The Liberation of the Accumulated Bones:Changchun Besieged

In modern Chinese textbooks, the three major battles during the Chinese Civil War, especially the Liao-Shen Campaign, are historical events that most Chinese people must learn about. However, hidden within this history is a siege that has been deliberately buried and never dared to be mentioned.

This 150-day horrific siege resulted in the starvation deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians, possibly exceeding the number in the infamous Nanjing Massacre. This is the little-known Siege of Changchun.

Changchun is a city with a relatively short history. Although it has become a third-tier city due to the decline of the Northeast in recent years, before 1945, it was a genuine first-tier city in China and even Asia.

As the homeland of the Manchu people, after the Qing Dynasty established its regime, it implemented a 200-year-long policy of sealing off the area outside the Great Wall to reserve it for themselves and prevent other ethnic groups from occupying the Manchu’s ancestral land. This policy remained until after the Opium Wars when, under the threat from Russia, the Qing Dynasty allowed immigrants to settle, leading to the historically famous “Move to the Northeast.”

Large numbers of farmers from the Central Plains began migrating to the Manchurian region in the Northeast. Changchun, located at the center of the Northeast, rapidly developed under these circumstances. Especially after the South Manchuria Railway began operating, the population soared. In 1907, Changchun officially opened to trade, becoming one of the most important trade ports in the Northeast.

Before the “Mukden Incident,” Changchun had already grown into a major city with a population of 300,000. In 1932, with the support of Japan, the puppet state of Manchukuo was established with Puyi as its emperor, and its capital was set in Changchun, which was renamed Hsinking. The Japanese had grand plans for Changchun, treating it as the future base of their empire, and thus planned the city with standards surpassing those of Tokyo.

In 1932, the Japanese formulated the “Great Hsinking Metropolitan Plan,” which borrowed from the 19th-century Paris reconstruction plans and the British Garden City movement, initiating large-scale, high-standard infrastructure construction in Changchun.

For example, the city’s roads were planned to be 26-60 meters wide, with central arteries reaching 54 meters, divided into fast and slow lanes, which few Chinese cities today can match. Changchun was the first city in Asia to fully implement flush toilets, and at that time, flush toilets were already widespread in Changchun. Changchun was also the first city in Asia to fully implement piped gas and to bury all electrical lines underground. The Japanese even had foresight in planning a subway system, although it was never implemented.

Thanks to the Japanese emphasis, Changchun’s economy developed rapidly during the puppet Manchukuo period, quickly becoming the leading economic center in the Northeast. By 1944, its urban area had expanded to 80 square kilometers, with a population of 1.217 million, including 140,000 Japanese immigrants, making it a super metropolitan city in China, second only to Shanghai.

Manchukuo, centered around Changchun, had a solid foundation in various aspects due to the Japanese construction over 14 years, and its economic output even surpassed that of mainland Japan, earning it the nickname “Asian Ruhr.” This is the origin of the Northeast being considered a heavy industry base.

It is not an exaggeration to say that all these achievements were due to the Japanese construction. After Japan’s surrender in August 1945, the Soviet Union, with sinister intentions, entered the Northeast first, declared war on the Kwantung Army, and seized people, food, and machinery before the Japanese defeat was settled.

After looting, the cunning Russians did not withdraw. Instead of returning the territory to the Nationalist government, they secretly notified their ally, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), who were still hiding in Yan’an, to quickly move into the Northeast and seize the territory. This is the familiar Liao-Shen Campaign in our textbooks.

While reading history, have you ever wondered how the CCP, who were hiding in Yan’an caves during the entire Anti-Japanese War, suddenly had an army of hundreds of thousands and a large territory in the Northeast capable of engaging the Nationalist forces in strategic battles?

Did the CCP’s forces and territory fall from the sky? This is closely related to the Russians’ secret assistance. The Russians handed over a large number of advanced weapons left by the surrendering Kwantung Army to the CCP, giving them an advantage over the Nationalist forces in terms of weaponry. Moreover, many key members of the surrendered Japanese army were directly incorporated into the CCP’s forces.

These Japanese soldiers were willing to serve the CCP mainly to ensure the safe return of other Japanese troops and civilians in the Northeast to Japan. At that time, the lives of Japanese civilians were in the hands of the Russians, so they had no choice but to comply. Those left in China who joined the CCP were essentially the backbone of the Kwantung Army.

For example, in 2006, journalist Fu Leping from Phoenix Weekly published an article revisiting some of the Japanese soldiers from that time, writing a report titled “The Almost Forgotten History: Decoding the Japanese Veterans in the Fourth Field Army.” One officer of the former Kwantung Army’s Second Air Corps, named Miichiro Hayashi, led 20 pilots, 24 mechanics, 72 technicians, and nearly 200 ground support personnel to join the CCP. These Japanese formed the backbone of the CCP’s Northeast Old Aviation School, the cradle of the Chinese Air Force. Prominent figures such as former PLA Air Force Commander Wang Hai and Deputy Commander Lin Hu were among their students.

In 2002, on the 30th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, NHK aired a documentary titled “The Japanese Who Were Kept,” where a Japanese veteran recalled that Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army typically included a Japanese infantry squad in each regiment. These Japanese soldiers, well-trained and experienced, significantly boosted the combat effectiveness of the Fourth Field Army.

The addition of these Japanese soldiers allowed the CCP to quickly establish a powerful force upon entering the Northeast. Combined with the elite troops Lin Biao brought from within China, they formed the basis of the formidable Fourth Field Army. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director Kato Matsudaira publicly announced on September 28, 1948, that according to the Kwantung Army’s data, a total of 140,000 former Kwantung Army officers and their families were incorporated into the CCP’s forces, with at least 60,000 directly serving the CCP, mainly providing technical and tactical guidance, and some even directly engaging the Nationalist forces as mercenaries.

Japan now has a “Fourth Field Army Veterans’ Association,” which organized a reunion visit to China in April 1990. This event was publicly reported. Zhou Enlai, in a meeting with a Japanese delegation on June 27, 1956, acknowledged the contribution of some Japanese, saying, “We are grateful to some Japanese who participated in the liberation war as doctors, nurses, and technicians, which strengthened our confidence in forming friendly relations with the Japanese people.”

With the Russians’ support in weaponry and the Japanese’s help in personnel, the CCP quickly accumulated enough power to rival the Nationalist forces upon entering the Northeast. With General Lin Biao in charge, it was no surprise that the Nationalists were at a disadvantage. Initially, Chiang Kai-shek, who held illusions about the Russians, only took control of a few major cities in the Northeast and did not fully grasp the region. However, the Nationalists still had a numerical advantage, and the fate of the Northeast was still uncertain.

At this critical juncture, the Nationalist’s Northeast Administrator Chen Cheng made an unforgivable mistake. Distrusting the former puppet army, which had previously served under Manchukuo, Chen Cheng disbanded 500,000 puppet soldiers upon arriving in the Northeast, retaining only 70,000. These disbanded puppet soldiers, although not as formidable as the Kwantung Army, were still trained regulars, with some being highly capable. With no other options, they had to join the CCP if they did not want to become bandits.

According to the “Biography of Chen Cheng,” at least 400,000 of these disbanded soldiers were incorporated by Lin Biao. By August 1948, Lin Biao’s Fourth Field Army had grown from 110,000 to over 700,000 within two years. Additionally, there were 330,000 local militia, bringing the total strength of the Fourth Field Army to over one million. Meanwhile, the Nationalist forces in the Northeast had only 550,000, primarily confined to the major cities of Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou, isolated and unsupported, causing a reversal in the Northeast battlefield’s situation.

Lin Biao aimed to encircle and annihilate the Nationalist forces, making the capture of Changchun crucial. In May 1948, Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan decided to lay siege to Changchun without attacking, intending to force the garrison to surrender through starvation, thus avoiding significant casualties from direct assault. This strategy was adopted after a failed attempt to capture the city in mid-May 1948, resulting in heavy casualties with nearly 40,000 troops lost.

On May 29, 1948, Lin Biao sent a telegram to Mao Zedong: “After the battle on the 24th, we repeatedly considered and discussed it with the Northeast Bureau Standing Committee, and the commanders at all levels did not express much confidence in taking Changchun.” The next day, Lin Biao proposed:

“Take a long-term siege approach against Changchun, fighting off reinforcements first, then attacking the city. We should prepare for a period of 2 to 4 months. We can be confident in destroying the enemy and capturing Changchun.”

Subsequently, Mao Zedong agreed to this plan. Lin Biao then issued the “Methods for the Siege of Changchun,” even proposing a slogan: “Make Changchun a dead city.”

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) mobilized 12 independent divisions to complete the siege. They implemented a complete blockade within a radius of 45 kilometers centered on Changchun, with a depth of 25 kilometers. They prohibited the entry of grain, vegetables, fuel, cattle, and horses into the blockade zone. Under the strict control of the PLA, a food crisis quickly emerged in Changchun. After Changchun Airport fell at the end of May 1948, all contact with the outside world was cut off. Food supplies in the city could only rely on air drops.

To prevent the Nationalist forces from receiving the air drops, the PLA set up numerous artillery and anti-aircraft gun positions around Changchun, forming a tight air defense. Nationalist planes often had to escape before completing air drops to avoid being shot down or dropped supplies haphazardly from high altitudes. As a result, very little food actually reached the city, far from meeting the needs of the 700,000 people.

Out of desperation, at the end of June, the Nationalist commander Zheng Dongguo issued the “Temporary Measures for Grain Control in Wartime Changchun,” which stipulated that citizens could only keep enough grain for three months and had to sell the rest to the municipal government at fixed prices to ensure the needs of the garrison. Any violations would result in the confiscation of grain and severe punishment. This order essentially robbed Changchun residents of their food.

Without any food reserves, a large-scale famine quickly appeared among Changchun’s residents. Grain prices in the city soared from a few yuan per jin to 10,000 yuan per jin, yet it was still impossible to buy. Later, Zheng Dongguo said in his memoirs, “Since July, there have been deaths from starvation in the city. Many civilians, having exhausted their grain or having had it confiscated by the military, had to survive by eating tree leaves and grass roots, eventually dying from extreme weakness. The number of people dying from starvation increased, with some collapsing and dying suddenly while walking on the streets. Corpses were left unburied. The tragedy of people selling human flesh even appeared on the streets.”

At this point, some may ask, with no food in the city, why didn’t people flee? Soldiers couldn’t escape, but ordinary civilians couldn’t either? The answer is they couldn’t escape.

Because Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan’s siege strategy aimed to force the large population of Changchun to consume limited grain, causing the Nationalist forces to quickly run out of food and become unsustainable. If civilians were allowed to leave, the burden of grain consumption would be reduced, and the Nationalist forces would hold out longer. So, Lin Biao’s deputy, the political commissar of the Fourth Field Army, Luo Ronghuan, reported to the Central Committee of the Communist Party on September 9, 1948:

“Two months of siege have yielded significant results, causing a severe food shortage in the city. Sorghum costs 30 million yuan per jin but is unavailable. Residents rely on tree leaves and grass for sustenance, with many dying from starvation. Our strategy is mainly to prohibit passage. We set up sentries every 50 meters on the front line with barbed wire and trenches, closely monitoring gaps, and preventing refugees from coming out. Those who attempt to leave are persuaded to return.”

In plain terms, the Communist Party’s strategy was to accelerate the consumption of grain by innocent civilians in the city to starve out Changchun, achieving the goal of subduing the city without fighting. The number of people who died of starvation was not a consideration.

By June 28, the extreme food shortage in Changchun had reached the point of cannibalism. Large numbers of desperate starving people began to break through the defenses to steal the Nationalist forces’ grain supplies. The Nationalist forces and police opened fire, resulting in many deaths.

From August 1, under Chiang Kai-shek’s orders, the Nationalist forces began to evacuate large numbers of residents to reduce the city’s grain consumption. The political commissar of the First Army Corps of the Fourth Field Army, Xiao Hua, ordered at the time: “Prevent all departures of people from Changchun. Even if individuals on the verge of starvation need to be dealt with, it should be handled by the regiment but not become the responsibility of the besieging forces.”

Due to the Communist Party’s strict siege, approximately 200,000 refugees were trapped between the Nationalist and Communist positions, unable to advance or retreat. Hundreds of people starved to death in the wilderness every day. Luo Ronghuan explained at the time:

“In the blockade struggle, a basic prohibition of entry and exit must be enforced. Those who have already left can be released in batches, but not in large numbers at once, so the enemy cannot quickly evacuate. If none are released, the high number of deaths would also be bad.”

The situation was so dire that Luo Ronghuan’s report mentioned, “They knelt in groups before our sentries, begging for passage. Some abandoned their babies and children and fled, others hanged themselves in front of our sentries. Soldiers, seeing this tragic situation, softened and cried along with the starving people, saying, ‘It’s the orders from above, we can’t help it.’ Some soldiers even secretly let the refugees pass. After correction, another extreme occurred: beating, tying up, and even shooting refugees. The number of deaths and injuries is not yet counted.”

They preferred to shoot starving refugees rather than let them out. Reading Luo Ronghuan’s report, what emotions do you feel? This was not liberation but massacre. The so-called People’s Liberation Army did such things.

However, the PLA would release certain special people. For instance, to undermine the Nationalist forces’ morale, they would release deserters or those who surrendered. They would also release valuable technical personnel. The famous storyteller Shan Tianfang, a native of Changchun, once recalled, “During the siege, the Shan family paid 17 taels of gold and a diamond watch to buy a way out. A Nationalist platoon leader said, ‘I’ll send you out through the east bridge checkpoint. The PLA has a checkpoint specifically for receiving Nationalist defectors. You just pretend to be a defector, and the PLA, treating defectors well, will surely take you in.’”

A Japanese female writer named Endo Homare, who was 7 years old during the Changchun siege, later wrote a book titled “A Japanese Girl in the Changchun Siege: How I Survived the Tragedy of War in China,” recounting her experience. Her father, Okubo, was one of the Japanese who stayed in Changchun. Their family ran the “New Kyoto Pharmaceutical Factory,” producing addiction treatment drugs. Okubo once gave medicine to the Communist forces, so the underground Communist Party leader in Changchun, Lin Feng (later Liu Shaoqi’s secretary), wrote a cloth note with the PLA stamp as a token of gratitude. The note said that if their family needed to go to the liberated area, they could present the note to the PLA.

During the siege, Endo Homare’s elder brother, sister-in-law, and nephew starved to death. Desperate, her father Okubo led 90 surviving Japanese out of Changchun on September 20, 1948. They crossed the refugee area littered with corpses, slept among the dead, and finally reached the PLA positions the next day. Okubo presented the cloth note from Lin Feng to negotiate with the PLA, but they outright rejected its validity.

（This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）