to the Premier.” On June 10, the Central Committee issued the “Notice of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Establishment of Financial, Political, Legal, Foreign Affairs, Science, and Cultural Education Groups,” reviewed and modified by Mao Zedong: “These groups are directly under the Central Politburo and Secretariat, reporting directly to them. Major policies are decided by the Politburo, and specific deployments are made by the Secretariat.” The concentration of economic decision-making power, coupled with the increasing autocratic style within the Party, made it difficult for the Central Committee and the State Council’s coordination departments to function effectively. In June, Deng attended an enlarged Military Committee meeting, where Mao Zedong also spoke, criticizing dogmatism in military work; in July, Deng intervened to protect Liu Bocheng, advising Mao Zedong to retain Liu Bocheng’s position as a Central Politburo member. On July 31, Khrushchev secretly came to Beijing, and Mao Zedong, accompanied by Deng, held talks with Khrushchev. In August, the Central Committee held an enlarged Politburo meeting in Beidaihe (commonly known as the Beidaihe Conference); Mao Zedong emphasized concentrating on industrial focus, mainly steel, stating, “Marx and Qin Shi Huang should be combined”;Deng Xiaoping demanded strict enforcement of a unified national plan, emphasizing “ensuring key points first” and “disregarding minor issues.” Mao Zedong said that the rural people’s communes were spontaneously established by the masses; Deng agreed with Mao’s views on the nature of rural people’s communes. After the Beidaihe Conference, a nationwide surge in steel production began rapidly; simultaneously, a rural people’s commune movement spread quickly across the country, marked by excessive targets, exaggeration, misdirection, and “communist winds,” which were serious “leftist” errors. From September to November, Deng inspected the Northeast, North China, and the Great Southwest, marking his longest inspection tour since joining the central government in 1952, during which he visited numerous localities and units. On November 6, Deng arrived in Zhengzhou to attend a Central Committee work meeting chaired by Mao Zedong, historically known as the “First Zhengzhou Meeting.”
In 1959, the Central Committee decided to hold the Seventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in Shanghai in early April. On April 5, Mao Zedong addressed the issue of power concentration in the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau and the Secretariat: “Power should be concentrated not only in the Central Committee and the Political Bureau but also in the Standing Committee and the Secretariat. … I am the commander-in-chief, Deng Xiaoping is the deputy commander-in-chief and deputy marshal. The two of us, one principal and one deputy.” From July 2 to August 1, Mao Zedong proposed that the Central Committee hold an expanded Politburo meeting in Lushan. Criticism of the “Great Leap Forward” and the people’s commune movement during the meeting made Mao change his initial intention to continue correcting “leftist” errors. Following Mao’s suggestion, from August 2 to August 16, the Central Committee held the Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in Lushan, criticizing Peng Dehuai, Huang Kecheng, Zhang Wentian, and Zhou Xiaozhou. The session passed a resolution on “the mistakes of the anti-Party group led by Comrade Peng Dehuai,” and launched the “anti-rightist” campaign within the Party. Deng did not attend the meeting due to a thigh fracture requiring hospitalization, but he was very concerned about the Lushan Conference. At that time, Deng expressed different views on the criticism of Peng Dehuai, sparing him from the turmoil of the Lushan Conference, although he formally expressed opposition to Peng Dehuai and support for the Great Leap Forward through a written statement. The slogan “Anti-rightism, boosting morale, and initiating a new Great Leap Forward” became central, leading to a resurgence of high targets, exaggeration, commandism, and “communist winds,” causing severe imbalances in the national economy.
In 1960, after inspecting grassroots areas, Deng and President Liu Shaoqi established an emergency committee and proposed the “Sixty Articles on Agriculture” and “Three Freedoms and One Contract,” beginning to adjust the national economy. On March 24, Deng arrived in Tianjin by train to attend an expanded meeting of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau convened by Mao Zedong, historically known as the “Tianjin Meeting.” Due to the failure to resolve the serious problems in the Party and national leadership system, and other reasons, the principles of collective leadership and democratic centralism within the Party were continuously weakened and undermined, leading to personal worship and “leftist” errors, ultimately resulting in the disastrous “Cultural Revolution,” causing significant damage to China. On September 16, a CPC delegation led by Deng and Peng Zhen left Beijing for Moscow to participate in Sino-Soviet Party talks, returning on September 23. On September 30, Deng led the CPC delegation to Moscow again for the drafting committee meeting of the International Conference of Communist and Workers’ Parties.
Subsequently, Deng actively participated in adjusting and rectifying the national economy. In September 1961, he proposed the “Seventy Articles on Industrial Work,” redirecting economic development from exaggerated idealism to pragmatism, 334-337.
On January 11, 1962, the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference officially began. Deng emphasized at the conference to “pay more attention to adhering to the Party’s fine traditions,” “avoid bureaucratic airs,” and “avoid becoming detached from the masses and reality.” At the conference, Mao Zedong and other central leaders took the lead in self-criticism, taking responsibility for shortcomings and mistakes in their work, which had a profound impact on the Party’s democratic construction. The conference still affirmed the general line, the “Great Leap Forward,” and the people’s commune movement as entirely correct, without fundamentally changing the “leftist” guiding ideology. Mao criticized Deng’s economic measures by name, leading to a rift between Mao and Deng. At the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee, Mao expanded and absolutized the concept of class struggle, asserting that the bourgeoisie would exist and attempt to restore capitalism throughout the entire socialist historical period, and become the root of revisionism within the Party, causing the Party’s guiding ideology to increasingly fall into “leftist” errors focused on class struggle. The conference also negated the efforts of the Seven Thousand Cadres Conference to strengthen democratic centralism within the Party, leading to increasingly abnormal intra-Party democratic life and undermining the style of seeking truth from facts.
On July 6, 1963, the first meeting between the Chinese and Soviet parties took place, with Suslov, head of the Soviet delegation, presiding and giving a lengthy speech. On July 14, disregarding the agreement made before the Sino-Soviet talks that “no news about the talks would be released during the talks,” the Soviet side published an open letter to all levels of the Soviet Party organizations and all communists in response to the CPC’s letter of June 14. Deng replied: “Our Party has always advocated not making public the differences between fraternal parties in front of the enemy. However, since public debate has been provoked, it should be conducted on an equal basis. We have always been forced to respond, never initiating attacks on any other party. When we are openly attacked, we cannot but respond. We believe that during the period from the conclusion of this round of talks to the next round, we can discuss a resolution acceptable to all for stopping the public debate.”
Second Downfall
On November 10, 1965, Shanghai’s “Wenhui Bao” suddenly published Yao Wenyuan’s article “Critique of the New Historical Drama ‘Hai Rui Dismissed from Office.’”
On May 16, 1966, the expanded meeting of the Central Political Bureau of the CPC passed the “Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,” marking the official start of the “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.” Deng worked tirelessly to maintain stability and restore order. Liu Shaoqi and Deng immediately went to Hangzhou to report to Mao Zedong and asked Mao to return to take charge of work. After returning to Beijing, Liu and Deng held a Central Political Bureau meeting to discuss countermeasures, drafting the “Eight Decisions” including “big-character posters limited to campuses,” “distinguishing between inside and outside campuses,” “assemblies limited to campuses,” “no demonstrations,” and “no large-scale assemblies.” These decisions received Mao’s approval, and work groups were dispatched to various schools, but were fiercely attacked by students manipulated by the Cultural Revolution faction. Almost every school split into factions, attacking each other, with rampant searches, beatings, and other violent acts. On July 16, Mao swam across the Yangtze River and returned to Beijing on July 18. Liu Shaoqi immediately requested to meet Mao, but Mao refused. On July 19, Mao declared that sending work groups was a mistake, asserting it was not just a matter of understanding, but a matter of line. On July 21, Mao formally instructed the withdrawal of the work groups. On July 24, Mao convened a meeting with Central Standing Committee members and members of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, criticizing Liu Shaoqi and Deng for sending work groups and deciding to withdraw them. On July 29, Mao held a meeting at the Great Hall of the People with Cultural Revolution activists from Beijing universities and middle schools, announcing the withdrawal of the work groups and criticizing Liu Shaoqi, Deng, and Zhou for sending them. From August 1 to August 21, Deng attended the Eleventh Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee in Beijing and spoke. The session passed the “Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” (the “Sixteen Points”) and elected Mao Zedong, Lin Biao, Zhou, Tao Zhu, Chen Boda, Deng, Kang Sheng, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Li Fuchun, and Chen Yun as members of the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau. At the plenary session, Kang Sheng, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and others attacked Liu Shaoqi, while Xie Fuzhi attacked Deng, claiming he had changed since the liberation of the country. Liu Shaoqi and Deng were criticized as leading figures of the “bourgeois headquarters,” and Chen Boda took the opportunity to report on Deng to Mao. Deng, accused of “line errors,” effectively ceased to participate in the central leadership. In fact, he no longer participated in central leadership work. To implement the spirit of the plenary session, from August 13 to 23, Lin Biao, entrusted by Mao Zedong, presided over a central working meeting, during which Deng was criticized. After the meeting, Deng handed over the work of departments such as the International Liaison Department and the Central Investigation Department to Kang Sheng. Deng was effectively suspended and deprived of his powers, spending most of his time at home reading documents, writing reviews, and undergoing criticism.
From October 9 to October 28, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held a working meeting in Beijing to discuss the “Cultural Revolution” issue and criticize the “bourgeois reactionary line.” Lin Biao spoke at the meeting, naming Liu Shaoqi and Deng as executing “a line that suppressed the masses and opposed the revolution,” and stated that “the erroneous line of this Cultural Revolution movement was mainly initiated by Liu and Deng.” After the meeting, the entire country criticized the “bourgeois reactionary line.” On October 23, Mao Zedong convened a central working meeting, where Chen Boda from the Central Cultural Revolution Group reported criticizing Liu Shaoqi and Deng. As a result, Liu Shaoqi and Deng conducted self-criticism. On November 7, Deng was criticized by name for the first time in big-character posters in Beijing, titled “Second Capitalist Roader.” Subsequently, big-character posters and party newspapers began criticizing Liu Shaoqi and Deng, calling Deng “another major capitalist roader in power besides Liu Shaoqi,” “China’s second revisionist,” and “the root of the bourgeois reactionary line.” On December 13, Mao Zedong instructed the “Cultural Revolution faction” to criticize Deng and Liu Shaoqi as “reactionary elements.” Deng was overthrown for the second time. Afterward, Liu Shaoqi and Deng no longer appeared in public. Deng was placed under house arrest in his residence in Zhongnanhai.
On New Year’s Day 1967, the Cultural Revolution Group mobilized hundreds of thousands of people from various universities in Beijing to gather at Tiananmen Square to criticize Liu Shaoqi and Deng. At that time, Deng was the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, and with State President Liu Shaoqi, he was labeled as the “biggest capitalist roader within the Party” and was stripped of all his positions. On March 15, Deng’s brother Deng Shuping committed suicide out of despair. At the end of March, at a meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee, Deng was removed from his position as General Secretary. Subsequently, the Red Guards continuously criticized and attacked him. In May, Wang Dongxing visited Deng’s home and conveyed a message from Mao Zedong: first, to be patient and not to rush; second, that Liu and Deng could be separated; and third, that Deng could write to him (Mao) if there were any issues. By August, the criticism of Deng had escalated to physical struggle. Red Guards held a criticism meeting at Deng’s home in Zhongnanhai, forcing Deng to kneel and sit in the “jet plane” position. On August 5, Liu Shaoqi and Deng were criticized and struggled against in their respective residences. In September, Liu Shaoqi and Deng’s children were expelled from Zhongnanhai. Mao Zedong placed Deng and his wife under house arrest in their home in Zhongnanhai. Deng’s two younger children, Deng Rong and Deng Zhifang (along with Deng’s stepmother Xia Bergeng), were sent to a crowded workers’ dormitory in Beijing and were not allowed to meet their parents. Deng’s three children were sent away, leaving only his wife Zhuo Lin and his stepmother with him.
On May 16, 1968, the “Deng Xiaoping Project Group” was officially established, headed by Kang Sheng and Huang Yongsheng, and others. At the 12th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee held in October, Deng was formally removed from all his positions inside and outside the Party, but retained his Party membership. At the meeting on October 13, Mao Zedong said: “During the war, Deng Xiaoping fought against the enemy, and no historical problems have been found.” With Deng’s downfall, his family members also faced persecution.
In September 1968, Deng’s eldest son, physics student Deng Pufang, was paralyzed from the waist down after being thrown from a fourth-floor window during a “class purification” movement at Peking University. Although Red Guards present sent him to the hospital in time, he suffered a compression fracture of the thoracic vertebrae. In 1969, Deng’s children were allowed to visit their parents in Zhongnanhai and learned from Deng Nan about Deng Pufang’s disability. Zhuo Lin was heartbroken and cried for several days and nights, while Deng remained silent, smoking constantly. In 1970, Deng wrote to the Central Committee requesting that Deng Pufang be allowed to join him in Jiangxi, and in 1971, Deng Pufang was permitted to reunite with his parents.
On October 17, 1969, Lin Biao issued an “urgent directive” to mobilize the entire military into a state of emergency preparedness. On October 18, Lin Biao issued the “First Order” to the entire military to enter a state of emergency war readiness, formally issued by Chief of Staff Huang Yongsheng and others as the “First Order of Vice Chairman Lin.” On October 20, Deng was sent to Nanchang, Jiangxi, and placed under house arrest at Wangchenggang in Xinjian County, about a 20-minute drive from Nanchang. Deng’s accommodation was the former office of the infantry school principal. Starting in January 1970, his salary was stopped, and Deng’s original monthly salary of 402 yuan and Zhuo Lin’s 165 yuan were replaced by living allowances of 120 yuan for Deng, 60 yuan for Zhuo Lin, and 25 yuan for his stepmother Xia Bergeng. Starting in the summer, at his request, Deng was allowed to work in a tractor factory in the mornings. Zhuo Lin took on the laundry work without forced labor. This period was regarded by Deng as the most painful time of his life.
On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, after his failed coup attempt, fled by plane and died in a crash in Öndörkhaan, Mongolia. Deng commented: “Lin Biao’s demise was an act of divine justice!” Following the failure of Lin Biao’s coup, Deng wrote to Mao Zedong expressing his views on the Lin Biao incident. On November 8, Deng wrote to Mao Zedong, expressing his willingness to continue working for the Party and the people. On August 14, 1972, Mao Zedong commented on Deng’s letter: “Please forward this to Premier Zhou for reading and to Director Wang for distribution to comrades in the Central Committee. Deng Xiaoping’s mistakes are serious, but they should be distinguished from those of Liu Shaoqi. (1) In the Central Soviet Area, he was persecuted along with Mao, Xie, and Gu, being one of the so-called ‘four sinners’ of the Mao faction. The materials for his persecution can be found in the books ‘Two Lines’ and ‘Since the Sixth Congress.’ The person who persecuted him was Zhang Wentian. (2) He has no historical problems, meaning he never surrendered to the enemy. (3) He was effective in assisting Comrade Liu Bocheng in fighting and has war merits. Besides this, after entering the city, he also did some good things, such as leading a delegation to Moscow for negotiations without yielding to Soviet revisionism. I have said these things many times before and now say them again.” This comment marked the beginning of a turning point in Deng’s second phase of criticism. Zhou, in the name of the Central Committee, formally notified the Jiangxi Provincial Committee, announcing the immediate lifting of Deng’s supervision and allowing him to conduct investigation and research work. At the end of the year, Deng and his wife Zhuo Lin were arranged to visit places like Jinggangshan in Jiangxi, to tour Jinggangshan, pay homage to relics, and revisit Ruijin and other places.
On February 20, 1973, Deng left Jiangxi and returned to his old residence in Zhongnanhai, Beijing. On March 10, following Mao Zedong’s opinion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China decided to restore Deng Xiaoping’s Party life and his position as Vice Premier of the State Council. On the evening of March 28, Zhou, following Mao Zedong’s instructions, presided over a Politburo meeting, where it was announced that Deng would serve as Vice Premier in charge of foreign affairs. From April 1973, as Zhou’s assistant, Deng began to accompany Zhou to the airport to greet and see off guests, meeting foreign guests, and participating in some activities of meeting foreign guests, but had not yet taken on the task of negotiating with them. On April 12, Deng, in his capacity as Vice Premier, attended a banquet held for the Cambodian King Norodom Sihanouk. On December 12, at a Politburo meeting, Mao Zedong proposed the transfer of commanders of major military regions, formally proposing that Deng serve as Chief of the General Staff. Deng was appointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China, re-entering the leadership core. On December 18, Zhou presided over a meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, and based on Mao Zedong’s proposal, it was decided that Deng would serve as a member of the Central Politburo and a member of the Central Military Commission. On December 22, Deng, on behalf of the Military Commission, announced a major reshuffle of the commanders of the major military regions.
In early 1974, Zhou’s health deteriorated. By May and June, Zhou’s health had worsened significantly. On June 1, Zhou was admitted to the 305 Hospital of the People’s Liberation Army for treatment. Although Zhou was already in the hospital, he nominally retained his positions. Under his personal guidance, Deng effectively became the acting Premier. Meanwhile, in early 1974, the Gang of Four, led by Jiang Qing, launched the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” campaign, which intensified the conflict between Deng and the Gang of Four. On October 20, Mao Zedong proposed that Deng be appointed as the Vice Chairman of the Party, First Vice Premier, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Chief of the General Staff. Mao Zedong told Zhou and Wang Hongwen that Deng Xiaoping was a rare talent with strong political thinking.
“Three Vice-Chairmen and One Chief”
On January 5, 1975, based on Mao Zedong’s proposal, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued Document No. 1 of 1975, appointing Deng as Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. Deng immediately began to rectify the nationwide ultra-leftist wave. From January 8 to January 10, the Second Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party was held in Beijing. Despite being ill, Zhou chaired the meeting, which confirmed Deng as a member of the Central Politburo and elected him as Vice Chairman of the Central Committee and a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. From January 13 to January 17, the First Session of the Fourth National People’s Congress was held, chaired by Zhou, who was appointed Premier of the State Council, and Deng and 12 others were appointed Vice Premiers. Deng was behind the scenes drafting Zhou’s report. The main goal proposed by Zhou at the meeting was the realization of the “Four Modernizations.” The Congress decided that Deng would serve as the First Vice Premier of the State Council. After Premier Zhou was hospitalized due to his severe illness, Deng presided over the daily work of the Central Committee, the State Council, and the Central Military Commission.
On March 5, Vice Premier Deng replaced Zhou at the National Conference of Industrial Secretaries of Provinces, Municipalities, and Autonomous Regions. At the meeting, Deng pointed out, “We must oppose the initiators of factional struggles.” On May 3, Mao Zedong convened a Politburo meeting at his residence, where Zhou met Mao for the last time. Mao criticized Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao for only opposing empiricism and not dogmatism, and decided to let Deng preside over Politburo meetings and criticize Jiang Qing and others. From May 12 to May 17, Deng paid an official visit to France, becoming the first Chinese leader to visit a Western country. On May 27, based on Mao Zedong’s opinion, Deng presided over a Politburo meeting and criticized Jiang Qing and others. On September 7, Zhou and Deng met with the Romanian delegation at the hospital. On September 13, Acting Premier Deng held the Central Agricultural Conference in Shanxi on the “Learn from Dazhai in Agriculture” campaign. During the meeting, the struggle with the Gang of Four reached a fever pitch. Deng began to comprehensively rectify the extremely chaotic economic situation, military construction, and scientific research work, and engaged in a head-to-head struggle with the powerful Jiang Qing Group. In October, while leading the “rectification,” Deng formulated three programmatic documents: 1. “Outline on the General Principles of Work for the Whole Party and the Whole Country (Draft)”; 2. “Outline Report on the Work of the Academy of Sciences (Draft)”; 3. “Some Issues on Accelerating Industrial Development (Draft).” Deng also proposed taking Mao Zedong’s “Three Instructions as the Key”: 1. Learning the dictatorship of the proletariat, anti-revisionism and prevention of revisionism; 2. Promoting stability and unity; 3. Improving the national economy. On November 20, based on Mao Zedong’s opinion, the Politburo meeting proposed that Deng preside over drafting a resolution on the Cultural Revolution. The general view was that the Cultural Revolution was fundamentally correct, with some deficiencies. Deng said, “It is not appropriate for me to preside over writing this resolution. I am a person in the Peach Blossom Spring, ’not knowing the existence of the Han, regardless of Wei and Jin’.” On November 24, at the “Briefing Meeting,” Mao Zedong instructed on how to “avoid making new mistakes,” with Deng reading Mao Zedong’s letter. Deng did not affirm the Cultural Revolution but obeyed Mao Zedong’s instructions: the Chairman hoped for a correct attitude towards the Cultural Revolution; the Chairman said that taking class struggle as the key link was the Party’s basic line; the “main points of the briefing speech” approved by Mao Zedong were issued to senior cadres nationwide on November 26. Due to multiple reports from Mao Zedong’s nephew and liaison Mao Yuanxin, saying that Deng “rarely spoke about the achievements of the Cultural Revolution” and that Deng’s “Three Instructions as the Key… actually only one instruction remains, that is, production has been improved,” Mao Zedong decided in November to address Deng’s so-called “right-leaning” problem. In criticizing Deng, Mao said, “What three instructions as the key, stability and unity do not mean abandoning class struggle, class struggle is the key link, the rest are secondary,” “Xiaoping… this person does not grasp class struggle, he has never mentioned this key link, it is still the white cat, black cat theory, it doesn’t matter if it is imperialism or Marxism.” Mao Zedong also pointed out, “Some people are always dissatisfied with this Cultural Revolution, always want to settle accounts with the Cultural Revolution, always want to overturn the verdict,” thus launching the “Criticize Deng, Counter the Right-Deviationist Reversal of Verdicts” campaign. On December 2, Mao Zedong met with U.S. President Gerald Ford, with Deng accompanying Mao for the last time in meeting foreign guests, marking their last meeting.
Third Downfall
Deng’s actions faced opposition from the “Gang of Four,” and he was accused of promoting a “right-leaning reversal of verdicts.” On January 8, 1976, at 9:57 a.m., Zhou Enlai passed away. On January 15, a memorial service was prepared at the Great Hall of the People in Tiananmen Square. First Vice Premier Deng delivered the eulogy. Ji Chaozhu said Deng “choked up when he just started reading ‘Our Premier,’ paused for a moment. Everyone was in tears.” At the Politburo meeting on January 20, Deng made his third self-criticism, expressing his hope to see Mao Zedong again. On February 2, two weeks after Deng submitted his resignation, the Central Committee announced to senior cadres that, with unanimous consent of the Politburo, Hua Guofeng was appointed Acting Premier. The Politburo approved Mao Zedong’s proposal for Hua Guofeng to serve as Acting Premier of the State Council and preside over daily work. Mao Zedong told Hua, “You take charge, I am at ease.” Hua’s appointment was seen as Mao Zedong’s effort to reconcile the contradictions between the “Gang of Four” and pragmatic cadres and military personnel. On February 15, at a meeting of provincial, municipal, autonomous region, and major military region secretaries, Hua Guofeng stated, “The urgent task now is to criticize Deng Xiaoping and Deng Xiaoping’s revisionist line. Under this goal, cadres and masses should unite.” However, like Mao Zedong, Hua Guofeng placed limits on the campaign: no big-character posters criticizing Deng on the streets, no criticism over the radio. On February 16, the Central Committee approved the report of the Central Military Commission, announcing that the speeches of Deng and Ye Jianying at the expanded meeting of the Military Commission last summer were seriously wrong, and their speech documents were no longer to be disseminated.
Around February 1976, large-character posters criticizing Jiang Qing and supporting Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were circulated nationwide. April 4, a Sunday and China’s traditional “Qingming Festival” for tomb sweeping, saw over 2 million people gather in Tiananmen Square, with Zhou Enlai’s memorial activities reaching a peak. The Politburo held an emergency meeting where Hua Guofeng criticized Deng’s faction as “a group of bad people who have jumped out, some of whom directly attack Chairman Mao, many attack the Central Committee, and are very malicious.” Beijing Mayor Wu De stated, “It appears this is a planned action. Deng Xiaoping prepared public opinion extensively from 1974 to 1975, and this event this year is the result of Deng Xiaoping’s meticulous planning. … The nature is clear: it is a counter-revolutionary incident.” The Politburo meeting accused Deng of being the mastermind behind the event and decided to forcibly remove the wreaths around the Monument to the People’s Heroes. On April 5, the “Tiananmen Incident” occurred in Beijing, with memorials for Zhou, opposition to the “Gang of Four,” and support for Deng. On April 5, the Central Politburo deployed militia and police to clear all wreaths at the scene and also arrested some people. The public chanted slogans like “Return our wreaths, return our comrades,” which were eventually suppressed.
On April 7, without Deng’s participation, the Central Politburo held a meeting and decided to remove Deng from all party and state positions: “The Central Politburo discussed the counter-revolutionary incident that occurred in Tiananmen Square and Deng Xiaoping’s recent performance, believing that Deng Xiaoping’s issue has turned into a confrontational contradiction. According to the great leader Chairman Mao’s proposal, the Politburo unanimously decided to remove Deng Xiaoping from all party and state positions, retaining his party membership to observe future developments.” Deng was accused of being the “backstage boss” of the event and was again removed from all party and state positions, marking his third downfall. When Wang Dongxing first informed Mao Zedong about the possibility of Jiang Qing mobilizing the masses to criticize Deng, Mao instructed Wang to relocate Deng to a safe place not far from his children, keeping the residence secret from the “Gang of Four.” On April 8, Deng asked Wang Dongxing to deliver a letter to Mao Zedong, expressing his continued adherence to party discipline: “I fully support the Central Committee’s decision to appoint Comrade Hua Guofeng as First Vice Chairman and Premier. … I express my heartfelt gratitude to the Chairman and the Central Committee for allowing me to remain in the party.” On the same day, the People’s Daily criticized the Tiananmen Incident as a “premeditated, planned, and organized counter-revolutionary political event.”
On April 18, the People’s Daily editorial “What Does the Tiananmen Square Incident Reveal?” classified the participants of the April 5 movement as “a group of counter-revolutionaries who are anti-communist, anti-people, and anti-socialist,” and labeled Deng as the “chief representative of these counter-revolutionaries” and the “backstage boss of rightist reversal.” On June 30, Deng received a notice to move back to his old residence on Kuang Street from his temporary residence in Dongjiao Minxiang.
On May 11, June 26, and September 2, Mao Zedong suffered heart attacks. In August, the “Criticize Deng” movement was launched, and Deng’s three “rectification” documents were denounced as “three major toxic weeds.” On September 3, Jiang Qing rushed to Dazhai to prepare for criticizing Deng. On September 9, Mao Zedong passed away. After launching the “Criticize Deng and Counterattack the Rightist Reversal” movement, Mao Zedong expressed: “The Cultural Revolution committed two mistakes, namely ‘overthrow everything’ and ’total civil war’; the Cultural Revolution was ‘70% success and 30% error’; the overall view is ‘basically correct, with some shortcomings.’ Mao Zedong also pointed out that he had done two great things in his life: first, driving away Chiang Kai-shek and the Japanese, which was not controversial; second, launching the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ which had few supporters and many opponents.” On October 6, Hua Guofeng, Wang Dongxing, and Ye Jianying initiated the Huairen Hall Incident, arresting the Gang of Four and ending the Cultural Revolution without bloodshed. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, and Mao Zedong passed away, and the Gang of Four was overthrown. On the afternoon of October 7, a Politburo meeting was held. The meeting decided that Hua Guofeng would become the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Although the decade-long turmoil had ended, China faced a “three crises” (faith, confidence, and trust).
After the arrest of the Gang of Four, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China announced the end of the Cultural Revolution, but there were disagreements within the Central Committee regarding Deng’s rehabilitation. On October 10, Deng wrote to Hua Guofeng and the Central Committee, firmly supporting the Central Committee’s decisive action to smash the “Gang of Four.” On October 26, Hua Guofeng announced that the current task was to criticize the “Gang of Four,” with Deng’s criticism being ancillary.
Post-Cultural Revolution
On January 6, 1977, the Politburo meeting discussed Deng’s reinstatement and decided to restore his positions. On February 7, Hua Guofeng supported the People’s Daily’s editorial which formally proposed the “Two Whatevers” viewpoint: “Whatever decisions Chairman Mao made, we must resolutely uphold; whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave, we must always follow.” This viewpoint strongly opposed Deng’s return. In the same month, Deng expressed objections to the “Two Whatevers” viewpoint during a conversation with Wang Zhen, believing it was not Marxism or Mao Zedong Thought. Hua Guofeng initiated China’s economic special zones, supporting Deng’s reform measures after his 1977 return, and promoting the country’s opening up. However, the “Great Leap Forward” in the foreign context faced severe criticism. On March 10, after the fall of the Gang of Four, the first Central Committee work meeting was held, during which Deng’s reinstatement was proposed, causing controversy. On April 10, Deng wrote a second letter to Hua Guofeng, expressing “full support for Chairman Hua’s guidelines for governing the country and the current work deployment. … I sincerely accept the criticisms and teachings from the great leader and mentor Chairman Mao regarding my work shortcomings. … Regarding my personal work, what to do and when to start, I fully adhere to the Central Committee’s considerations and arrangements. … We must use accurate and complete Mao Zedong Thought to guide our entire party, army, and people … When the Central Committee decided to have Comrade Hua Guofeng serve as Chairman of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Military Commission, I understood that the Central Committee led by Hua Guofeng defeated the Gang of Four in the most wise and correct manner …”. In the same month, Deng stated to Wang Dongxing, Li Xin, and others that the “Two Whatevers” were unacceptable. On May 13, Document No. 15 from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China forwarded Deng’s two letters. From July 16 to July 21, Deng attended the Third Plenary Session of the 10th Central Committee; on July 17, the session unanimously passed the “Resolution on Restoring Deng Xiaoping’s Positions,” deciding to restore Deng as a Central Committee member, Politburo member and Standing Committee member, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Chief of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Army. On August 12, the 11th Central Committee’s First Plenary Session was held, where Deng vigorously reformed the military, reformed the education system, and rectified unjust, false, and mistaken cases. Deng became the third highest leader in the Communist Party of China, retaining his position as Politburo Standing Committee member and Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, second only to Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying.
Before the end of 1978, Deng was not yet the highest leader within the party. Hua Guofeng held the highest leadership positions in the Central Committee, State Council, and Central Military Commission. Hua Guofeng was considered to be at odds with Deng politically. The evolution of the “Two Whatevers” resulted in Hua Guofeng being resisted by the party, with Deng at the forefront.
On August 3, 1977, at a seminar on science and education work, Deng was determined to hold the college entrance examination in 1977, allowing higher education institutions to recruit new students through unified exams. In December, Deng strongly recommended Hu Yaobang, Vice President of the Central Party School, to become Minister of the Central Organization Department. On March 18, 1978, at the opening ceremony of the National Science Conference, Deng spoke and reversed the political positioning of intellectuals from the lower status during the Cultural Revolution, stating that “intellectuals who serve socialism are part of the working people,” changing the “disrespect for intellectuals” erroneous thinking since the Cultural Revolution. On September 19, 1977, Deng talked with the main officials of the Ministry of Education about “Correcting the Disruptions in the Education Front,” essentially changing one major policy of the Communist Party during the Cultural Revolution.
On February 26, 1978, the Fifth National People’s Congress was convened. Hua Guofeng delivered the government work report, emphasizing the adherence to class struggle and the enhancement of the “Four Modernizations.” The meeting confirmed the personnel decisions of appointing Hua Guofeng as Premier, Deng Xiaoping as Vice Premier, and Ye Jianying as Chairman. However, before implementing his strategy, Deng had to resolve the differences in approach between him and Hua Guofeng. On May 11, “Guangming Daily” reprinted an article titled “Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth,” which was agreed upon by Hu Yaobang and signed by “Special Commentator.” This article, supported by Deng and his subordinates, criticized “rigid dogmatism” and “personal worship,” targeting the “Two Whatevers” and indirectly implying Hua Guofeng and Wang Dongxing were responsible. On May 12, both “People’s Daily” and “PLA Daily” reprinted the article, which was subsequently reprinted by many local newspapers. This realist political philosophy was considered a factor in Deng winning this political game. On April 5, the CCP Central Committee announced the start of redressing “rightist elements” wrongfully labeled since 1958. After Deng’s third comeback, from November 10 to December 15, the CCP Central Committee held a working meeting. The meeting vindicated the Tiananmen Incident on April 5, 1976, indicating Deng had gained the upper hand in the current struggle. The meeting severely criticized Hua Guofeng, who admitted that political issues should be solved based on facts and the principle of “practice is the sole criterion for testing truth.” On December 2, in response to new situations and problems arising at the Central Working Conference, Deng discussed with Hu Yaobang, Hu Qiaomu, and Yu Guangyuan his speech for the closing session, drafting an outline by hand: “…promote democracy, strengthen the legal system. The core of democratic centralism is democracy, especially recently. Democratic elections, democratic management (supervision). The unity of politics and economics, mainly against empty politics for now. Decentralization. Trying every possible means. The contradiction between autonomy and national plans should be mainly adjusted by the law of value and supply-demand relationship (product quality)….” On December 5, while discussing revisions to the speech with Hu Qiaomu, Yu Guangyuan, and Lin Jianqing for the closing session of the Central Working Conference, Deng said: “We should emancipate our minds, use our brains, look forward, otherwise, the Four Modernizations have no hope. Venting should be allowed as a punishment for lack of democracy. With normal democracy, big-character posters will be less. Establish and improve democracy and the legal system, implement economic democracy, manage the economy with economic methods, make responsibilities clear, ensuring positions with corresponding responsibilities and powers. Without democracy, talents cannot be cultivated.” On December 13, in his speech at the closing session of the Central Working Conference, titled “Emancipate the Mind, Seek Truth from Facts, and Unite as One to Look Forward,” Deng said: “The more people who are willing to think and solve problems, the more beneficial it is for our cause. Both revolution and construction need a group of pioneers who dare to think, explore, and innovate. Without such a large group of pioneers, we cannot get rid of poverty and backwardness, nor catch up or surpass advanced international levels.” The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China was held at the Jingxi Hotel on December 18. At this plenary session, Deng criticized Mao Zedong’s political line of taking class struggle as the key link and shifted the focus of national work to economic construction. Deng criticized the “Whateverists” (who followed Mao Zedong’s words to the letter), establishing the guideline of seeking truth from facts. He negated Mao Zedong’s organizational line of “knocking down everything,” redressed the injustices of the Cultural Revolution, the campaign against the “rightist reversal,” and the Tiananmen Incident of 1976 (announced by the Beijing Municipal Committee before the end of the meeting). Politically, while negating Mao Zedong’s late-life mistakes, Deng began to reform the planned economy established during Mao’s era. At the time, no complete reform plan was set, and over the next decade, the approach was “crossing the river by feeling the stones.” On December 25, the Politburo meeting decided to establish the Central Secretariat, replacing the “Central Office” solely controlled by Wang Dongxing to handle the daily affairs of the Central Committee. Hu Yaobang was appointed as the Secretary-General of the Central Secretariat. The meeting criticized Hua Guofeng’s “Two Whatevers” and his “Great Leap Forward.” The meeting reiterated the importance of seeking truth from facts and emancipating the mind, highly praised the discussion on the criterion of truth, and proposed the implementation of the “Four Modernizations” and the most fundamental rectification of the political line, aiming to achieve a moderately prosperous society by the end of the century. The Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee had significant historical significance, marking the end of Hua Guofeng’s transitional period and the beginning of Deng’s era of reform and opening up. At this meeting, Chen Yun, Deng Yingchao, Hu Yaobang, and Wang Zhen entered the Politburo of the Central Committee, and Chen Yun was recommended as the Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. Deng later stated, “Hua Guofeng was just a transition, not a generation, as he didn’t have his own independent ideas, only the ‘Two Whatevers.’”
In principle, Deng supported expanding freedom and took a pragmatic approach. However, bearing ultimate responsibility for maintaining social order, he would quickly tighten control when doubting whether order could be maintained. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, debates like the “Xidan Democracy Wall” expanded freedom of speech. Deng encouraged more democratic discussions within the Party but decisively suppressed challenges when protesters attracted large crowds and began opposing the fundamental system. Deng wanted to allow more freedom than in Mao’s era but also wanted to establish principles defining the acceptability of political speech. He told Hu Qiaomu and Hu Yaobang to propose the Four Cardinal Principles to help delineate the boundaries of freedom.
Deng’s reform plan first implemented the “household responsibility system” in rural areas, dividing land originally belonging to “people’s communes” among thousands of households for them to farm and manage autonomously. This quickly developed the rural economy and solved the supply issues for urban and rural life. Rural reform began in 1979, reflecting a fundamental shift in rural economic form, from a “command economy” to an economy based on the “contract system.” The Chinese Communist Party no longer centered on class struggle but focused on economic construction. Deng advocated for China’s opening to the outside world. After the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, the CCP proposed implementing “special policies and flexible measures” in Guangdong and Fujian provinces to attract overseas funds and technology to accelerate China’s modernization. Deng supported establishing special economic zones to open up to the outside world. From 1979 to 1980, the CCP established four special economic zones: Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong province, and Xiamen in Fujian province. These zones were used to trial special economic policies, including attracting foreign investment and advanced technology, establishing joint ventures, and developing foreign trade. As the “chief architect,” Deng proposed achieving basic modernization in China: “By the late 1980s, double the gross national product of 1980, first solving the food and clothing problem for 1.1 billion people. By the end of the 20th century, double the gross national product again to reach a moderately prosperous level. In the third step, by the middle of the 21st century, double the gross national product again to reach the level of a moderately developed country.” He continued to oversee and formulate the overall strategy for reform and opening up, proposing the “three-step” economic development strategy suitable for China’s national conditions.
After the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, streamlining the military became part of the reform agenda. On March 30, Deng stated at the Party’s theoretical work seminar: “We need to plan and selectively introduce advanced technologies and other beneficial things from capitalist countries, but we must not learn and introduce the capitalist system or various ugly and decadent things. We need to introduce progressive and beneficial things from capitalist countries to the people, especially the youth, and criticize the reactionary and corrupt things from capitalist countries…. Without democracy, there is no socialism, no socialist modernization. The more socialism develops, the more democracy develops.” Deng emphasized not to challenge the Four Cardinal Principles: 1) The socialist road, 2) The dictatorship of the proletariat, 3) The leadership of the Communist Party, 4) Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. On October 4, Deng addressed the economic issues at a meeting of provincial, city, and autonomous region first secretaries convened by the CCP Central Committee: “Economic work is the biggest political issue now. Economic problems are overriding political issues; not only now but for a long time in the future, the focus must be on economic work. Politics means the Four Modernizations, later called Chinese-style modernization, lowering the standards. The goal of the Four Modernizations cannot be achieved by empty talk… To solve these issues, we need to think broadly and be flexible in policy. In short, use economic methods to solve political and social problems.”
On February 23, 1980, Deng chaired the Fifth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee. The meeting decided to restore Liu Shaoqi’s reputation. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang entered the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and began the construction of legal institutions. The Central Secretariat was restored, and Hu Yaobang was appointed General Secretary of the Central Secretariat. On May 17, Deng attended Liu Shaoqi’s memorial service and delivered a eulogy. In August, the Third Session of the Fifth National People’s Congress was held. During the meeting, Deng, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Chen Yun, and others resigned from their positions as vice-premiers, and Zhao Ziyang replaced Hua Guofeng as the Premier of the State Council.
In March 1981, Deng criticized Bai Hua’s writing of “Bitter Love” by name, stating that “this is an issue related to adhering to the Four Cardinal Principles.” In June, at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, Hu Yaobang succeeded Hua Guofeng as Chairman of the Central Committee. Deng personally took on the role of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the CPC.
Reform and Opening Up
At the end of 1978, Xi Zhongxun was appointed the First Secretary of the Guangdong Provincial Committee, and Yang Shangkun was appointed the Second Secretary and served as Deng’s liaison. Deng and Yang Shangkun had a special relationship, both being from Sichuan. When Deng was the General Secretary, Yang was the director of the Central Office, acting as a reliable liaison between Deng and the military. Previously, Ye Jianying had told Xi Zhongxun that to gain the sincere cooperation of people from Guangdong at home and abroad, it was necessary first to redress the cadres wronged in the early 1950s for being accused of localism. In September 1982, Yang Shangkun became the Executive Vice-Chairman and Secretary-General of the Central Military Commission.
On August 18, 1980, at an expanded meeting of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, Deng delivered a speech on the reform of the Party and State leadership system (commonly known as the “8.18 Speech”), pointing out that China must implement “political system reform,” distinct from “political reform.” The purpose of the reform was not to abolish the current socialist system but to perfect it to improve administrative efficiency and serve the “Four Modernizations,” which the outside world referred to as “administrative reform.” At this meeting, Deng proposed a comprehensive constitutional amendment to the National People’s Congress, directly leading to the later birth of the 1982 Constitution. In June 1981, under Deng’s chairmanship, the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC adopted the “Resolution on Certain Historical Issues of the Party Since the Founding of the PRC,” which had been deliberated over 18 months, involving over 4,000 participants and nine large-scale revisions. The “Resolution” established Mao Zedong’s historical position in China, noting that his leadership was consistently correct before 1957 but committed a series of “left” errors afterward, including the expansion of class struggle, rash advances in economic construction, and the “wrongful initiation” of a “civil strife exploited by counter-revolutionary groups that brought severe disaster to the Party, the country, and the people of all ethnic groups.” He emphasized the need to correct the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution and Mao’s later years, overcome personality cults, and accurately and fully evaluate Mao’s contributions to the Chinese revolution. He proposed to emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts, unite and look forward, adhere to the Four Cardinal Principles, and build socialism with Chinese characteristics. Subsequently, he proposed the concept of “One Country, Two Systems” as a solution for the Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan issues.
On November 23, 1981, Deng met with the delegation of the Workers’ Party of Korea and introduced China’s situation: there were two main issues. One was the education of young people; the influence of anarchy and extreme individualism brought by the “Cultural Revolution” was profound; solving this problem would not be easy and would take at least ten years of work, mainly through education, starting with small matters. The other was the issue of institutional reform, the biggest problem China was currently facing; now, organizations were bloated, personnel were redundant, and bureaucratism was developing rather than reducing, making it challenging to solve problems; this issue was present not only at the central and provincial levels but also in enterprises; enterprise reform should start with institutional reform; an enterprise that originally required only one thousand people had two or three thousand; now they planned to reform enterprises to have the appropriate number of people, with redundant management and other personnel being arranged for study while still receiving wages; they were starting to experiment with some methods; this would take time and require a lot of organizational work, mainly ideological work; however, everyone, regardless of their personal impact or support, had a common understanding of the universal problems; but finding the right remedy for these problems was complicated, with neither too drastic nor too mild a remedy working. On December 8, Deng met with Sir Yue-Kong Pao, Chairman of the Hongkong and Kowloon Wharf and Godown Company, and others, saying: economic construction must proceed within our capabilities and must be stable; if we genuinely achieve this, economic development may be faster; the main issues domestically were significant employment pressure, with the state needing to arrange jobs for seven to eight million people each year, and a lack of knowledge; for such a large country, just judicial personnel and economic police needed one to two million people, but they could not be trained quickly; they were considering policies to handle the Hong Kong issue, and these policies would not affect the interests of Hong Kong investors.
Since 1982, Deng focused on domestic reform. On February 20, the Central Committee passed regulations on the retirement of veteran cadres to ensure the rejuvenation, knowledgeability, and specialization of the cadres and established the “Central Advisory Commission” to accommodate these veteran cadres. Deng hoped members of the Central Advisory Commission would resign from their official positions in the Party and government; he announced that the Central Advisory Commission would only exist for 10 to 15 years; he explained that the commission was established because its members had special revolutionary experience needed for the transition period. Deng presided over the 12th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, promoting the new generation of leadership in the CCP and establishing the Central Advisory Commission, an advisory body for retired senior officials; in the autumn of 1992, the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China announced the abolition of the Central Advisory Commission, marking the complete retirement of the first generation of CCP elders. At the same time, they began to streamline institutions and reduce government staff. On August 21, 1982, Deng met with United Nations Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, explaining China’s foreign policy: some said China was belligerent, but China most desired peace; China hoped for at least twenty years without war; they faced the task of development and overcoming backwardness. On September 12, Deng attended the First Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC, elected as a member of the Central Political Bureau and the Standing Committee of the Central Political Bureau, with the meeting deciding that Deng would serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission; Hu Yaobang was appointed General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Zhao Ziyang was appointed Premier of the State Council. On September 13, Deng was elected Director of the Central Advisory Commission at its first plenary session.
On May 22, 1983, Deng met with a delegation from the government of Mauritius, stating that they were now separating the economy and politics in rural areas, but during implementation, they needed to conduct thorough experiments and proceed gradually; all places that had conducted experiments proved that the separation of government and community was correct. In October, at the Second Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee of the CPC, Deng emphasized that the “ideological front should not engage in spiritual pollution” and issued instructions to clean up pollution, leading to a “Clean Up Spiritual Pollution” campaign, mainly led by Hu Qiaomu, Deng Liqun, and Wang Zhen. Deng, concerned that continued criticism of the right would lead to a resurgence of leftist tendencies, severely impacting the imminent urban economic system reform, ended the clean-up campaign in May 1984.
In 1984, Deng analyzed and judged the development trends of the then international strategic landscape and surrounding situation, proposing that the world’s mainstream was “peace and development,” and put forward the policy of “opposing hegemony” and “China does not seek to lead,” as part of the strategy of keeping a low profile in foreign policy. At the same time, he guided a strategic shift in military construction, stating that the military should make way for economic construction, announcing that the Chinese military would reduce its personnel by one million, vigorously promoting talent training among soldiers, and significantly shutting down military industries and transitioning them to civilian use. Although Deng made some progress in adjusting the defense industry and military enterprises in the 1980s, the process of transferring military enterprises from inland to coastal areas, overcoming bureaucratic styles, and improving personnel levels would still take many years to complete. Regardless of the benefits of military commercialization, mixing the military with private interests created opportunities for corruption and greed, deviating from the military’s spirit of dedication to its mission. Opponent Zhang Aiping once said, “If the military is keen on doing business, it will inevitably lead to corruption, akin to self-destructing the Great Wall.” On October 1, during the National Day parade, students from Peking University displayed a banner saying “Hello, Xiaoping.”
In September 1985, the National Representative Meeting of the Communist Party of China was held, during which 56 central committee members and 35 central committee alternate members were added. Among these newly added members were Hu Jintao, Wu Bangguo, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, He Guoqiang, Liu Yunshan, who later became Standing Committee members of the Politburo of the Central Committee.
On April 4, 1986, Deng Xiaoping, during a meeting with Yugoslav Federal Executive Council Chairman Veljko Vlahović, stated: “We have summed up the experience that we need to open up to the outside world, break the self-imposed isolation, and invigorate the internal economy to mobilize the enthusiasm of the people nationwide. Otherwise, productivity cannot develop. Engaging in egalitarianism and ‘big pot rice’ will forever prevent improvements in people’s lives and will fail to mobilize enthusiasm. On September 3, Deng discussed the urgency of political system reform, stating: “Every step forward in economic reform deeply highlights the necessity of political reform. Without reforming the political system, we cannot ensure the results of economic reform, nor continue its progress, and it will hinder the development of productivity and the achievement of the Four Modernizations.” On September 13, Deng pointed out that the goal of political reform is to “mobilize the enthusiasm of the masses, improve efficiency, and overcome bureaucratism. … The first is to separate the party from the government, solving the issue of how well the party can lead. This is key and should be prioritized. The second is to decentralize power, addressing the relationship between central and local authorities, as well as decentralization at all local levels. The third is to streamline institutions, which is related to decentralization.” On September 18, the “Central Political System Reform Research Group” was established, with members including Zhao Ziyang, Hu Qili, Tian Jiyun, Bo Yibo, and Peng Chong.
At the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, held from October 25 to November 1, 1987, Deng resigned from all party and government positions and no longer served as a Standing Committee member of the Politburo, but retained the positions of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China and the Chairman of the National Military Commission. Chen Yun was allowed to replace Deng as the Director of the Central Advisory Commission, while front-line work was handed over to Zhao Ziyang. Deng no longer served as Director of the Central Advisory Commission.
Foreign Relations
On the foreign front, on May 21, 1978, Deng met with US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, who later said: “Deng Xiaoping immediately fascinated me. He was shrewd and alert, with a strong understanding and a good sense of humor; he was resolute and straightforward.”
In October 1978, Deng continued his visit to Japan. Deng was the first Chinese leader to set foot on Japanese soil in 2,200 years of Sino-Japanese interactions. He expressed that despite the unfortunate history of the 20th century, the two countries had a history of over two thousand years of friendly exchanges and hoped to look forward to a future of friendly relations. The Japanese were deeply moved, acknowledging Japan’s aggression had caused significant disasters for China and wished to express their apology and extend a hand of friendship. Deng, with a spirit of reconciliation, hoped the two peoples could live together in a new era of peace and friendship. Deng arrived in Japan on October 19 and participated in the exchange of ratification documents for the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty with Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo on October 23.
In November 1978, Deng visited Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore. On December 16, China and the US officially announced the establishment of diplomatic relations.
From January 28 to February 5, 1979, Deng visited the United States, marking the first visit by a Chinese leader to the US since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. During the visit, Deng toured NASA and met with President Jimmy Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and others in Washington to discuss the normalization of Sino-US relations. During the visit, Deng tested their attitude toward China’s aggression against Vietnam.
On February 4, 1979, Deng returned to China. On February 17, China launched counterattacks against Vietnam on the Yunnan-Guangxi border, sparking the Sino-Vietnamese War. With a large and determined army, China indeed captured five provincial capitals. After capturing Lang Son on March 6, China immediately declared victory and began withdrawing its troops while attempting to destroy Vietnam’s infrastructure during the retreat.
Sino-British Hong Kong Handover Negotiations
On March 29, 1979, Deng met with Hong Kong Governor Murray MacLehose and clearly stated that after China reclaims Hong Kong in 1997, Hong Kong can continue to practice capitalism.
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher arrived in Beijing on September 22, 1982, shortly after her victory in the Falklands War. On September 24, she held discussions with Deng in Beijing about the future of Hong Kong. She insisted that according to the Treaty of Nanking, the Treaty of Beijing, and the 1898 Convention for the Extension of Hong Kong’s Boundaries, Britain had sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and the Kowloon Peninsula, but Deng clearly stated that there was no room for compromise on sovereignty. Before leaving China, Thatcher said in an interview with the BBC, “If one party to a treaty or agreement says, ‘I disagree, and I intend to breach it,’ then it’s hard to believe they will respect a new treaty.”
After the 12th round of negotiations, British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe flew to Beijing and met with Deng on April 18, 1984, for a two-hour discussion. Geoffrey Howe publicly admitted upon leaving Beijing for Hong Kong that “it is unrealistic to reach an agreement that allows Britain to continue governing Hong Kong after 1997.” On April 25, Deng met with representatives from Hong Kong and Macau at the East Building of the Great Hall of the People and held a press conference. Deng said: “The statements on Hong Kong by the central government, including me and Zhao Ziyang, and Director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office Ji Pengfei are official. Huang Hua and Geng Biao’s so-called non-stationary military presence in Hong Kong is simply nonsense.” On September 26, British Ambassador to China, Sir Percy Cradock, and Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Zhou Nan formally signed the final documents.
On December 18, 1984, Thatcher flew to Beijing and signed the Sino-British Joint Declaration with Zhao Ziyang in a brief ceremony on the following day.
On April 24, 1986, Deng met with prominent Hong Kong figures An Ziji and Chao Ji-min, saying: “Many Hong Kong people advocate making the Basic Law very detailed; it is not good if it is too detailed, as the more detailed it is, the harder it is to manage. You need to see how things will develop. Overall, there is no reason to change our policy; changing it would be detrimental to us, and Hong Kong would become a burden to the country. How can we support the lives of millions of people? It is not feasible to rely on the state to support it; it cannot be changed.”
In 1987, Deng attended the fourth plenary meeting of the Basic Law Drafting Committee and made a speech saying: “I have three shortcomings: drinking, spitting, and smoking.”
On January 18, 1990, Deng told Li Ka-shing: “The real way to stabilize Hong Kong is first to ensure that the mainland’s policy remains unchanged, and second to strengthen Chinese capital and reach a consensus with the domestic side, including recommending talented people to manage Hong Kong. It is necessary to have capable people managing Hong Kong to stabilize the situation. Patriotism means loving the whole of China, including Hong Kong. How to gather this force and in what form, should be considered.” On February 20, Deng met with Henry Fok and said: “We need to talk about history to future generations. Everyone must have a belief. Without a belief, we cannot unite or move forward, only complain and be discouraged. This is not acceptable.”
Issues During Reform
In the early 1980s, with increasing urbanization and population mobility, a large number of criminal gangs emerged, and various economic crimes began to surface. At that time, China’s legal system was still in its early stages of development (the Cultural Revolution had destroyed traditional moral order and legal concepts), and starting from 1983, Deng advocated for a strict crackdown on criminal activities.
Deng maintained the regime’s rule with an iron fist. On issues of Sino-Soviet and Sino-US relations, Deng felt significant pressure from both leftists and rightists. With China’s opening up, the Chinese people began to come into contact with Western democratic and human rights ideas. Rightists advocated expanding reforms to the political field, which Deng publicly criticized as “bourgeois liberalization” and insisted that Western political systems should not be copied; instead, China should continue along the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics. He asserted that what China needed most was social stability, stating that “Implementing bourgeois liberalization means going through another round of turmoil”; the left emphasizes that reforms should be limited and return to the Soviet model of that time.
In 1983, Deng Xiaoping pointed out at the 2nd Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee that strengthening Marxist leadership was necessary to overcome liberalism. In May 1985, Deng said that bourgeois liberalization was a path to bourgeois ways. Bourgeois liberalization means “worshipping the ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ of Western capitalist countries and denying socialism.”
At the 6th Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee on September 28, 1986, Deng made a severe speech against bourgeois liberalization: “Opposing ‘bourgeois liberalization’ is something I talk about the most and insist on the most. Liberalization actually aims to guide our current Chinese policies towards a capitalist path. Implementing liberalization will disrupt our stable and united political situation.” On December 4, 1986, after Fang Lizhi’s speech at the University of Science and Technology of China, large-scale student protests erupted. In response to the intense student unrest, Deng Xiaoping convened Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, Hu Qili, and Li Peng on December 30 to oppose bourgeois liberalization and criticize them for failing to quell the unrest: “Student protests, though significant, are not major issues in themselves, but given the nature of the problems, they are very serious events. … Wherever protests arise, it is because the local leadership is not clear in its stance and firm in its attitude. This is not just an issue in one or two places, nor is it a problem of one or two years; it is the result of several years of unclear stance and indecisive attitude against bourgeois liberalization.” Deng then issued instructions to oppose “bourgeois liberalization”: “We cannot do without dictatorship means. Not only should we talk about these means, but we must use them if necessary. Of course, they should be used cautiously, and arrests should be minimized. But if someone tries to create bloodshed, what can we do? Our policy is to first expose their conspiracy, avoid bloodshed as much as possible, and handle those leading the unrest according to the law. Without this resolve, we cannot stop this event. If we do not take measures, we will retreat and face more trouble in the future.” Due to Hu Yaobang’s sympathy towards the ideologies challenging the status quo of bourgeois liberalization, he was removed from his position as General Secretary.
In January 1987, after criticizing Hu Yaobang, the Central Political Bureau accepted his resignation from the position of General Secretary of the Communist Party of China but retained his position as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee; the Politburo also expelled a batch of party intellectuals engaged in “liberalization” activities from the party; by the end of January, the prolonged student unrest finally subsided. Hu Yaobang realized he had to take responsibility for the “indecisive attitude” and knew it was time to submit his resignation. Hu Yaobang’s position as General Secretary was succeeded by Zhao Ziyang, another assistant to Deng Xiaoping, and the economically conservative Li Peng was appointed as Premier of the State Council. Between April and May 1987, when Deng noticed that the “conservative” forces within the party were attempting to use the anti-bourgeois liberalization movement to attack the entire reform and opening-up route, he publicly stated, “To achieve the Four Modernizations … we need to focus on opposing the ’left,’ because our past mistakes were due to the ’left,’” and “We face both ’left’ and ‘right’ interference, but the greatest danger is still the ’left.’” Deng then reaffirmed the importance of reform and opening-up, stating that “the left is the primary danger” and insisted on continuing reforms. Deng decisively ended the anti-bourgeois liberalization movement and prevented a leftist resurgence; from May, the rhetoric of reform and opening-up soared.
In 1988, Deng’s economic advisors warned that the timing for price reform was not right because, under inflationary pressure, many goods were in short supply. In 1988, the official retail price index was 18.5% higher than in 1987, and the retail price index for the second half of 1988 increased by 26% compared to the previous year.
1989 Tiananmen Incident
In the spring of 1989, China experienced social unrest. On April 15, Hu Yaobang passed away. Beijing students, mourning Hu Yaobang, presented political ideals and demands to the National People’s Congress representatives and Premier Li Peng. The student unrest resurfaced and quickly spread to major cities such as Xi’an and Changsha. On April 16, about 800 students marched to Tiananmen Square and laid wreaths at the Monument to the People’s Heroes; the police did not intervene with the mourners coming from universities. The movement then spread to society, and the situation took a rapid downturn.
On April 24, the day after Zhao Ziyang’s visit to North Korea, the Central Politburo Standing Committee decided to classify the student movement as “turmoil.” On April 26, the People’s Daily published an editorial titled “We Must Clearly Oppose Turmoil” based on this decision. However, Deng was disappointed as the result was the opposite of what was intended; the student leaders not only did not retreat but also became more resolute and mobilized more students. On May 13, thousands of Beijing students went on hunger strike in Tiananmen Square in anticipation of Soviet reformist leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit, aiming to pressure the central government to form a pressure group. Despite Zhao Ziyang’s advice to students to exercise restraint to avoid disrupting the Sino-Soviet summit, student emotions grew more intense, and they rejected all compromise proposals. Due to mutual distrust and lack of rationality, the failed interactions between the students and the authorities led to an uncontrollable situation. On May 15, Gorbachev arrived in Beijing; on May 16, Zhao Ziyang publicly stated during a meeting with Gorbachev, “On the most important issues, it is still necessary for Comrade Deng Xiaoping to steer the course”; on May 17, over a million people marched in Beijing to support the hunger strike, with many directing their anger at Deng. The State Council decided to impose martial law in parts of Beijing starting from May 20 to ensure social stability and restore normal order. On the afternoon of June 3, Qiao Shi held an emergency meeting to discuss the final plan for clearing the square; Yang Shangkun submitted the plan to Deng, who immediately approved it. Even after using live ammunition and lethal weapons against fellow citizens, it took the army about 4 hours to travel the 4-mile route from Muxidi to Tiananmen. This shocking event became known as the “June Fourth Tiananmen Incident.” Deng proposed the “Sixteen Character Policy” of “observe calmly, maintain stability, respond with composure, and keep a low profile,” leading the Communist Party through the crisis.
Deng met with senior officers of the martial law troops in the capital and said, “This turmoil was bound to come sooner or later. It was determined by the international climate and China’s own small climate; it was bound to come … and now, it is more advantageous for us. The most advantageous thing is that we have a large number of old comrades still alive … They support taking resolute action against the riots. Although some comrades do not understand it for the time being, they will eventually understand and support the central decision.” Deng said, “The basic point of reform and opening-up … is not wrong. Without reform and opening-up, how could we have today? … What should we do in the future? I said we should continue to follow the original basic route, principles, and policies, and persist firmly.” Due to Zhao Ziyang’s sympathy for the “June Fourth Movement,” he was removed from his position as General Secretary. Deng decided not to choose a successor from the existing Beijing leadership but instead summoned Jiang Zemin, the then-Secretary of the Shanghai Municipal Committee, to become General Secretary of the Communist Party. It is reported that while Deng was considering who to succeed Zhao, Li Xiannian and Chen Yun repeatedly recommended Jiang Zemin, saying Jiang was a good cadre who adhered to the “two basic points” and advocated for his transfer to the central government; Deng quickly accepted their recommendation. On June 23-24, the 4th Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee convened and decided to remove Zhao from all his positions; Jiang was elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. From then on, Jiang was confirmed as the core of the third generation of leadership of the Communist Party.
Retirement
On May 31, 1989, Deng Xiaoping, in a statement on “Forming a Promising Leadership Team for Reform,” said: “… A good team, a team for reform and opening-up, must clearly do a few things about openness. Whenever there is an opportunity, we must seize it, insist, and act to reflect reform and opening-up. I have previously said that we need to create several more ‘Hong Kongs,’ meaning we need to open up and cannot retract; we must be more open than before. Without openness, we cannot develop. We have limited resources, but through openness, we can increase employment, boost taxes, make some money from land, stimulate development in various industries, increase fiscal revenue, and gain benefits. Hong Kong is a good example for us. Without Hong Kong, at least our information would not be so timely.
In summary, reform and opening up need to be bolder. On April 4, Deng [wrote a letter to the Political Bureau of the Central Committee], requesting to resign from the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Communist Party of China (CPC). On November 8, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee, the 85-year-old Deng announced his retirement. On November 9, the Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th Central Committee agreed to Deng’s resignation from the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Jiang Zemin, who was then the General Secretary of the CPC, took over. On March 21, 1990, Deng retired after resigning from the position of Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China at the Third Session of the Seventh National People’s Congress, with Jiang taking over. However, he remained the spiritual leader of the CPC.
Later Years
On September 4, 1989, Deng [stated, “The stability of the reform and opening-up policy brings great hope”]：“Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are chaotic, which seems inevitable. As for how chaotic it will become, it is hard to predict now; we need to observe calmly,” mainly because they failed to implement economic reforms. Therefore, if China wants to avoid the same fate, it must continue along the path of reform and opening up.
When Deng’s special train departed Beijing Station on January 17, 1992, other leaders in Beijing and the southern cadres responsible for receiving him only knew that Deng and his wife, along with their four children (Deng Zhifang did not accompany them), their spouses, and children—17 people in total—were going out for a leisure trip and “family vacation.” In the spring of 1992, Deng inspected Wuchang, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shanghai. Relying on his past prestige, Deng gave a series of speeches as an ordinary party member during the inspection, emphasizing the importance of economic construction, criticizing those who doubted the reform and opening up, and clearly stating that “left” elements are more frightening for China than “right” elements. Deng also specifically pointed out that the current primary task was to guard against “left” elements: “Now, there are influences from ‘right’ elements on us, and there are also influences from ’left’ elements on us, but the deeply rooted issue is still ’left’ elements. … The right can ruin socialism, and the ’left’ can also ruin socialism. China needs to be cautious of the right, but mainly prevent the ’left.’ … Describing reform and opening up as introducing and developing capitalism and thinking that the main danger of peaceful evolution comes from the economic field—that is the ’left.’” During the “Southern Tour,” Deng raised the issue of the socialist market economy, stating: “Market economy is not equivalent to capitalism, socialism also has markets,” “Whether there is more planning or more market is not a fundamental difference between socialism and capitalism. Planned economy is not equivalent to socialism, capitalism also has plans; market economy is not equivalent to capitalism, socialism also has markets. Planning and market are both economic means,” “Avoiding disputes is one of my inventions. Avoiding disputes is to save time for work. Disputes complicate things, consuming all the time and achieving nothing. Avoid disputes, try boldly, and venture boldly. Rural reform was like this, and urban reform should be too.” On January 27, Deng, during an inspection of Zhuhai Jianghai Electronics Co., Ltd., said: “In Europe, welfare societies, which are shouldered by the state and society, are no longer feasible; with more elderly people and an aging population, the state and society cannot bear it, and the problem will only grow; we still need to maintain family support; the number of elderly people across the country is supported by individual households; Chinese culture, since Confucius, has advocated caring for the elderly.”
As media across the country published support for reform and opening up, and Yang Shangkun, who accompanied Deng on the southern tour, began to promote Deng’s southern tour speeches in the military, the Central Committee of the CPC organized the key points of the southern tour speeches at the end of February 1992 and issued them to all party members as Document No. 2 of the Central Committee of the CPC in February 1992. This marked the end of the three-and-a-half-year “governance and rectification” and sparked a new round of economic enthusiasm.
Shortly after Deng’s southern tour, a “doubling” craze swept the country; the so-called “doubling” referred to the pursuit of high-speed growth in local GDP or industrial output. After more than a decade of economic reforms, from rural to urban areas, despite experiencing several fluctuations, China finally stepped into the market economy. In October 1992, the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China was held amidst a “Deng Wind” atmosphere nationwide. Jiang pointed out at the meeting: “The goal of economic system reform is to establish a socialist market economy system”; since “socialism” and “market economy” are contradictory opposites in historical materialism, the 14th Congress established the concept of “socialist market economy,” reflecting that the CPC had broken free from the constraints of traditional Marxism; in practical terms, the 14th Congress marked the victory of the market reform faction—the CPC henceforth defined the roles of “planning” and “market” in economic development based on their different “functions,” rather than viewing “planning” and “market” as “main” and “secondary” roles. In other words, “planning” no longer played the leading role in economic development; it was merely to set strategic goals for macro-social and economic development. The 14th Congress can be seen as an important milestone for China’s move towards a market economy.
The “Deng Wind” of 1992 reactivated China’s economy, which had been stagnant for over three years, and made significant strides toward a market economy. However, due to the failure to establish market regulations in time and the government’s inability to formulate effective economic control measures promptly, China experienced economic overheating and financial disorder between 1992 and 1993. Deng’s ideological concepts and political guidelines, known as the “Deng Xiaoping Theory,” continued to be implemented. He was officially praised as the “chief architect of reform and opening up and socialist modernization in China,” but he himself said that reform was actually “crossing the river by feeling the stones.”
According to official reports, October 31, 1993, was Deng’s last public appearance. He took a ride on the newly completed Beijing subway, exploring half of old Beijing with great interest.
Due to health reasons, Deng stopped handling national affairs from 1994. Chen Yun also underwent major surgery in August 1994 and passed away in April 1995. By this point, China’s “dual peak political” pattern had officially collapsed.
Death
On December 12, 1996, Deng was hospitalized in the South Building of the General Hospital of the People’s Liberation Army due to respiratory disease. CCTV’s Channel 1 began airing the biographical documentary “Deng Xiaoping” on January 1, 1997. Deng, who was in the late stages of Parkinson’s disease at the time, watched all 12 episodes of the documentary in his hospital room. In late February 1997, before the Spring Festival, Deng, whose condition had slightly stabilized, conveyed his New Year’s greetings to people of all ethnic groups in the country to Jiang Zemin, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and expressed his hope that the two major tasks of “restoring sovereignty over Hong Kong this year and convening the 15th Party Congress” would be handled well under Jiang’s leadership. On February 15, Deng’s wife, Zhuo Lin, and children wrote a letter to Jiang Zemin, conveying Deng Xiaoping’s final wishes. On February 19 at 21:08, Deng Xiaoping passed away at the age of 92, due to Parkinson’s syndrome and pulmonary infection. On February 20, in accordance with the United Nations 1947 flag etiquette, the UN headquarters lowered the flag to half-mast, and the UN General Assembly observed a moment of silence. His hearse was a Toyota Coaster with double rear doors. As per Deng’s wishes, his corneas were donated for ophthalmic research, and his organs were donated for medical research. On March 2, his ashes were scattered at sea. With Deng’s passing, China entered the post-Deng Xiaoping era.
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