Mao Zedong and Lin Biao:The Mystery of the First Faction's Defection(Part 1)

On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of Defense, suddenly attempted to escape by plane and died in a crash in Wendu’erhan, Outer Mongolia. Lin Biao, who was designated as the successor leader at the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party in 1969, unexpectedly chose to defect. This not only astonished the Chinese people at the time but also left the outside world, which had limited understanding of the Communist Party, puzzled. Over the past 50 years, speculation about Lin Biao remains shrouded in mystery. What is the significance of the event on September 13, which marked the substantive collapse of the Cultural Revolution and revealed the nature of the Communist Party as a criminal organization? Are there any undiscovered meanings? To clarify these points, we need to thoroughly examine the relationship between Lin Biao and Mao Zedong.

From Lin Biao’s career, it is clear that he was Mao’s most trusted associate from the early days in Jinggangshan. At the age of 21, Lin Biao graduated from the Whampoa Military Academy and, after participating in the Northern Expedition and the Nanchang Uprising, quickly rose to prominence after joining Jinggangshan, becoming a division commander at the age of 24. Along with Peng Dehuai and Huang Gongluo, he became one of the so-called “Three Heroes of the Red Army.” Lin Biao stood out among the many talents, partly due to his background from the Whampoa Military Academy, but more importantly, it was Mao Zedong’s diligent cultivation and promotion that played a crucial role.

When Mao first established himself in Jinggangshan, he needed to build his own influence within the party and the military. Lin Biao was Mao’s first key protégé. Before arriving at Jinggangshan, Lin Biao had limited experience and no connections with the various factions, making him a promising candidate for cultivation compared to already established figures like Zhu De and Wang Erzhong. Lin Biao did not disappoint Mao’s efforts. In several anti-encirclement campaigns, he performed outstandingly and made significant military achievements, demonstrating the traits of a renowned general.

However, Lin Biao, in his youth, was somewhat inexperienced and arrogant. He was not particularly impressed by Mao’s efforts to promote and cultivate him and often did things that embarrassed Mao. For example, he frequently wrote to the Central Committee requesting to leave Jinggangshan to engage in guerrilla warfare, which angered Mao, who remarked, “What do you know, kid?” Lin Biao had a low opinion of Mao’s strategy of moderate operations, believing that Mao was inexperienced and would only lead to the collapse of the troops. Therefore, when the army was being reorganized, Lin Biao openly wrote to the Central Committee demanding that Mao Zedong’s command be revoked. Although Mao did not react strongly at the time, he remembered this incident and believed that Lin Biao’s letter was instigated by Peng Dehuai, which became a significant issue at the Lushan Conference. We will discuss this in detail later.

After the Red Army’s Long March reached northern Shaanxi, Lin Biao, frustrated with being under Mao’s wing and feeling unfulfilled, wanted to go south to fight guerrilla warfare, even disobeying orders multiple times. Mao was infuriated and criticized Lin Biao, saying that the Red Army was not Lin Biao’s private army. Subsequently, Lin Biao was reassigned to the newly established Red Army University as its president. Despite Lin Biao’s disobedience and frequent outbursts, Mao’s political rise and his understanding of Lin Biao’s character meant that Lin Biao’s status as his top protégé remained unchanged. For example, the position of president of the Red Army University was akin to Chiang Kai-shek’s appointment as president of the Whampoa Military Academy. Graduates of the Red Army University, after the founding of the People’s Republic, were all at least major generals, and Lin Biao, as the president, controlled significant resources.

Another important hidden reason for the unbreakable relationship between Lin Biao and Mao was Lin Biao’s cousin, Lin Yuying, also known as Zhang Hao. In 1935, Zhang Hao returned to China from the Soviet Union as a representative of the Comintern, posing as an ordinary worker and working closely with Mao Zedong. He falsely claimed to represent the Comintern’s directives, helping Mao overcome the split crisis caused by Zhang Guotao and establishing Mao’s central leadership position. Therefore, when Zhang Hao died of illness, Mao personally carried his coffin.

At the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, the Eighth Route Army had only three divisions, two of which were commanded by the Lin brothers. Lin Biao was the commander of the 115th Division, while Zhang Hao was the political commissar of the 129th Division. This arrangement highlights the importance of the Lin brothers to Mao. After the Marco Polo Bridge Incident, Mao immediately sent Lin Biao back to the mountains like a fierce tiger. Lin Biao’s 115th Division achieved notable success at Pingxingguan, solidifying the Red Army’s reputation. However, Lin Biao’s joy was short-lived when he was accidentally injured by a soldier in Yanxi Sanfang District, leaving him with a lifelong, unresolved injury.

Mao was particularly concerned about Lin Biao’s injury. To prevent his ace from facing further danger, Mao decided to send Lin Biao to the Soviet Union, where he stayed for five years and only returned after the Yan’an Rectification Movement. The Yan’an Rectification Movement was essentially a prolonged large-scale purge within the Communist Party, similar to the Cultural Revolution, and marked the first time in Communist history that a mass movement targeted the party. Under the banner of “rectifying the past to prevent future mistakes, treating illnesses to save people,” Mao used methods such as historical reviews, exaggerated accusations, and collective responsibility to create a precedent for using mass movements to suppress dissent within the party, establishing Mao Zedong Thought as the central ideology and consolidating the authority of the supreme leader. The Yan’an Rectification Movement, in both its content and form, laid the seeds for the subsequent Cultural Revolution. During this movement, prominent figures like Liu Shaoqi, Kang Sheng, and Peng Zhen quickly rose to prominence, while Lin Biao was given special protection by Mao. During the more than four years of the rectification movement, Lin Biao was largely insulated from the political turmoil and well-protected.

After the movement ended, Lin Biao was sent to Chongqing to participate in the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. During the eight-year anti-Japanese war, Mao Zedong had made public statements and secretly trained elite troops. When Chiang Kai-shek achieved victory with his own resources, the Communist forces had already amassed a significant number of troops. However, at that time, Mao Zedong still lacked the strength to fully challenge the Kuomintang. In fact, who could seize the large piece of territory left by the Japanese, the Northeast, became the key factor in the balance of power between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

In October 1945, after Japan’s surrender, Mao Zedong quickly mobilized the party’s elite and, with covert help from the Soviet Union, had Lin Biao lead a force of over 100,000 troops to rapidly enter the Northeast. The Japanese had invested decades in developing the industrial base in Northeast China, and with the weapons and equipment left by the Kanto Army, the importance of the Northeast was well understood. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek, who failed to grasp the Soviet intentions and naively hoped to conclude a new Sino-Soviet treaty and smoothly take over the Northeast, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party seized the opportunity. By the time Chiang realized that Stalin’s real intention was to delay and wait for the Communists to take over, it was too late.

After the Communist forces took over the Northeast, they incorporated some of the Kanto Army troops and a large amount of Japanese weaponry, quickly capturing numerous strategic locations. On September 28, 1948, Kato Matsuhira, the director of the Japanese Foreign Ministry’s Investigation Bureau, released data on the Kanto Army. A total of 140,000 Japanese soldiers and their families surrendered and were incorporated by the Communist forces, with at least 60,000 of them directly serving the Communists in technical and tactical roles, and some even fighting as mercenaries against the Nationalist forces. Thus, the Communist forces accumulated significant capital in the Northeast, comparable to the Nationalist forces.

Moreover, Lin Biao’s entry into the Northeast was like a tiger entering the mountains, significantly altering the situation. When he first arrived, there were tensions with the Northeast Bureau Secretary Peng Zhen, who was unhappy with Lin Biao. Consequently, Mao Zedong decisively reassigned Gao Gang to assist Lin Biao. Lin Biao, having consolidated both political and military power in the Northeast, was given the freedom to make bold moves, revealing his military genius. After initial setbacks in attacking Shenyang, Lin Biao achieved significant victories through operations in Jiangnan and Linjiang, eliminating large numbers of Nationalist forces and clearing smaller cities. Within a year, the Northeast Army expanded to over 500,000 troops. The Communist forces had surpassed the Nationalists in both quantity and quality.

After May 1947, Lin Biao led his troops in a counteroffensive, launching consecutive autumn and winter offensives that compressed the Nationalist forces into isolated zones in major cities like Changchun, Shenyang, and Jinzhou. By August 1948, less than three years after Lin Biao entered Northeast China, the Nationalist forces had been compelled to change their commanders three times. Lin Biao’s Northeast Army had miraculously expanded to 1.03 million troops, becoming unmatched in terms of equipment and combat effectiveness, and turned into a powerful asset for the Communist forces as they continued their nationwide campaign.

In November 1948, Lin Biao launched the Bird’s Water Campaign, annihilating the Nationalist forces outside the Great Wall. From this point, the situation in the Chinese Civil War began to reverse. During his time governing Northeast China, although Lin Biao generally followed Mao Zedong’s directives, he also displayed a considerable degree of independence in military matters. For instance, in November 1945, Mao ordered Lin Biao to fight the Nationalists in Jinzhou, but Lin Biao opposed this decision and preferred to avoid the battle. After exchanging telegrams, Mao ultimately conceded. In April 1946, during the difficult battles at Siping, Mao, in a heated moment, ordered Lin Biao to hold the position at all costs, but Lin Biao preemptively abandoned the position and bluntly told Mao in his telegram: “Please consider carefully, Chairman.” Such insubordinate remarks would have been fatal after 1949, but during the critical period of the civil war, Mao still accepted Lin Biao’s opinions, highlighting a notable difference from his later, more petty behavior.

In March 1949, Lin Biao led the newly renamed Fourth Field Army of a million troops southward, sweeping all before them with unstoppable momentum, ultimately reaching Hainan Island and establishing the Central-South Military Region Command. At that time, Lin Biao commanded six major military regions with over 1.5 million troops, sweeping from north to south with impressive power and influence. In terms of military achievements, Lin Biao was unmatched among the Communist commanders.