Chen Yun's Three Statements:Shaping China's Political and Economic Landscape

Chen Yun, a veteran of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) who started his career as an apprentice at the Commercial Press, is famous for his “three statements”: “The Chinese are easy to govern; they won’t rebel even if they starve to death”; “State power must be passed on to our children”; “China cannot establish a press law.” These remarks reflect his profound influence on Chinese policy and his harsh attitude towards the people. The planned economy and the policy of unified purchase and sale that he implemented subjected Chinese farmers to long-term exploitation, with the tragic lessons of the three-year famine becoming part of history. Chen Yun’s policies not only impacted China’s economy but also shaped the phenomenon of familial control in Chinese politics.

Author: Fenglin Mantan

For ease of reading, the editors of this website have made appropriate modifications without altering the original meaning. It is also stated that this article represents the author’s views, and this website only serves as a platform to present them so that readers can gain a comprehensive understanding of historical truths!

Chen Yun, a veteran of the CCP who rose from an apprentice at the Commercial Press, is known for his “three statements.” He said, “The Chinese are easy to govern; they won’t rebel even if they starve to death; state power must be passed on to our children, so they won’t desecrate our graves; China cannot establish a press law.” The policies based on his thinking still influence China today.

Many online believe that Chen Yun was even worse than Kang Sheng. Kang Sheng mainly targeted people within the CCP, while Chen Yun’s policies targeted hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese. The planned economy and the unified purchase and sale policy that Chen Yun implemented in China for over thirty years subjected Chinese farmers and rural areas to severe government exploitation, leaving the farmers impoverished.

Next, please follow us as we delve into Chen Yun’s life and how his policies profoundly influenced China.

Chen Yun’s Famous Quotes and Influence

On November 29, 1937, 32-year-old Chen Yun arrived at Yan’an Airport from Dihua (now Urumqi), Xinjiang, along with Wang Ming, Kang Sheng, and others returning from Moscow, Soviet Union. Yan’an in winter was dry and cold, with sandstorms blowing from the north. Mao Zedong and other central leaders of the CCP braved the cold wind to greet Wang Ming, the favorite of the Comintern. After disembarking from the plane, Chen Yun saw Mao Zedong wearing a sleepless cap, and he hurriedly took off his own fur hat and placed it on Mao’s head, giving Mao a sense of warmth. This gesture left a deep impression on those present, showing that Chen Yun was adept at flattering.

A few days later, Mao Zedong appointed Chen Yun as the Minister of Organization of the CCP Central Committee, a crucial position he held for seven years.

Nowadays, many people, especially overseas Chinese, are unaware of what beneficial things Chen Yun, as an old revolutionary of the CCP, did for the Chinese people. They only know that his three statements caused great harm to the Chinese people:

“The Chinese are easy to govern; they won’t rebel even if they starve to death.”

“State power must be passed on to our children so that our own children take over, and at least they won’t desecrate our graves.”

“China cannot establish a press law. The Kuomintang under Chiang Kai-shek implemented a press law and did a decent job, but the loopholes were exploited by us communists, and the result was that they were driven to Taiwan. Our Party must control the press.”

Experts analyzing Chen Yun’s first statement, “The Chinese are easy to govern; they won’t rebel even if they starve to death,” suggest that Chen Yun advocated for the continued deprivation of basic rights such as food, housing, migration, travel, and wealth accumulation to ensure the long-term rule of the red families. By constantly depriving the people of these rights through policy, while occasionally granting them small favors like squeezing toothpaste, the people would be grateful. This would ensure the red dynasty’s perpetuation. If this is true, it is nothing short of the notorious “tricks of the merchant,” a strategy for keeping the populace ignorant.

The strategy involved the following:

1. Keep the people ignorant, so they lack independent thought and are easier to govern.
2. Weaken the people so that a strong state can maintain control without fear of rebellion.
3. Keep the people exhausted, so they are too preoccupied with survival to care about politics or their rights.
4. Humiliate the people, stripping them of self-respect and confidence, and encouraging them to inform on each other, living in constant fear.
5. Impoverish the people, making them dependent on the state and easier to govern.

If these methods failed, the people could be killed.

It can be said that Chen Yun’s approach of keeping the populace ignorant was consistent with the poisonous planned economy and unified purchase and sale policies that affected millions of farmers. From the early years of CCP rule, Chen Yun’s so-called unified purchase and sale policy was a planned economic policy that tightly controlled agricultural resources like grain, cotton, and oil. Starting in 1953, the government implemented grain procurement in rural areas and rationed grain in cities, a policy that lasted for over 30 years.

China’s arable land accounts for only 7% of the world’s total, while its population accounts for 22%. This is one of the few countries in the world where land is too precious to raise large numbers of livestock. The Chinese people have little meat and dairy to eat, and their primary source of protein may come from soybeans, vegetable oil, eggs, and pork. The staple foods are rice and wheat, and grain has traditionally relied on imports. But Chen Yun, who was in charge of the economy, insisted that China should export grain, especially rice, to earn foreign exchange.

Chen Yun’s Planned Economy and Political Strategy

In 1953, Chen Yun ordered the Ministry of Foreign Trade, Grain, Soybeans, and Vegetable Oil to squeeze out all available resources for export. The following year, he issued another order, stating that certain commodities like meat should have their domestic sales curtailed to ensure exports. Other commodities, like fruits, tea, and various local products, should be exported first, with any surplus then being sold on the domestic market. The foreign exchange earned was to be used for two purposes: supporting world revolution by exporting the revolution and planting the red flag worldwide; and importing luxury goods like cars from abroad for the enjoyment of CCP high officials. At that time, the No. 34 Special Supply Department of the Beijing Food Supply Office and the Special Needs Department on the fourth floor of the Beijing Department Store were places where high-end imported goods were provided to CCP officials.

Chen Yun’s unified purchase and sale policy, a planned economy policy, subjected Chinese rural areas and farmers to brutal government exploitation from the 1950s to the 1980s, leaving farmers destitute. During the three-year famine, more than 30 million people starved to death in rural China. In addition to the Great Leap Forward and exaggerated reports, the unified purchase and sale policy was the main culprit. Mao Zedong praised Chen Yun’s unified purchase and sale policy, saying that it helped the CCP tightly control China’s hundreds of millions of farmers.

In early November, Wan Li, the Party Secretary of Anhui Province, went to the revolutionary base area of the Dabie Mountains for an investigation. When he arrived at the Yanzihe Commune in Jinzhai County, the car couldn’t drive in, so Wan Li had to get out of the car and ask local cadres to lead the way on foot. During the journey, he came across a dilapidated thatched house, and because it was too dark inside, it took him a while to realize that there was an old man and two girls sitting in a pile of firewood by the lonely stove. He warmly greeted them: “Old man, it’s already past eight o’clock, why are you still sitting in the firewood and not going to work?” The old man remained motionless.

The local cadre, embarrassed, scolded the old man: “You old fool, Secretary Wan Li is here asking you something, why don’t you speak?” Only then did the old man look up dumbly at Wan Li. Suddenly, the old man stood up, and Wan Li was shocked to see that the old man was completely naked. Wan Li quickly told the old man to squat back in the firewood and awkwardly asked the two girls, “Why are you two girls squatting there too?” The two teenage girls looked at Wan Li with shy curiosity but remained motionless.

The local cadre then realized what was happening and whispered, “Secretary Wan, the two children don’t have any pants to wear. The mountain wind is cold, so they’re hiding in the firewood to stay warm.” Wan Li couldn’t bear to see any more, hurriedly turned around, and left. Standing in the cold mountain wind, he couldn’t help but shed tears.

Later, when Wan Li visited another household, he saw that the house was also empty, with the doors and windows made of mud bricks, and there was no wooden furniture in sight. In the middle of the room sat a middle-aged woman in ragged clothes, and Wan Li asked about her situation: “How many people are in your family?” The middle-aged woman replied, “Five, my husband and I, and three children.” Wan Li asked, “Where’s your husband?” The woman said, “He’s out working.” Wan Li asked, “Where are the three children? Have they gone out to play? Please call them back so I can see them.” The woman looked embarrassed and refused to go out to find them.

Wan Li felt something was strange. After repeatedly urging, the middle-aged woman finally walked straight to the stove and reluctantly lifted the lid. Wan Li discovered that three naked children were huddled inside the stove. The stove, having recently been used for cooking, still retained some warmth, and the three children, who had no clothes to wear, were taking refuge from the cold inside. After leaving this thatched hut, Wan Li was already in tears. The poverty and hardship experienced by Chinese farmers from the 1950s to the 1980s were directly caused by Chen Yun’s planned economy and the policy of unified purchase and sale. This was Chen Yun’s greatest “contribution” to the Chinese people.

In the second half of 1958, the primary task of the Communist Party of China was to take the first step in surpassing the United Kingdom and catching up with the United States by producing 10.7 million tons of steel. With only four months left until the end of the year, and only 4.5 million tons of steel produced in the first eight months, how could more than 6 million tons be produced in the remaining four months? Chen Yun suggested to Mao Zedong to mobilize the masses to build small furnaces. As a result, on August 17, 1958, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China adopted a resolution at the Politburo expanded meeting in Beidaihe, calling on the entire party and nation to strive for the production of 10.7 million tons of steel. This led to an unprecedented scene in China: the whole nation engaged in a massive steel-making campaign, wasting resources and labor, cutting down forests, and even breaking pots to smelt iron, but all that was produced was scrap iron.

In 1948, when Lin Biao’s forces were attacking Changchun and failed to capture it after nine attempts, Chen Yun came up with a vicious plan: to besiege the city with a population of 500,000 without attacking, cutting off food supplies and preventing anyone from leaving. From May 30 to September 11, 1948, in these 105 days, at least 120,000 people starved to death in Changchun, according to official figures, with the actual number being even higher. Lin Biao, still a man of some humanity, after besieging the city for a while and seeing that many civilians had already died, couldn’t bear it anymore. He sent a telegram to Mao Zedong, stating that the Communist Party’s slogan was to serve the people, but what they were doing now contradicted this slogan. He pointed out that ordinary soldiers carrying out the blockade were finding it difficult to understand and do their ideological work and asked if the Central Committee could allow the people of Changchun to escape.

According to previous practices, when Lin Biao sent a telegram to Mao Zedong, if Mao agreed, he would reply. If there was no reply, it meant Mao did not agree. This time, Mao did not reply. Lin Biao had no choice but to continue the siege. Unable to continue watching the people of Changchun starve to death, the Nationalist commanders defending Changchun, Zheng Dongguo and Li Hong, had no choice but to surrender, and the Communist forces entered Changchun. By this time, only 170,000 residents of Changchun were left.

After Lin Biao’s death in a plane crash in Wudulun Khan, Mongolia, Chen Yun proudly remarked, “If everything had been done according to Lin Biao’s wishes, we would never have captured the Northeast.” Just based on the policies of nationwide unified purchase and sale and the starvation tactics in Changchun, people have every reason to believe that Chen Yun was a hundred times more evil than Kang Sheng. Kang Sheng was merely Mao Zedong’s enforcer, harming only people within the Communist Party’s ranks. However, all of Chen Yun’s vicious schemes directly harmed hundreds of millions of Chinese civilians. His treachery and malice far exceeded Mao Zedong’s.

After the Cultural Revolution, when it came time to settle scores with the rebels, Hu Yaobang advocated leniency, arguing that these grassroots fishermen were merely pawns used by the Cultural Revolution group and, as long as they had no blood debts, they should be let off the hook. But Chen Yun resolutely opposed this, insisting that none of them be spared and that they be ruthlessly suppressed. He believed that once these people regained power, they would dig up the graves of the Communist Party’s senior officials. Deng Xiaoping, who detested the Cultural Revolution because it had crippled his son Deng Pufang, agreed with Chen Yun on this issue. Deng argued that even the high-ranking officials’ children who had rebelled during the Cultural Revolution and persecuted those in power should be held accountable. Of course, exceptions were made for children of senior officials like Bo Xilai and Song Binbin, but those whose parents were provincial or city-level leaders and had blood debts had to be punished and never allowed to enter politics.

Chen Yun and the Consequences of Chinese Politics

However, Chen Yun strongly opposed Deng Xiaoping’s stance, arguing that all the children of senior officials should be protected, regardless of how many people they had killed or how much destruction they had caused, because they were the children of the Communist Party’s senior leaders. He insisted that they not only be physically protected but also politically protected. No one was allowed to bring up their crimes during the Cultural Revolution, and their actions had to be covered up. Not only should they be protected politically, but they should also be allowed to enter politics and become successors because their children could be trusted not to dig up the graves of the Communist Party’s founders. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang could serve as transitional leaders, but after the old guard passed away, the second-generation reds should take over.

Deng Xiaoping was wary of the children of senior officials, allowing them to emigrate or tacitly permitting them to engage in business within China, as long as they stayed out of politics. But Chen Yun strongly resisted this. After the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989, Chen Yun bluntly stated, “It seems that our children are still reliable; they won’t dig up our graves. We fought for this country, so it should be inherited by our descendants.” He also proposed that each family of cadres at the provincial level and above should have one child enter the third tier of leadership, while other children should go into business to accumulate wealth, ensuring a smooth transition of power to the second and third generations of the red nobility.

For example, Zhou Enlai’s adopted son Li Peng, Xi Zhongxun’s son Xi Jinping, Bo Yibo’s son Bo Xilai, Liu Shaoqi’s son Liu Yuan, Li Weihan’s son Li Tieyin, Yu Qiwei’s son Yu Zhengsheng, Zeng Shan’s son Zeng Qinghong, Yao Yilin’s son-in-law Wang Qishan, Ye Jianying’s son Ye Xuanping, Deng Xiaoping’s son Deng Pufang and daughter Deng Nan, Wang Zhen’s son Wang Jun, Li Peng’s son Li Xiaopeng, Ulanfu’s son Buhe, and so on, all entered politics. Local officials followed suit, forming complex and entrenched family-based power groups that monopolized and inherited the political power of the entire nation, controlling the economic lifeblood of China and dividing the country among themselves. Whenever a new and profitable sector emerged, these princelings would be the first to seize it. For example, during the three-year pandemic, the red families controlled nucleic acid testing and vaccine production and sales.

This system of power-sharing has become a new burden oppressing the Chinese people. The entangled roots of the princelings in China’s political and economic spheres have made it impossible to address corruption through normal legal channels. This has become a cancer in China’s development, preventing any meaningful social reform.

Chen Yun’s policy of appointing second-generation reds to government positions effectively tied all the princelings together on the same boat, even if their fathers had once fought to the death for power. For example, Liu Shaoqi’s son Liu Yuan, who had suffered the most during the Cultural Revolution and had a deep-seated hatred for Mao Zedong, completely changed his tune once he entered the third tier of leadership, going from being anti-Mao to pro-Mao.

When the Cultural Revolution had just ended, Liu Yuan was admitted to Beijing Normal College. In the early 1980s, during the campus democracy movement, he was a leading figure, running for people’s representative. He once described the Cultural Revolution like this: “In thousands of dark nights, my heart bled and cried every hour. I gritted my teeth to keep from going insane. Why? To see the day when truth would triumph over evil.” Given Liu Yuan’s status, from being a prince to suddenly becoming a dog, his suffering was evident. At the time, during the election meeting, someone in the audience asked a question, and he responded with some very progressive statements. For example, he said that multi-party systems and socialism are not contradictory and that China must have democracy. He was willing to lead the charge against feudal forces and break with privilege.

These were all recorded in black and white. But after Liu Yuan entered the third tier of leadership and became a high-ranking official, he began to defend Mao Zedong. He said, “Some people say Mao committed crimes, even if that’s true, it can only be considered dereliction of duty.” He even used an analogy, saying, “China is a big warehouse, and Mao is the warehouse keeper. The warehouse caught fire, and the keeper didn’t watch it properly, so of course, he should be criticized. But he’s different from the Gang of Four, who set the fire in the warehouse.”

Take a look at this situation; it’s as if the Cultural Revolution was initiated by the Gang of Four, and Mao Zedong didn’t guard the gate. Mao Zedong himself admitted that he accomplished two things in his life, one of which was launching the Cultural Revolution and persecuting Liu Yuan’s father, Liu Shaoqi, to death. Liu Yuan even brought his mother, Wang Guangmei, and other sisters to meet with Mao Zedong’s descendants for consultations. He said, “For our two families, the Maos and the Lius, unity brings victory, while conflict brings decline. Unity is correct, separation is wrong. At the very least, our two families should strive to unite rather than fight, to unite rather than separate.”

Liu Yuan’s logical thinking aligns with Chen Yun’s, remaining confined to the level of gathering a group of Water Margin heroes to seize and maintain power. Those children of high-ranking officials who have entered the political arena are inherently a bunch of unruly, ruthless children. In the words of Yuan Shao from the ancient play Righteous Loyalty, they all share the following common traits: great ambition, excessive boasting, no political achievements, little wisdom, a fierce attitude, small courage, being mean and suspicious, poor interpersonal relationships, short-sightedness in politics, ineptitude in military matters, and incompetence in organization.

Now, many Western experts and scholars studying China generally believe that the current internal and external troubles China is facing are indeed related to the stupidity, stubbornness, and arrogance of certain high-ranking officials’ children who easily ascended to power due to their fathers. And the Chinese have played a good hand terribly, becoming fools who ruin the country and harm the people.

Chen Yun’s views on not allowing a press law in China align with Xi Jinping’s notion that “the Party’s media must follow the Party’s line.” Without a press law, all media is controlled by the Party, serving the interests of one person or one Party, distorting facts and reversing black and white at any cost. Public opinion loses its function of supervising the government and becomes a tool for brainwashing the people. The entrepreneur Ren Zhiqiang once opposed the idea that “the Party’s media follows the Party’s line.” He said, “When did the people’s government become the Party’s government? Are they spending Party dues? This should not be changed lightly. Don’t use taxpayers’ money to do things that don’t serve the taxpayers.” Ren Zhiqiang then added, “It’s now thoroughly divided into two opposing camps. When all media takes on a surname and no longer represents the people’s interests, the people are abandoned to be forgotten.” Because Ren Zhiqiang publicly challenged Xi Jinping, he was sentenced to 18 years in prison.

Special Treatment and Public Image of Chen Yun

Chen Yun’s “using power for personal gain” is often contradicted by many articles in the Chinese Communist Party’s media, praising the “noble character and integrity” of the older generation of proletarian revolutionaries like Chen Yun, often mentioning Chen Yun’s family discipline. Chen Yun consistently preached “cultivating oneself through speech, exercising power with caution, disciplining oneself with words, forgiving and respecting oneself, never using the power in his hands for personal gain or benefiting his family.” He often said, “Power is given by the people and must be used for the people, to seek welfare for the people.” These articles praise Chen Yun for not engaging in special privileges, strictly demanding of himself by the standards of ordinary workers. He particularly instructed that his children should not be picked up and dropped off for school, should not receive special treatment, and should live and study like the children of ordinary people.

These articles are political propaganda that puts a positive spin on his image, not necessarily reflecting objective facts. Let’s first look at the special treatment Chen Yun enjoyed during his time in Yan’an. On November 29, 1937, Chen Yun arrived in Yan’an from Xinjiang. Shortly after, he was appointed as the Minister of the Central Organization Department of the Communist Party. Chen Yun had a childhood condition of frequent nosebleeds, and the dry winter air in Yan’an caused his old condition to recur. He had the Secretary-General of the Central Organization Department, Deng Jie, select a female student from the Northwest Public School to serve as his personal nurse. At that time, many young women from all over the country had flocked to Yan’an, and they were concentrated in this female student team of the Northwest Public School, known as the dance team. So, the 18-year-old student, Yu Ruomu, who had no nursing experience, was chosen. The Central Organization Department was housed in a small courtyard on the western hill of Yan’an city, with three cave dwellings, two flat-roofed houses, and about a dozen cadres. Chen Yun lived in one of the cave dwellings. After Yu Ruomu arrived, she used Soviet-imported nasal drops on Chen Yun every morning and evening. After a month, Chen Yun’s nosebleeds stopped. With nothing else to do, Yu Ruomu read newspapers there. Three months later, Yu Ruomu married Chen Yun, who was 14 years her senior and had already been divorced once. It was a whirlwind marriage, completed in three months from meeting to marriage. Afterward, Chen Yun sent her to study at the Central Party School of the Communist Party, where she entered the 19th class. Deng Xiaoping, then Political Commissar of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army, even wrote a doggerel:

A thousand miles of fate are tied by a single thread,
Nose pain brings a beautiful marriage.
The female secretary of Sun Yat-sen’s policy,
Becomes the caregiver of the man’s line.

Deng Xiaoping’s doggerel mocked the romantic relationship between Chen Yun and Yu Ruomu. In Deng Xiaoping’s view, Sun Yat-sen developed his much younger English female secretary into his wife, while Chen Yun, due to a nosebleed, used the organization’s resources to find a female nurse and then developed this nurse, 14 years his junior, into his wife. Did Chen Yun follow the same path as Sun Yat-sen? Could ordinary soldiers in Yan’an enjoy such special treatment?

After the Cultural Revolution, Chen Yun made a comeback. How did he engage in special privileges then? Let’s just talk about Chen Yun’s son, Chen Yuan, studying abroad, which was very special. Chen Yuan was a student in the Department of Automatic Control at Tsinghua University, class of 1968. In 1978, he was admitted to the graduate program in the Department of Precision Instruments at Tsinghua University. After enrollment, he applied for and received approval to transfer to the Department of Economics and Management to pursue a master’s degree. Such a transfer of department and major was impossible without solid connections at that time. In 1979, Chen Yuan wanted to study abroad on public funds, so he wrote a report to Wang Zhen. Wang Zhen approved it with a few large characters: “Agree, let the Foreign Affairs Office handle it.” Chen Yuan took Wang Zhen’s approval slip to the Minister of Education, Jiang Nanxiang. Jiang Nanxiang said, “You are a graduate student at Tsinghua University, so you should go to Principal Liu Da.” Liu Da was the Party Secretary and Principal of Tsinghua University. He had worked under Chen Yun for two years in the Northeast, so he was sure to handle the Chen family’s matters. Liu Da also approved, writing, “Agree, forward to the Foreign Affairs Office.” If Chen Yuan were not Chen Yun’s son, would Wang Zhen, Jiang Nanxiang, and Liu Da have gone out of their way to help him?

The reason is simple: First, studying abroad on public funds required passing a national exam, which Chen Yuan had not taken. Even if he had taken the exam, it was uncertain whether he could have been admitted on his own merit. Second, before Wang Zhen and Liu Da’s approvals, the list of public-funded students studying abroad from Tsinghua University had already been published. If the Tsinghua Foreign Affairs Office allowed Chen Yuan to take one of Tsinghua University’s slots for studying abroad, it would mean changing the already published list. This would require removing a student who had already been selected and replacing them with Chen Yuan, who had not taken the exam and had used connections to secure a spot. According to Luo Zhengqi, who was then the Propaganda Minister of the Tsinghua University Party Committee, when the matter of Chen Yuan using connections to study abroad on public funds reached the Tsinghua Foreign Affairs Office, it caused an uproar. The Foreign Affairs Office was in a difficult position. A young cadre at the Tsinghua Foreign Affairs Office said, “We are under the control of the Ministry of Education’s Foreign Affairs Office. Let’s send the materials to the Ministry of Education and see how they handle it.” The Ministry of Education’s Foreign Affairs Office was infuriated when they heard about this, saying, “How are we supposed to handle this?” Both the Tsinghua Foreign Affairs Office and the Ministry of Education’s Foreign Affairs Office were very displeased with the special approval of Chen Yuan’s public-funded study abroad and deliberately spread the word. Soon, both Tsinghua and Peking University knew about it, and there was a chorus of criticism, cursing Chen Yuan, Wang Zhen, and Liu Da sharply, saying all kinds of things. For example, some said, “The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) was just established, and Chen Yun became its secretary. The first thing he did was use his power to benefit his son.”

Luo Zhengqi recalled: “When I organized the propaganda committee meeting at Tsinghua, I heard nothing but curses. Not only were they cursing Chen Yun and Wang Zhen, but also Liu Da. People who had just emerged from the Cultural Revolution were already disgusted by the upper echelons of the CCP using privileges to oppress the good, acting arbitrarily, and indulging in corruption and luxury. The fall of the Gang of Four brought great relief to the people, but no one expected that privileges would make a blatant comeback. The head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection took the lead in abusing power for personal gain.” Hearing the curses from Tsinghua people, Luo Zhengqi, the Minister of Propaganda at Tsinghua University, couldn’t sit still. He picked up his pen and wrote a letter to Chen Yun, which read:

Comrade Chen Yun,
It is understandable that Comrade Chen Yun wishes to go abroad at public expense, but it is not appropriate for him to do so. Publicly funded overseas travel requires an examination, and the examination period has passed. The list of those traveling abroad at public expense for this term has already been finalized, and they are currently being dispatched. Chen Yun’s actions make our work difficult and have a negative impact. The masses have already criticized central leadership comrades for this matter. Please intervene and do not let him go abroad this time. I heard that he wants to switch to self-funded travel. Currently, the impact of self-funded travel by the children of central leaders is also not good. Please arrange it at another opportunity in the future.
Regards,
Minister of Propaganda at Tsinghua University, Luo Zhengqi

After reading Luo Zhengqi’s letter, Chen Yun’s face darkened, and he remained silent. His son, Chen Yuan, spoke up: “Our fathers fought to establish the country, and I never thought that such a small matter of me going abroad would be so troublesome.” In his view, those who fought for the country should enjoy its benefits, and with those benefits came privileges. The merits of the fathers should translate into benefits for their children. Wang Zhen, who justified this, Minister of Education Jiang Nanxiang, and Tsinghua University President Liu Da, who paved the way for him, all shared this logic. When one door closes, another opens. Under the banner of the old revolutionary Chen Yun, Chen Yun turned to the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, became Yu Guangyuan’s graduate student, and successfully went abroad using the publicly funded study abroad quota from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.

Two years later, after returning to China, he intended to start his political career as the party secretary of Xicheng District in Beijing, but he failed to be elected as a delegate to the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party. So, he turned to the financial sector, where he was appointed Deputy Governor of the People’s Bank of China, and later became the President and Party Secretary of the China Development Bank. In March 2013, Chen Yun became the Vice Chairman of the 12th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, a vice-national level official. Some people said that if his father were not Chen Yun, Chen Yun would be nothing.

In 1981, Hu Yaobang wanted to transfer Tsinghua University’s Deputy Party Secretary, Luo Zhengqi, to become the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Youth League, but this was blocked by Chen Yun and did not happen. The Chen family bore a grudge, and Luo Zhengqi could no longer stay in Beijing. In 1983, Luo Zhengqi went to Shenzhen to establish Shenzhen University and served as the party secretary. In 1985, he became the president of Shenzhen University. In 1989, because of the involvement of Shenzhen University students in the Tiananmen Square protests, Luo Zhengqi was expelled from the Communist Party and dismissed from public office. The events of June 4, 1989, were seen by old revolutionaries as revenge for blocking their son from studying abroad on public funds years earlier.

Hu Jiwei, who had served as the Editor-in-Chief and President of People’s Daily, once recalled that his daughter had associated with Chen Yun’s daughter. Once, when invited to visit the Chen family in Zhongnanhai, Chen Yun’s daughter took the initiative to ask Hu Jiwei’s daughter, “Do you want to see my father?” After returning home, Hu Jiwei’s daughter said to him: “She and Chen Yun’s daughter were led around several times by the secretary, passing through several courtyard gates before finally reaching Chen Yun’s residence. I finally understood what it means to live in a deep courtyard, feeling something deeply unsettling.”

The house Chen Yun lived in within Zhongnanhai, whether in terms of size or grade, was unimaginable. The costs of expansion and renovation at that time were astronomical. From 1982 to 1986, when Xiang Nan was the Party Secretary of Fujian Province, he learned about the special supplies provided to Chen Yun in Fujian, which were usually handled by a section chief from the Ninth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security. This section chief was responsible for regularly airlifting local seasonal fruits and a few specialties from Fuzhou and Xiamen to Beijing.

When he hesitated to inquire further, the section chief from the Ninth Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security sternly told him, “Comrade Xiang Nan, you should not interfere in this matter.” A dignified First Secretary of a provincial party committee was powerless to question a small section chief from the Ministry of Public Security about his special task within his jurisdiction. How could Xiang Nan not be angry? Later, Xiang Nan mentioned this matter to Hu Yaobang, the General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee, in Beijing, believing that it was detrimental to the image of the old revolutionary Chen Yun, who had always been known within the party for his simple living and strict self-discipline. Hu Yaobang later hinted to one of Chen Yun’s staff members to be mindful of the influence. Unexpectedly, Chen Yun, using his control over the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, preemptively took measures to deal with Xiang Nan, ending his political career.

After reading the above stories, one can’t help but conclude that Chen Yun was very hypocritical. Chen Yun framed Gao Gang. According to some publicly published documents, in the memoirs of Gao Gang’s wife, Li Liqun, she often mentioned Gao Gang’s close friendship with Lin Biao and Peng Dehuai, and how he cursed Chen Yun as a “conniving, treacherous businessman” and “a villain.” Before Gao Gang committed suicide, he scolded Chen Yun to his face, saying, “I finally see through you. How did I not see through you before?” Before his suicide on August 17, 1954, Gao Gang was a member of the CCP Politburo, Vice Chairman of the Central Government, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Director of the National Disciplinary Inspection Commission.

Li Liqun once said that Lin Biao had previously said: “During the Northeast Liberation War, without Gao Gang’s cooperation, without Gao Gang working with me to replenish the troops, which grew to over a million, I wouldn’t have won the battles. Can I say Gao Gang is bad? I can’t; I, Lin Biao, still have a conscience.”

Li Liqun said that in August 1966, when Lin Biao became the only Vice Chairman of the CCP Central Committee, he asked Ye Qun to invite her to his home and inquired about her children’s situation. He said, “Gao Gang was wronged.” He added, “It was Chen Yun who asked him, Lin Biao, to expose Gao Gang, but he said at the time, ‘I can’t say Gao Gang is bad against my conscience. In Northeast China, there was dissatisfaction with Liu Shaoqi, and you, Chen Yun, were part of it, as was I, Lin Biao. The dissatisfaction with Liu Shaoqi came from Chairman Mao. It wasn’t just Lin Biao alone. We all said it, and that’s that.’”

Li Liqun said that from the winter of 1952 to the spring of 1953, during Mao Zedong’s interactions with Gao Gang, they talked about many private matters. Mao Zedong expressed some dissatisfaction with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai’s work. Mao Zedong indeed suggested that Gao Gang become the Premier, equivalent to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in the Soviet Union. Li Liqun said, “It was Chairman Mao who talked with Gao Gang. The Chairman said, ‘Gao Gang, how about you become the Premier?’ Gao Gang replied, ‘I’m not good enough; Lin Biao would be better.’ The Chairman then said, ‘Lin Biao is not good with economics; he’s good at fighting. Chiang Kai-shek was somewhat afraid of him, and Stalin admired him.’”

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, Gao Gang was in charge of the Northeast region during the Korean War. He cooperated very well with the commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, Peng Dehuai, and had a close personal relationship with him. After Gao Gang’s suicide, Li Liqun and her four children were driven out of their spacious home. Li Liqun said, “They made me move out, from Xinjiekou to Xuanwu District. At that time, my home didn’t even have central heating or a stove. The three older children were boarding at school, and the youngest stayed with me. In winter, I shivered with cold. General Peng secretly sent a guard to check on me and asked if I had any difficulties. The guard didn’t dare say that he was sent by General Peng. It’s like this old man who had dinner with your family in Shenyang. I said it was General Peng. Then the guard waved his hand, signaling me not to mention General Peng.”

At first, Gao Gang thought that he had developed a close personal friendship with Chen Yun during his work in Northeast China. Li Liqun said, “Chen Yun claimed to be in poor health, unable to go out, and just stayed at home thinking and talking about this and that. Going to the war front, going to the countryside to collect grain and recruit soldiers—weren’t all these tasks handled by Gao Gang? At that time, Chen Yun even gratefully said, ‘Oh, old Gao, you are very considerate. I’m not well, so you’re the one running around.’ Gao Gang thought he had a close relationship with Chen Yun. Especially when Gao Gang went to Beijing, Chen Yun often sought him out for news, saying that Chairman Mao frequently talked to him about everything. So Gao Gang considered Chen Yun a true friend, but in the end, he was betrayed by Chen Yun.”

Thus, Chairman Mao told Gao Gang that he had seen since 1942 that Chen Yun was unreliable. When the situation was good, he would come out; when it was bad, he would fall ill. Later, in 1954, Chen Yun changed suddenly. So Gao Gang said, “I misjudged you, Chen Yun.”

On February 16, 1954, Chen Yun came to Gao Gang’s house and persuaded him to admit to crimes of opposing the Party, opposing Chairman Mao, and having ambitions to seize power. Gao Gang said to Chen Yun, “I have not opposed the Party or Chairman Mao, and I have no ambitions; you know this best. Everyone has expressed dissatisfaction with Shaoqi, so why is everything being pinned on me alone?” Chen Yun replied, “Chairman Mao is angry right now; it’s hard to explain anything. You might as well admit to it for now, and after Chairman Mao’s anger subsides, we can see how the situation develops.” Hearing this, Gao Gang became even angrier and said fiercely, “I have no ambitions, and I have not opposed Chairman Mao. What do you want me to admit to? I only opposed Liu Shaoqi and didn’t want him to be Chairman Mao’s successor. You know this best. Moreover, I’m not the only one who opposed Liu Shaoqi—you were also one of the main opponents of Liu Shaoqi. You know this in your heart. You all said things against Liu Shaoqi, so why am I the only one being held responsible now?”

Chen Yun hastily defended himself, saying, “I’m different from you. Shaoqi has made self-criticisms, so we shouldn’t keep holding on to his mistakes, should we?” Gao Gang pointed out, “But when the time comes and the big chess piece falls, if you don’t rebel, I will. Isn’t that what you, Chen Yun, said? Now you want me to admit to having ambitions and trying to seize power while you clear yourself completely.”

The argument between the two grew louder and louder until Gao Gang finally cursed Chen Yun, calling him a “sly, cunning man. Now I see through you! Why didn’t I see through you before? People like you, stubborn and inflexible, are on a dead-end road!” Chen Yun threw down a threat and angrily tossed a draft letter Gao Gang had written to Mao Zedong onto the table before leaving in a huff.

At the end of February 1954, after the Fourth Plenary Session of the Seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, a forum was immediately held on the Gao Gang issue. During the forum, Chen Yun added insult to injury by saying, “Today, I will tell the Party about what Gao Gang and I used to discuss. Gao Gang may think I’m not being a good friend, but I’m following the Party’s principles; not speaking out would be following the principles of a clique. Gao Gang’s personal ambition grew step by step, from small to large. If there were no roots of personal ambition, such problems wouldn’t have erupted all at once. Gao Gang should now shed his glamorous façade and start anew.”

Chen Yun chose Party loyalty over friendship. He continued to expose Gao Gang, saying, “Gao Gang told me that he would rather be Vice Chairman than General Secretary. I supported General Lin in running the Ministerial Conference and opposed Shaoqi being General Secretary. If there were to be Vice Chairmen, there should be more than one—you and I should each be one.”

Listening to Chen Yun’s speech, Gao Gang’s face turned ashen, his breathing quickened, and his anger reached its peak. He furiously said to Chen Yun, “You and I, each one—those were your words! Now how can you say they were mine? I’ll tell you, Chairman Mao said that in the future, when he steps back, the Central Committee could take turns being in charge. And you, Chen Yun, said that this was a good idea—one for you, one for me, and Lin Biao could also be included. Gao Gang even mentioned that Chairman Mao had said you, Chen Yun, were ‘cunning, able to read the situation,’ but I, Gao Gang, didn’t believe it and fell into your trap.” He said it all.

The meeting’s host, Zhou Enlai, immediately and sternly stopped Gao Gang, saying, “Don’t say anything more!” fearing that the angry Gao Gang would reveal all his past conversations with Chairman Mao and the tasks he had been assigned. Gao Gang was denied further defense, and nothing could clear his name.

Chen Yun was clearly replacing Deng Xiaoping as the top leader. From November 10 to December 15, 1978, the Central Working Conference of the Communist Party of China was held in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping, then Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, visited Southeast Asia (Singapore, Thailand, and Burma) with his wife from November 5 to 14 and did not attend the meeting. The meeting was presided over by Hua Guofeng, then Chairman of the Communist Party of China and Premier of the State Council.

On the third day of the meeting, November 12, 1978, Chen Yun launched a surprise attack, speaking at a group meeting of the Northeast Group, calling for the immediate rehabilitation of a number of major unjust, false, and wrongful cases and the resolution of some issues left over from the Cultural Revolution and the history of the Communist Party of China. Before leaving for his overseas visit, Deng Xiaoping had already set the tone for this Central Working Conference, which was to emancipate the mind, seek truth from facts, unite, and look forward. Deng Xiaoping’s “looking forward” meant not looking back, not digging up old grievances, and focusing on reform, opening up, and economic development.

Chen Yun’s speech at the meeting received active support from Tan Zhenlin, Hu Yaobang, and others. However, Chen Yun’s surprise attack disrupted the original agenda of the meeting, causing the meeting to lose control and changing the theme of the Central Working Conference. Deng Xiaoping’s focus on looking forward was replaced by Chen Yun’s focus on looking back, namely, settling accounts from the Cultural Revolution and rehabilitating unjust, false, and wrongful cases. Chen Yun’s proposal immediately gained strong support from within and outside the Party, from cadres affected by the Cultural Revolution, and from the victims of various political movements and their families.

When Deng Xiaoping returned from his overseas visit, he found that the situation had changed dramatically. He immediately realized that this was an attempt by Party elder Chen Yun to compete with him for popular support, Party support, and possibly even for the top leadership position. Thus, Deng Xiaoping decided to change course immediately, not using the speech drafted for him by Hu Qiaomu, but having Yu Guangyuan rewrite the speech, incorporating new content. For example, promoting democracy, as there is no socialism without democracy; allowing everyone to speak, as letting people speak won’t bring the sky down; shifting the focus of the entire Party’s work to economic construction; and replacing the slogan of class struggle with the slogan of building the Four Modernizations.

According to Bao Tong, Zhao Ziyang’s political secretary, if Deng Xiaoping had not promptly changed the direction of the meeting and insisted on his views before the overseas visit, then Deng Xiaoping’s position as the top leader would have been lost at the meeting, and Chen Yun, not Deng Xiaoping, would have become China’s number one figure. However, this incident also made Deng Xiaoping wary of Chen Yun’s ambition and penchant for intrigue.

When Chen Yun spoke at the Central Working Conference in November 1978, he was still just an ordinary Central Committee member, not a member of the Politburo, and certainly not a member of the Politburo Standing Committee. Since the Ninth National Congress, Chen Yun had not been elected to the Politburo. Although he was not a Politburo member, Chen Yun, who was a year younger than Deng Xiaoping, had an even longer standing in the Party than Deng Xiaoping. At the Third Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, held from September 24 to 28, 1930, 25-year-old Chen Yun was elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee. On January 7, 1931, at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in Shanghai, Chen Yun was elected as a member of the Central Committee. Since then, Chen Yun had remained in the Central Committee for 56 years. From January 15 to 18, 1934, at the Fifth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee held in Ruijin, Chen Yun, at the age of 29, was elected as a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Politburo and Secretary of the Central Secretariat, which is equivalent to the later Politburo Standing Committee.

During the Yan’an period, Chen Yun remained as Secretary of the Central Secretariat and also served as the Head of the Central Organization Department of the CPC. After the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, Chen Yun served as the Vice Premier of the Central People’s Government’s Government Administration Council, concurrently as the Director of the Finance and Economics Committee of the Government Administration Council. In 1950, after the death of Ren Bishi, Chen Yun was added as a Secretary of the CPC Central Secretariat, ranking among the five top leaders, with a status second only to Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, and Zhu De. In 1956, at the Eighth National Congress of the CPC, Chen Yun was elected as a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee.

At the Central Working Conference of the CPC in November 1978, Chen Yun’s mindset was completely different from that of Deng Xiaoping, who had already returned to the positions of Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Vice Chairman of the Military Commission. It could be described as “the barefooted are not afraid of those with shoes.” Chen Yun used his seniority within the party to draw attention under the guise of advocating for the people, demanding the overturning of the Cultural Revolution and the rectification of a series of major wrongful cases during the political movements of the Cultural Revolution. For example, regarding the case of the “61 Traitors Group” involving Bo Yibo and others, the case of the Peng Dehuai Anti-Party Group, and the issues concerning Tao Zhu, Wang Heshou, and others being labeled as traitors.

At this Central Working Conference, Chen Yun’s performance of raising the banner of redress and shouting slogans of democracy indeed gained the support and welcome of many cadres and participants. After such a commotion, a little over a month later, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CPC, held from December 18 to 22, 1978, Chen Yun realized his dream. He was added as the sixth-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Vice Chairman of the CPC Central Committee, and was elected as the First Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, overseeing the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the central political and legal departments, including public security, prosecution, courts, and civil affairs, thus reentering the core of central leadership.

From then on, he reverted to being a conservative. Interesting, isn’t it? Chen Yun was like a “chameleon,” but his true nature was always that of a sophisticated opportunist.