Mao Zedong and Lin Biao:The Mystery of the First Faction's Defection(Part 3)

After the start of the Cultural Revolution, Liu Shaoqi was soon persecuted to death in Kaifeng, Henan, which Mao Zedong appreciated as a significant achievement. Lin Biao, who was the most effective in cheering and waving flags, quickly rose through the ranks, becoming the nominal second-in-command as the Vice Chairman, reaching the pinnacle of his career. However, Lin Biao was not at ease with this. When he suddenly received a notification from Zhou Enlai to return to Beijing, he was extremely hesitant. Lin Biao’s concern stemmed from two reasons:

Firstly, he knew that Mao Zedong did not voluntarily elevate him but did so out of necessity to fill the power vacuum after Liu Shaoqi’s downfall. Deng Xiaoping had already fallen with Liu Shaoqi, and the powerful Zhou Enlai had always been suppressed by Mao. Thus, Lin Biao’s rise became a choice by elimination.

Secondly, with the momentum of the Cultural Revolution in full swing, Mao needed someone to support him. Although Jiang Qing was loyal, she was ultimately ornamental and had no roots within the party or the military. She could dabble in cultural affairs, but exerting life-and-death power was beyond her. Therefore, Lin Biao, who commanded the army, was necessary. By then, the entire government system was paralyzed, and without the army’s participation, the Cultural Revolution could not continue.

Despite his worries, once bound to the ship of thieves, there was no turning back. Thus, at the height of his career, Lin Biao’s tragedy began.

After thoroughly crushing Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong was determined to kick aside the obstructive Politburo and the bureaucratic system, seizing the party and national leadership through the Central Cultural Revolution Group. This group was chaired by Chen Boda, with Jiang Qing issuing orders from behind as the First Vice Chair. The real power lay in the hands of Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and others. Lin Biao was essentially sidelined, often reduced to merely signing off on decisions.

In Gao Wenquan’s book “The Late Years of Zhou Enlai,” it is written that Lin Biao was kept in the dark about many of Mao Zedong’s major decisions during the Cultural Revolution, often being informed only after the fact. This left Lin Biao unsure of Mao’s intentions and ignorant of the Revolution’s direction. As various leaders fell like dominoes, Lin Biao, as Vice Chairman, was embarrassingly unaware of the movement’s trajectory.

Lin Biao’s status as an observer in the Cultural Revolution was partly due to his position and his attempts to avoid trouble. Mao Zedong was acutely aware of this, mocking Lin Biao to his face for wanting to be the “Ming Shizong” (the Jiajing Emperor who secluded himself and ignored state affairs). Consequently, after Lin Biao’s death, Mao found it difficult to find a pretext to criticize him, leading to the absurdity of linking Lin Biao with Confucius in the “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” campaign, which was a farcical mismatch.

Later, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying launched a coup at the Huairen Hall, arresting the so-called Gang of Four. For propaganda purposes, they mischievously lumped Lin Biao and Jiang Qing together, calling them the Lin-Jiang counter-revolutionary clique, which was a huge joke. Lin Biao and Jiang Qing represented two irreconcilable factions with no common interests. It can even be said that Lin Biao was the biggest obstacle to Jiang Qing’s rise to power. Indeed, Lin Biao and Jiang Qing both benefited from Liu Shaoqi’s downfall, but that was all. Lin Biao represented the military faction, while Jiang Qing represented the Cultural Revolution faction. There was an inherent conflict between these factions in their power struggle.

The Cultural Revolution faction’s main backer was Mao. Throughout Mao’s decades of rule, his strategy was consistently based on one principle: balance. He supported the weak to suppress the strong to always retain the final say. The factionalism within the CCP and the military had existed since its inception and became the norm. After the founding of the PRC, Mao went to great lengths to eliminate the various factions and strongholds within the party and the military, ensuring a balance of power. Undermining others was a tactic he used repeatedly. Thus, the Cultural Revolution faction thoroughly understood and implemented Mao’s intentions. Their ultimate goal was to use the Central Cultural Revolution Group to achieve Mao’s absolute control over party, government, and military power, restraining other factions within the party. Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and Mao Yuanxin were all people who rose through connections and writing. To Mao, they were reliable lackeys because, without him, they had no foothold within the party or military. During her trial, Jiang Qing bluntly said, “I am Chairman Mao’s dog.”

Therefore, the military faction represented by Lin Biao despised the Cultural Revolution faction. As Vice Chair of the Central Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing was arrogant and seized control of the Cultural Revolution under Mao’s guidance, making infiltrating and controlling Lin Biao’s military system her primary target. Jiang Qing openly demanded that Lin Biao arrange important positions for her in the military, but Lin Biao consistently refused. For Lin Biao, there was no room for negotiation regarding his hard-won military power.

Through years of political struggle, Lin Biao deeply understood that without power, there was no voice. Chen Boda had followed Mao since Yan’an for 33 years, but in his last three years, he was abandoned simply for minor policy disagreements. Mao Zedong even labeled him as “never having cooperated on major issues in over 30 years.” Tian Jiaying, Mao’s secretary who served him for nearly 20 years, ended up committing suicide after a candid critique of Mao’s manipulation tactics, with the exact reasons still unknown. Mao was harsh and ungrateful to those around him, let alone others. Lin Biao’s survival in the Cultural Revolution was not due to flattery but his deep roots and influence in the military, making him a genuine power player. If the Cultural Revolution faction, led by Jiang Qing, infiltrated and controlled the military, Lin Biao would lose his political leverage, risking becoming another Liu Shaoqi or even Gao Gang.

The fundamental conflict between Lin Biao and Jiang Qing was a strong counterattack against Mao’s undermining tactics. Lin Biao was already dissatisfied with the expansion of the Cultural Revolution and understood Mao’s balancing act to curb his power, leading to his resistance to the Cultural Revolution. As the conflict with Jiang Qing became public, Lin Biao’s showdown with Mao Zedong approached.

The 1969 “Lin Biao’s First Order” incident marked the end of Mao and Lin Biao’s decades-long political mentor-student relationship, opening the confrontation between the supreme and deputy leaders. Mao’s erratic handling of international relations ultimately led to the Sino-Soviet split. In early 1969, a war broke out at Zhenbao Island, bringing China and the Soviet Union to the brink of war. In October, Mao convened a Politburo meeting to discuss precautionary measures, ordering all national leaders to disperse urgently. Lin Biao, fearing a sudden Soviet nuclear attack, instructed Beijing’s garrison to strengthen defenses.

A staff officer at the General Staff Department, Yan Zhongchuan, eager to please, combined Lin Biao’s directives into a “First Order of Vice Chairman Lin.” Seeing this, Mao considered it an overreach, believing it challenged his authority as the supreme leader, leading to dissatisfaction. Though Mao did not react immediately, Lin Biao’s concerns began to take root.

Lin Biao’s son, Lin Liguo, quickly rose through the ranks, becoming Deputy Minister of the Air Force Operations Department within two years of joining the army, thanks to Lin Biao’s subordinates. Some even sycophantically equated loyalty to Lin Liguo with loyalty to Mao, which displeased Mao, sensitive about succession since losing his son in the Korean War.

Later, when Mao prepared to elevate Zhang Chunqiao, a Cultural Revolution rising star, he sought Lin Biao’s opinion. Lin Biao, realizing Mao intended to replace him with Zhang, remained silent, further fueling Mao’s suspicion that Lin was grooming his son as his successor.

In August 1970, the second Lushan Conference became the breaking point between Mao and Lin Biao. The disputes arose from two issues: the “genius theory” and the establishment of the presidency. Zhang Chunqiao, following Mao’s intentions, removed the word “genius” from a draft report, citing that Khrushchev had used the term, which Mao disliked. The old revolutionaries, unaware of Mao’s intention, seized this as an opportunity to attack the Cultural Revolution’s new elite, with Lin Biao leading the charge.

Chen Boda supported Lin Biao with Marxist-Leninist quotations on “genius,” intensifying the debate. Chen Yi and Wang Dongxing also echoed Lin Biao’s criticisms, demanding the downfall of those perceived as anti-Mao. Zhang Chunqiao cunningly refrained from revealing Mao’s role in the removal, allowing the old revolutionaries to incriminate themselves, providing Mao with evidence of their disloyalty.

The controversy over the “genius theory” led Mao to express his anger, accusing the old revolutionaries of plotting against him. This trivial issue of a single word highlighted the bizarre nature of CCP power struggles.

In Zhang Chunqiao’s report, following Mao’s opinion, it was suggested to abolish the position of the State Chairman in the Constitution. This idea had actually been hinted at by Mao on many occasions. However, many attending leaders did not understand the underlying intricacies, leading to severe divisions within the CCP. Many believed Mao was playing the usual game of feigned modesty, deliberately being humble. So why did Mao not set up the position of State Chairman?

In 1959, Mao, under the pretext of considering the national interest, stepped down as State Chairman, promoting Liu Shaoqi while he remained in power behind the scenes. Then he launched the Cultural Revolution and removed Liu Shaoqi. Therefore, he had no reason to occupy this position again; otherwise, it would appear to outsiders that the purpose of launching the Cultural Revolution was merely a despicable struggle for the chairman’s position. However, Mao did not want a second person to repeat Liu Shaoqi’s fate, creating a situation where the country had two leaders contending against each other. So, he simply abolished the position of State Chairman.

However, Lin Biao, who had always been compliant with Mao, unusually insisted on this issue, publicly opposing Mao for the first time. The reasons for his actions are not documented, but from the situation at that time, I personally analyze three reasons.

First, although Lin Biao was Mao’s designated successor according to the party’s succession rules, he was not a member of the Standing Committee. His official positions were only Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of National Defense. His ranking in administrative affairs was even behind many Politburo members, making his position as a successor neither legitimate nor justified. Second, the relationship between Mao and Lin had already shown cracks. If Lin Biao did not secure the position of State Chairman, he would be increasingly disadvantaged in political struggles against the rising stars like Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, and Wang Hongwen. Third, I think Lin Biao’s insistence was also to test Mao’s true intentions. If Mao really intended to take action against him, the dispute over the State Chairman position could be a signal.

Lin Biao’s insistence garnered the support of many party elders. Their support for Lin Biao was not necessarily because they truly wanted Lin Biao to be the State Chairman but rather as an opportunity to express their foolishly loyal support for Mao to continue as the State Chairman and simultaneously counterattack the new elites of the Cultural Revolution. However, Lin Biao’s influence greatly exceeded Mao’s expectations, resulting in severe criticism and fierce backlash. Mao used his usual tactics to intimidate Lin Biao, first forcing Lin’s staunch supporters Wu Faxian, Ye Qun, and Qiu Zuo to write self-criticisms, and then sending people to hint that Lin Biao should also write a self-criticism. Mao’s methods were like those he used against Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi in Lushan—forcing them to write self-criticisms in black and white, then having the organization define the nature of the issue, allowing for various manipulations.

But with the precedents of Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, being smart, would not repeat the same mistake. Regardless of Mao’s soft and hard tactics, Lin Biao agreed to let his subordinates write self-criticisms but refused to write one himself, not giving Mao any leverage. Frustrated, on August 15, 1970, Mao began his southern tour, during which he frequently met with regional officials, indirectly criticizing and creating public opinion. In his talks, Mao extensively discussed the history of internal party struggles, defining the attack at the second Lushan Conference as the tenth internal party struggle. He explicitly brought up Lin Biao’s issues, stating that the Lushan Conference was a struggle between two headquarters, and Lin Biao had to bear some responsibility for it. Mao’s statements indicated that a major political storm was imminent.