Lin Biao:The Rise and Fall of a Military Genius (Part 1)

Lin Biao (December 5, 1907 – September 13, 1971), originally named Yu Rong, with courtesy names Yangchun and Zuodai, and pseudonyms Yurong, Yurong, Yurong, Youyong, and Chun’er. He was from Huanggang, Hubei, and was a political figure and military strategist in the People’s Republic of China[3]. A founding father of the People’s Republic of China[4], he was a former national-level leader and one of the main founders and first-generation leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the People’s Liberation Army. He held the rank of Marshal in the People’s Republic of China.

Lin Biao joined the Chinese Socialist Youth League in June 1923, and in 1925, he entered the fourth class of Whampoa Military Academy, where he joined the Chinese Communist Party and participated in the Northern Expedition. In August 1927, he took part in the Nanchang Uprising, then moved to Jinggangshan, where he held various positions including commander of the Red Fourth Army and corps commander of the Red First Army. He participated in several anti-encirclement campaigns and the Long March. During the Anti-Japanese War, he served as the commander of the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army, led the Pingxingguan Campaign, and then went to the Soviet Union for recuperation. During the Second Chinese Civil War, he served as the commander-in-chief of the Northeast Democratic Coalition Army, secretary of the Northeast Bureau of the CPC Central Committee, commander of the Northeast Field Army, and commander of the Fourth Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army. He commanded the Liaoshen Campaign, the Pingjin Campaign, and others, capturing Northeast China, North China, Central South China, South China, and Hainan Island.

After the founding of the People’s Republic of China, he held important positions including Vice Premier of the State Council, Vice Chairman of the Central Committee, Minister of Defense, and First Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission. During the Cultural Revolution, he chose to follow Mao Zedong and became the second highest-ranking member of the Chinese Communist Party, having been named Mao’s successor in the CPC Constitution and the 1970 draft constitution[a]. He was the de jure successor.

In the Third Lushan Conference of 1970, internal political conflicts within the CPC Central Committee intensified. His faction was embroiled in power struggles with figures like Kang Sheng and Zhang Chunqiao, and more critically, his relationship with Mao Zedong gradually deteriorated, leading to his political downfall. On September 13, 1971, Lin Biao, along with his wife Ye Qun, son Lin Liguo, and others, attempted to flee by plane from Shanhaiguan Airport in Qinhuangdao[5]. Their aircraft, the No. 256 Trident, crashed in the Subarga Basin about 70 kilometers northwest of Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia[6], killing all nine people on board. This incident is known as the September 13 Incident, and after the news broke, Lin Biao was labeled a counter-revolutionary, and his position was taken over by the Gang of Four.

Lin Biao demonstrated outstanding performance in the Anti-Japanese War and the Chinese Civil War. He was an important founding figure of the People’s Republic of China[7], leading the Fourth Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army from the northernmost part of China in Heilongjiang to the southernmost part in Hainan Island, destroying more enemy forces than the Northwest Field Army and the North China Field Army[8].

The Revolutionary Period

Embracing Revolutionary Ideals

At the age of 9, Lin Yu Rong’s father Lin Mingqing sent him to a private school, where his teacher Li Zhuohou, the father of “the Father of Chinese Geology” Li Siguang, had participated in the Tongmenghui in his early years and was open-minded and knowledgeable. Li said, “Yu Rong is delicate and hard to grasp, whether he is a dragon or an insect depends entirely on himself”[9].

Lin Yu Rong’s cousins Lin Yu Ying and Lin Yu Nan were significant figures in the history of the Chinese Communist Party. In July 1919, Lin Yu Nan and Yun Daiying established the Xunxin[b] School, which Lin Yu Rong attended. During this period, the May Fourth Movement gave rise to various progressive ideologies, which also influenced Lin Yu Rong[10].

Couplets: Everywhere in the reading room, there is a place for me, In all actions, few things are said to others.

“Sacrifice to Confucius on the Upper Day” Confucius was a figure from our Zhou Dynasty, known for his benevolence and love for the people, thus he remains a great figure revered to this day. On August 5 of the ninth year of the Republic of China, which is the mid-autumn festival, schools nationwide sacrifice to Confucius, following ancient customs. Our school’s teachers and students also sacrificed to Confucius, with more than a hundred students attending. As Confucius is a saint, he is our Chinese education founder[11].

In March 1922, with the help and encouragement of Lin Yu Nan, Lin Yu Rong, who had not yet graduated from elementary school, was admitted with excellent grades to the Wuchang Gongjin School founded by Dong Biwu and others. His entrance exam essay “On Coeducation” was praised by the examiner Qian Jiepan[11]. Lin Yu Rong frequently interacted with Communist revolutionaries like Chen Tanqiu, Dong Biwu, Yun Daiying, Lin Yu Nan, and Lin Yu Ying, listening to their discussions on national affairs[10].

At that time, Lin Mingqing’s cloth factory fell into difficulties, and without money to support Lin Yu Rong’s education, he wrote to ask Lin Yu Rong to return home to farm[12]. In January 1923, Lin Yu Rong chose to take a six-month break from school to earn enough money before returning. With Lin Yu Nan’s help, he worked as a substitute teacher in elementary school. In 1924, he became a leader of the student movement at Gongjin School and a member of the Chinese Socialist Youth League, appointed by the CPC Wuchang Committee as the secretary of the Gongjin School League Branch[11].

In the autumn of 1925, during the May Thirtieth Movement, Lin Yu Rong took the lead in participating in the protests. Introduced by Lin Yu Nan, he became a member of the Chinese Communist Party[11]. In the summer, he was elected as a student representative from Hubei Province and attended the Seventh National Congress of the All-China Students Federation held in Shanghai. At that time, few people from Lin’s village and surrounding areas had graduated from high school, and Lin Mingqing wrote to ask the already graduated Yu Rong to return home to run a private school and take care of the family, but he did not reply[13].

From Writing to Joining the Military

At the end of 1924, based on suggestions from Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong, the Central Committee of the CPC required various regions to quickly select outstanding youth to apply for the Whampoa Military Academy to train military talent for the CPC. Lin Yu Rong’s desire to apply was approved by his two cousins. He wrote to inform his father, and Lin Mingqing, initially opposed to the idea, eventually gave in and provided some financial support, which deeply moved Lin Yu Rong. Later, Lin Yu Rong passed the exam in Shanghai and was admitted[13].

Upon arriving in Guangzhou, Lin Yu Rong, dissatisfied with his name sounding feminine, changed it to Lin Biao[13], with the alias Youyong. With recommendation letters from Lin Yu Nan, he received care from Xiao Chunu and Yun Daiying. In January 1926, he joined the Whampoa Military Academy as a cadet. On March 8, after passing the selection exams, he was promoted to the Fourth Phase Students’ Regiment and assigned to the 2nd Battalion, 3rd Company of the Infantry Department, where he was one of the few openly identified Communist Party members and served as the secretary of the 3rd Company Party Branch.

On October 4, 1926, the Whampoa Academy’s fourth-phase students graduated early and joined the National Revolutionary Army for the Second Northern Expedition.

Whampoa Fourth Phase Cadet Oath: Do not love money, do not steal life. Unite will, love and sincerity. Abide by the will, stand firm. Fight for the cause, sacrifice for the cause. Inherit the lives of martyrs, carry forward the Whampoa spirit. To achieve the goals of the National Revolution and to seek the completion of world revolution. Solemnly swear.

In December 1926, Lin Biao was assigned by instructor Nie Rongzhen to the 2nd Battalion, 7th Company of the 4th Army of the Ye Ting Independent Regiment as a trainee platoon leader, and later promoted to platoon leader. Yi Shuiqiu, who served in the same company, recalled that Lin Biao was very intelligent. During shooting training organized by the company commander, Lin frequently contributed ideas and methods. For instance, he used a small iron barrel filled with white lime as a target; when hit, the lime would spray out, greatly enhancing the shooting’s enjoyment and training quality[13].

In May 1927, Lin Biao was promoted to company commander of the 7th Company, 3rd Battalion of the 73rd Regiment, and his unit went through the battles of Shangcai and Lingying.

The First Chinese Civil War Period

Nanchang and Hunan Uprisings

In April 1927, after Chiang Kai-shek announced the purge of the Communist Party, Lin Biao still chose to follow the CCP. On August 1, the CCP launched an armed uprising in Nanchang. On the 2nd, Lin, directly led by Nie Rongzhen and Zhou Shidi, arrived to join the uprising. “(Lin) led his platoon exceptionally bravely in this battle, with Lin Biao always at the front of his soldiers”[14].

On the 26th, the battle of Huichang took place. The Communist forces from the Nanchang uprising attacked the Guangzhou garrison troops commanded by Qian Dajun, totaling more than 10,000 men. When the 7th Company entered the position, Lin Biao, only 20 years old at the time, discovered that the Nationalist army’s frontal firepower was very strong, but the flanks were weaker. He decisively commanded a platoon to advance along a dry ditch and attack the enemy’s flank. After the Nationalist forces retreated, the Communist troops pursued them into Huichang city. Qian Dajun, who was once Lin Biao’s teacher, was so scared that he abandoned his sedan chair and fled on horseback alone, with the regiment and battalion headquarters praising the 7th Company[15][16].

In October, the main force of the Nanchang uprising was almost wiped out. In late October, the unit Lin Biao was with arrived at the west of Xinfeng Town, Jiangxi (Tianxinwei). Due to the sharp reduction in the number of troops and many high-ranking officers leaving, Zhu De held a meeting for all soldiers, announcing that the unit would be led by him and Chen Yi from then on, and said, “Those who want to continue the revolution can follow me, and those who do not wish to continue can go home. Come and go freely, and no coercion will be applied”[17][18]. Chen Yi, Su Yu, Chen Shiju, and Xiao Ke described that Lin Biao and some officers from the Whampoa Military Academy found Chen Yi to persuade him to leave with them. Chen Yi refused, and Lin and others left after leaving their guns behind. They later encountered difficulties and rejoined the unit. Chen Yi severely criticized Lin in front of the officers and soldiers but still allowed him to serve as the company commander of the 7th Company to make up for his mistakes[17][18][20]. Lin Biao later referred to this as a strategic retreat[16].

In January 1928, Zhu De’s unit was reorganized into the 1st Division of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolutionary Army, with Lin Biao serving as the company commander of the 2nd Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Regiment. From January 12 to mid-March, Zhu De and Chen Yi led their troops in the Xiangnan Uprising. During this period, a regiment from the Nationalist army’s Gui faction, commanded by Li Yixuan, attacked Leiyang. Zhu De withdrew from Leiyang city, which was occupied by the Nationalist troops on February 26. Lin Biao, leading the 2nd Company and coordinating with several hundred peasant soldiers, ambushed the Nationalist army’s Chen Bihu Regiment at the nearby Aoshansi Temple, annihilating more than 100 enemies (some sources say more than 400)[21][22][23].

On March 1, Zhu De’s forces attacked Leiyang city but were repelled and retreated towards Chenzhou. That night, Lin Biao, who had not participated in the battle earlier (possibly because he did not arrive in time), led the 2nd Company, supported by 3,000 peasant soldiers, to launch a surprise attack. The defending troops were briefly confused and resisted slightly, but then began to retreat after suffering 50 to 60 casualties. On the 12th, Zhu De promoted Lin to battalion commander[24].

The Meeting at Jinggangshan

On April 28, 1928, Lin Biao, along with Zhu De and Chen Yi, met with Mao Zedong’s Autumn Harvest Uprising troops at Jinggangshan. When Mao came down the mountain to greet them and saw Lin giving a speech to the troops by the roadside, he remarked, “This bandit, that warlord, as long as they have guns, they have their own territories. Our Red Army also has guns, and the Red Army can also sit on the world.” The next day, Mao asked Lin to give a report titled “The Red Army Can Rule the World” to the Red Army at Jinggangshan[25]. On May 25, the meeting troops were renamed the 4th Red Army (referred to as the Red Fourth Army), and Lin became the commander of the 1st Battalion, 28th Regiment of the 10th Division.

In June, the Nationalist army in Jiangxi launched the fourth “extermination” campaign against Jinggangshan. On June 23, the Red 28th Regiment launched the Battle of Qixiling, employing Lin Biao’s tactic of “selecting a group of key personnel from the regiment’s company and platoon leaders to form assault teams, equipped with short firearms, with each team consisting of 24 men, forming more than a dozen teams, and attacking the enemy in turn” to achieve victory. On August 25, Lin Biao temporarily served as the staff officer of the main force of the Red Fourth Army, and was promoted to regiment commander in November[26]. By this time, he had become the fourth highest-ranking officer in the Red Fourth Army[27].

In winter, Lin Biao’s suggestions such as “you must pay for what you buy” and “maintain hygiene, build latrines away from homes” led Mao Zedong’s famous “Three Major Disciplines and Six Points for Attention” to be expanded into “Three Major Disciplines and Eight Points for Attention”[28].

Lin Biao’s early retreats after commanding troops were criticized during the September 13 Incident, and Chen Shiju pointed out that such “mountaintop mentality” retreats to preserve one’s own troops had occurred frequently in the CCP’s military[16].

In January 1929, the Red Fourth Army mistakenly decided to leave a unit led by Peng Dehuai to stay behind while the main force left the base, resulting in continuous defeats. From February 10 to 11, the Battle of Dabaidi occurred. In the final effort with each soldier having only 20 bullets, the Red Fourth Army ambushed the advancing Liu Shiyi unit. The battle continued until the next morning with ammunition exhausted, and many soldiers fought with sticks, stones, and empty guns, achieving victory and capturing over 800 Nationalist soldiers. Mao Zedong praised the Red 28th Regiment for its strong combat effectiveness and ability to fight tough battles[29].

In March, the Red Fourth Army reorganized the regiments into divisions, forming three divisions. At 21 years old, Lin Biao became the commander (also called the chief commander, at the division commander level) of the main force’s first division, with Chen Yi as the party representative.

At this time, Lin Biao did not approach soldiers or lower-level cadres and never chatted or joked with lower ranks. He said, “Commanding troops requires strictness, with a compassionate heart and thunderous methods.” In the summer of 1929, a staff member at the Tiger Ridge Division headquarters in Fujian took a small amount of civilian property. Lin called him in for questioning and, after a few questions, immediately shot him dead. In December of that year, at Gutian, a cook in the First Detachment stole a pair of shoes. After being caught, the detachment commander Wang Liang and political commissar Li Cifan reported the incident to Lin, who immediately ordered the execution of the detachment leader by firing squad[20].

During the Longyan battles from May 23 to June 19, the Red Fourth Army captured Longyan three times. On the third attempt, the Red 28th Regiment annihilated over 2,000 troops from Chen Guohui’s brigade defending the city. Mao Zedong and Zhu De praised the Red First Division for their excellent performance in the two battles at Longyan[30].

On June 22, the Red Fourth Army held its seventh representative conference, where long-standing disagreements over the army’s construction between Mao Zedong and Zhu De erupted. Zhu De opposed Mao’s “party controls everything” viewpoint. Lin Biao supported Mao’s position, but the majority of attendees supported Zhu De’s viewpoint. Mao was removed from his position as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, and Mao left the Red Fourth Army for “medical treatment” after the conference. From December 29 to 30, the Gutian Conference was held. The conference passed a resolution fully accepting Mao Zedong’s military construction ideas. Mao Zedong regained leadership of the Red Fourth Army, was re-elected as the General Secretary of the Central Committee, and Lin Biao was elected as a member of the Central Committee, entering the Red Army’s decision-making level[31].

The Anti-Encirclement Campaign

In February 1930, 23-year-old Lin Biao was promoted to commander of the Red Fourth Army. In June, the unit was expanded, and the First Route Army of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army was established (later renamed the First Army Corps of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army, abbreviated as the Red First Army Corps), with Lin Biao serving as the commander of the Red Fourth Army.

From October to the following January, the First Front Army of the Red Army fought its first anti-encirclement war. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized over 100,000 troops under the command of Lu Dipping to attack the more than 40,000 troops of the First Front Army. Mao Zedong asked Lin Biao at a military meeting: “The Red Fourth Army is facing a tough battle again. Do you have confidence in breaking Chiang Kai-shek’s anti-encirclement campaign?” Lin Biao and Luo Ronghuan answered simultaneously: “We are confident!” On December 30, during the Longgang Battle, the Red Fourth Army, as the main attacking force, encircled and annihilated Zhang Huizan’s advancing Nationalist troops along with the Red Third Army Corps, Red Third Army, and Red Twelfth Army, killing nearly 10,000 Nationalist troops[32].

From April to May 1931, the First Front Army of the Red Army fought its second anti-encirclement war. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 200,000 troops to attack the First Front Army. Lin Biao’s Red Fourth Army performed excellently in the battles of Futian, Baisha, and Zhongcun. From July to September, the First Front Army fought its third anti-encirclement war. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 300,000 troops to attack the First Front Army. Lin Biao’s Red Fourth Army performed excellently in the battles of Liangcun, Huangpi, and Fangshiling.

On March 12, 1932, the Red Fourth Army and the Red Twelfth Army were merged to form the Red First Army Corps, with the 25-year-old Lin Biao promoted to Corps Commander (later known as Corps Leader). In April, during the Zhangzhou Campaign, the First Front Army annihilated two Nationalist brigades and captured 2,300 people. From July 2 to 10, in the Nanxiong Shuikou Campaign, 15 Nationalist regiments were defeated. From August 16 to 23, in the Le’an and Yihuang Campaigns, three Nationalist brigades were annihilated, and 5,000 were captured. From November 16 to the following January 8, in the Jinxing and Zixi Campaigns, one Nationalist brigade and one regiment were annihilated, and more than 4,000 were captured.

From February to March 1933, the First Front Army fought its fourth anti-encirclement war. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized about 500,000 troops under the actual command of He Yingqin to attack about 70,000 Red troops. From February 27 to March 1, in the Huangpi Battle, Lin Biao commanded his first large-scale military operation, unifying the command of the Red First Army Corps, Red Third Army Corps, and Red Twenty-First Army to achieve victory. On March 21, in the Caotaigang Battle, Lin Biao commanded the Red First Army Corps to annihilate Chen Cheng’s elite 11th Division, which had been pivotal to Chen Cheng’s rise. The two battles resulted in the annihilation of 19,000 Nationalist troops.

In October 1933, the Comintern sent Otto Braun (Li De) as a military advisor to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. With the support of new Red Army leaders like Bo Gu, the “Wang Ming Line” was implemented, and Mao Zedong lost his command of the army. Li De changed the Red Army’s favored strategies of maneuver warfare and guerrilla warfare to positional warfare and fortification warfare, requiring the Red Army to adopt “fortress-to-fortress” strategies at the strategic level and “short, sudden attacks” at the tactical level to deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s “fifth encirclement.” From December to October 10 of the following year, the First Front Army fought its fifth anti-encirclement war. Chiang Kai-shek mobilized 1,000,000 troops and launched a major offensive against the Central Soviet Area. The Nationalist forces used heavy artillery to destroy the Red Army’s rudimentary fortifications, while the Red Army, adopting Li De’s tactics, attacked Nationalist fortifications in positional warfare but suffered successive defeats due to a lack of heavy weapons[33].

From August 31 to September 3, in the Wenfang Battle, Lin Biao’s Red First Army Corps and allied units used maneuver warfare, killing or wounding over 2,000 Nationalist troops and capturing over 2,400. However, this rare victory during the “fifth anti-encirclement” did not change the overall situation.

Strategic Retreat with the Central Red Army

On October 10, 1934, Bo Gu, Li De, and others led the First Front Army (also known as the Central Red Army) with more than 86,000 troops to break out westward from their base and joined forces with the Red Second Army Corps and Red Sixth Army Corps to deal with Chiang Kai-shek’s “fifth encirclement.” Lin Biao led the Red First Army Corps with 18,000 troops and Peng Dehuai’s Red Third Army Corps was responsible for clearing the way.


During the Zunyi Conference from January 15 to 17, 1935, Nie Rongzhen recalled that Lin Biao “did not speak much before or during the meeting, and his attitude was ambiguous”[34][35]. Wu Xiuchuan and Li Fuchun also mentioned that Lin did not say much or remained silent[36]. However, “Lin Biao’s Diary” described: “Lin Biao spoke extemporaneously, expressing full agreement with Mao Zedong’s speech, reaffirming his views, and criticizing the Central Revolutionary Military Committee for errors in strategic guidance and missed opportunities due to poor command. Lin Biao cited the failure to implement the Central Revolutionary Military Committee’s incorrect operational guidelines in the Wenfang Battle and insisted on the victory achieved through luring the enemy deep into movement warfare, proving Mao Zedong’s strategic tactics were correct."[d].

After the Central Red Army crossed the Chishui River four times, Lin Biao suggested personnel changes in a letter to the Central “Three-Man Group,” requesting Mao Zedong’s removal, but it was not adopted[37].

In May 1935, after the First Front Army successfully crossed the Dadu River, Lin Biao led the portion of the First Front Army that had not crossed the river in a surprise attack on the Luding Bridge. The vanguard unit, the Red Fourth Regiment, forced its way through and reached the Luding Bridge on the 25th after several battles. Lin Biao, arriving later, quickly convened a meeting to plan the bridge seizure. The Red Fourth Regiment successfully captured the bridge in 2 hours[38][39]. Mao Zedong commented: “Crossing the Dadu River[e] was the most critical event during the Long March. If we had failed there, we would likely have been destroyed. Such a fate has precedents in history”[40].

Crossing the Snow Mountains and Grasslands to Arrive in Shaanxi

Liu Zhong recalled: “Corps Commander Lin often fell ill during the Long March and was not in good health. As the Red Army crossed several snow-capped mountains and entered the grasslands, his condition worsened.” “Some grasses could be poisonous, so most of the wild grasses found were shown to Lin Biao. He would taste and test all the grasses no one had eaten before, and he often rode a mule to find edible wild grasses, which he would then introduce to various units or report to the entire army in writing”[41].

From June 16 to 17, 1935, Lin Biao commanded the Lazi Kou Battle. From November 20 to 23, in the Zhi Luozhen Campaign, Lin Biao commanded the First Front Army, killing or wounding about 1,000 Nationalist troops and capturing more than 5,300. From February 20 to May 5, 1936, in the Eastern Expedition Campaign, Lin Biao personally reconnoitered the terrain to select a crossing point for the Yellow River, and the First Front Army crossed the Yellow River to attack Nationalist forces under Yan Xishan in Shanxi, annihilating about 7 Nationalist regiments and capturing more than 4,000[42].

At this time, including Lin Biao, proposed to Mao Zedong to establish a university for training Red Army cadres, which was approved. On June 1, 1936, the Red Army University was established, and Lin Biao was transferred to be the president and conducted teaching, no longer serving as Corps Leader. The following year in January, the school was renamed the Chinese People’s Anti-Japanese Military and Political University (abbreviated as “Kangda”), and Lin also served as the school’s political commissar[10].

During World War II

On July 28, 1937, the Japanese army launched a full-scale offensive against North China, marking the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War. On August 25, the second cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the Communist Party took place, leading to the reorganization of the Red Army. The First Red Army Corps and the Fifteenth Red Army Corps were reorganized into the 115th Division of the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army, with Lin Biao appointed as the division commander[10].

In September 1937, during the Battle of Pingxingguan, in collaboration with the Nationalist government forces, Lin Biao, after assessing the Japanese military route and inspecting the terrain, decided not to adopt Mao Zedong’s five telegrams aimed at obstructing the Japanese advance[43]. He rejected them on the grounds of “the general’s orders do not apply to those stationed outside,” and instructed his messengers to report back with a single sentence in a Hubei dialect: “We are all Chinese; if there are tricks or schemes, it is our duty to fight the Japanese devils” [44]. After setting an ambush, Lin Biao allowed the advance elements of the Japanese army to pass.

On September 25, Lin Biao led the main force of the 115th Division to annihilate part of the 21st Brigade of the Japanese army’s Itagaki Seishiro Division and their supply units in Pingxingguan, located dozens of kilometers northeast. The remnants of the 115th Division hindered Japanese reinforcements in two directions, with an independent regiment repelling a regiment from the 9th Brigade during the Yaozhan battle and pursuing them, collectively eliminating over 1,000 Japanese troops. This victory was the first major success for the Chinese forces, breaking the “invincibility” myth surrounding the Japanese army. After the Battle of Pingxingguan, Lin Biao gained widespread acclaim, but his family suffered retaliation from the Japanese, leading to the burning of their home. Lin Mingqing’s family fled for three years, eventually reaching Hunan. Upon learning this, Cheng Qian immediately sent people to search for them and provided financial support, enabling Lin Mingqing to safely arrive in Chongqing and then in Yan’an, where Mao Zedong personally met him and gave him a set of cotton clothes. Lin Mingqing often mentioned that these were gifts from Chairman Mao. Lin Biao’s mother, his fourth brother’s wife, and his daughter, among five people, died on the road[45].

On October 17, Lin Biao summarized twelve points of experience in fighting the Japanese army and published “The Experience of the Battle of Pingxingguan” [46].

Lin Biao unified command of his own forces and part of the 129th Division. On November 2, the 40th Brigade of the 20th Division of the Japanese army (under Brigade Commander Yamashita Tomoyuki) advanced to the western Madai Ridge of Xiyang City. Lin Biao commanded a regiment to delay the Japanese advance and cover the deployment of his main force for an ambush. The Japanese troops covered only 7 kilometers per day. On November 4, during the First Battle of Guangyang, Lin Biao’s 115th Division, with only the 343rd Brigade, ambushed a Japanese infantry battalion and a supply battalion in the area from Guangyang to Songta Town. The battle lasted 4 hours, resulting in the annihilation of nearly 1,000 Japanese troops, with the 343rd Brigade suffering over 200 casualties[47]. On November 7, during the Second Battle of Guangyang, three regiments of the 129th Division ambushed and annihilated over 250 Japanese troops.

On December 5, Lin Biao wrote “The Experience of the Anti-Japanese War” [48], summarizing fifteen points on combating the Japanese army. On December 22, Lin wrote a letter to Ren Bishi, Director of the Political Department of the Eighth Route Army:

I am very eager to understand the overall situation, but I lack materials and my own analysis is insufficient. Recently, I have some thoughts from abstract speculation, which I am presenting to you tentatively as follows… The Japanese war in China is not about wiping out all of China at once, but rather about gradually swallowing it. This approach is meant to digest and address international jealousy.

Lin Biao analyzed the global situation and believed that major powers would not actively engage in war against Japan, stating:

The Sino-Japanese War could develop into a world war. China should insist on fighting to the end to turn this war into a world war. Only when it becomes a world war can China achieve greater victory and the world revolution also develop and succeed [49].

Subsequently, the 115th Division under Lin Biao’s command also experienced battles such as the Battle of Fengjiagou, the Battle of Quyang, the Jin-Cha-Ji Anti-Eighth Route Siege Campaign, and the Battle of Wentang.

On January 13, 1938, Lin Biao, along with Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Liu Bocheng, and He Long, went to Luoyang to attend a meeting of generals above the division level convened by Chiang Kai-shek.

Trip to the Soviet Union for Treatment

On March 2, 1938, while the headquarters of the 115th Division was marching through the defensive positions of the 70th Division (Division Commander Wang Jingguo) of the 19th Army (Commander Yan Xishan) in the northern part of Qianjia Village in Xixian County, the advance troops had already informed the Jin army sentries. However, before the sentries could report to the company posts, Lin Biao (wearing a gray fabric, silk-cotton-lined Eighth Route Army officer coat) was shot by Jin army sentry Wang Lusheng, resulting in a penetrating gunshot wound to the left side of his spine and a fractured rib. Peng Yunsheng, the head of the medical office at the 115th Division’s headquarters, provided first aid and bandaged Lin Biao. Wang Jingguo, the Jin army commander, sent his chief of staff to apologize and offer condolences to Lin Biao. The 115th Division’s headquarters continued to march according to the original plan. Political commissar Luo Ronghuan arranged for the division’s medical department head, Gu Guangshan, to escort Lin Biao back to Yan’an. Gu Guangshan requested that the division’s security department head, Zhu Dixin, accompany them. Ultimately, Zhu Dixin led a guard company, and Gu Guangshan brought two medical staff and a service personnel to leave the division headquarters that day to escort Lin Biao westward. After six or seven days, the wound on Lin Biao’s back had healed enough for him to walk a few steps. When crossing the Yellow River, they encountered Jiang Yizhen, a medical expert sent from Yan’an to meet them. After handing over Lin Biao to Jiang Yizhen, Gu Guangshan returned east to catch up with the division headquarters [50].

Lin Biao was left with a lifelong autonomic nervous disorder [10][51] and had to receive regular pain relief injections, which resulted in a notably thin physique.

Lin Biao was sent back to Yan’an for treatment. Mao Zedong, rarely, rode 15 kilometers to welcome him [16]. While recuperating, Lin participated in “Anti-Japanese University” work and published articles such as “Speech on the Guidelines for Anti-Japanese University Education,” “On the Basic Lessons of Regular Warfare in North China and the Conditions for Guerrilla Warfare Development,” and “Report on Military Leadership Issues” [10]. Mao remarked, “Our Anti-Japanese University needs to train hundreds, thousands, tens of thousands of cadres like Comrade Lin Biao” [52].

After the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee in November 1938, Lin Biao went to the Soviet Union for further medical treatment. It was said that due to the excessive use of medication by Soviet doctors, Lin Biao suffered damage to his nervous system, resulting in symptoms such as fear of water, wind, colds, frequent diarrhea, and sweating. This condition worsened with age, and the only remedy was a highly dangerous surgery to remove the scar, which ultimately was not performed [53]. As his condition worsened, Lin Biao began to distrust Western medicine and researched traditional Chinese medicine to prescribe himself remedies [54].

In March 1940, Lin Biao succeeded Ren Bishi, who returned to China, as the head of the Chinese Communist Party’s delegation in Moscow. In June, the Soviet magazine “Communist International” published Lin Biao’s 12,000-word article “The Three-Year National Liberation War of the Chinese People” [55].

Participation in the Soviet-German War

According to legends heard by Chen Shiju in Yan’an, Lin accurately predicted that the German army would bypass the Maginot Line in France and launch a large-scale flanking attack on France. Lin Biao then explained to Soviet military leaders, “In the anti-’encirclement and suppression’ struggles in the Chinese Soviet areas, our Chinese Red Army often uses this tactic” [16].

On June 22, 1941, the Soviet-German War broke out. Lin Biao and others were taught by senior military instructors from the Fulongzhi Military Academy. Around September, they were incorporated into the Soviet Red Army to participate in the war. Liu Yalou described that after the outbreak of the war, “he provided an estimate of a certain action by Hitler to the Soviet military authorities at that time. Later enemy actions proved his estimate was accurate.” This was highly valued.

Return to Yan’an and Chongqing Negotiations

At the end of 1941, Lin Biao returned to China. On January 5, 1942, he flew to Lanzhou and met with Zhu Shaoliang, the commander of the Eighth War Zone. On January 16, Lin Biao arrived in Xi’an and met with Hu Zongnan, the deputy commander of the Eighth War Zone. On February 8, Lin Biao returned to Yan’an. Mao Zedong, who was used to staying up late and waking up late, made an exception and went to greet him early in the morning (Mao had never greeted Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, or Ren Bishi when they returned from the front lines or the Soviet Union). Upon returning, Lin Biao continued to serve as the president of the “Anti-Japanese Military and Political University” and as vice president of the Central Party School, participating in the Yan’an Rectification Movement initiated by Mao that month. Writer Shu Yun pointed out that Lin had always been wary of the “salvation movement” and had never purged anyone.

On the morning of September 14, 1942, Lin Biao, as Mao Zedong’s representative, set off from Yan’an to Xi’an to meet Jiang Jieshi, accompanied by Wu Yunfu, the director of the Eighth Route Army’s Xi’an Office. Due to continuous heavy rains that damaged roads and obstructed transportation, they only arrived in Xi’an on the afternoon of the 17th. By then, Chiang Kai-shek had already returned to Chongqing. On September 29, Lin Biao traveled to Chongqing by car and arrived at the Eighth Route Army Office in Chongqing on October 7. On October 13, he met with Chiang Kai-shek, accompanied by Zhang Zhizhong, the minister of the Political Department of the National Military Council. Lin Biao stated: “Mao Zedong repeatedly told me (Lin) that the two parties should come closer together and cooperate sincerely now and strive for permanent unity in the future. … Although the Communist Party adheres to communism, it cannot follow the specific methods of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin … exactly as they are in China. At present, the styles of both sides are different, and it is difficult to force unity. We can only rely on the Three Principles of the People and the anti-Japanese program to make efforts … hoping that under your leadership, a solid foundation can be laid for final success.” On the afternoon of December 16, Lin Biao, accompanied by Zhang Zhizhong, met Chiang Kai-shek for the second time, requesting the lifting of the blockade on the Shaanxi-Gansu Border Region and the provision of military supplies, ammunition, and medicine for the Communist army, but without result. By June 28 of the following year, he assisted Zhou Enlai in conducting another round of negotiations in Chongqing. During this period, Chiang Kai-shek repeatedly instructed Dai Li to try to pull Lin into the Nationalist camp, but to no avail. On June 7, 1943, Chiang Kai-shek met with Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao and agreed to their return to Yan’an. On June 28, Lin Biao, Zhou Enlai, Deng Yingchao, and more than 100 others left Chongqing by truck and returned to Yan’an. On July 16, 1943, Lin returned to Yan’an. On October 18, 1944, he published “How to Train Troops This Year.”

The Second Chinese Civil War

Heading to the Northeast to Take Command

In mid-September 1945, the Central Committee decided to seize the Northeast. On September 12, the Central Committee telegraphed Mao Zedong, who was in Chongqing, asking whether he would consider sending an effective military commander to the Northeast. On September 17, Liu Shaoqi, who was in charge of the Central Committee’s work, sent a telegram to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai in Chongqing: “In order to strengthen work in the Hebei, Rehe, and Liaoning regions, a Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Central Bureau should be established immediately, with Gao Gang, (Li) Fuchun, Kang Sheng, and others going to work there, and a strong military command organization should be established with Chen Yi, Lin Biao, or Xu Xiangqian taking charge.” On September 19, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai from Chongqing telegraphed the Central Committee to transfer Zhang Yunyi (acting commander of the New Fourth Army) and Rao Shushi: agreeing that Chen Yi and Rao Shushi should go to Shandong, Luo Ronghuan and Xiao Hua to the Northeast, and Lin Biao to Rehe, as soon as possible. On September 19, the Central Committee, led by Liu Shaoqi, sent a telegram: “The Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Central Bureau is to be established, and the Hebei-Rehe-Liaoning Military Region is to be expanded, with Li Fuchun as the secretary and Lin Biao as the commander. Luo Ronghuan will work in the Northeast.”

On September 22, Lin Biao sent a telegram from Puyang to the Shandong Bureau, Central China Bureau, and the Central Committee:

To resolutely implement the military committee’s intentions, we plan to arrange local work in the Hebei Central and Hebei East regions, mobilize the masses, organize armed forces, and prepare and train troops, build artillery, and arrange the battlefield. Therefore, I and Xiao Jinguang, to save time, intend not to go to Shandong.

On September 24, Lin Biao sent a telegram to the Military Committee, stating that he would make every effort to complete the major tasks assigned by the Central Committee and provided the specific departure time: I and Xiao and others are now in the Puyang Military Region, planning to set out on the 25th and travel through the South Hebei, Central Hebei, and East Hebei, which will take over a month to arrive. The chief of staff of the Hebei-Lu-Yu Military Region, Cao Li Huai, led the 21st Regiment of the Hebei-Lu-Yu and a small number of cadres to escort Lin Biao, Xiao Jinguang, Deng Hua, Li Tianyou, Nie Heting, Jiang Hua, and other leaders from Shangguai Village, passing through the anti-Japanese base areas in Nangong County, Hebei Central, Hejian, and Baxian, and heading towards Rehe in the Northeast. On October 17, 1945, Lin Biao, in Central Hebei, received a telegram drafted by Liu Shaoqi from the Central Committee, which stated, “Due to the urgent situation in the Northeast, Lin Biao and the troops heading to East Hebei are decided to speed up their move to the Northeast.” Lin Biao and his entourage crossed the Jing-Shan Railway on the night of October 18, and on the morning of October 19, arrived at the southern part of the anti-Japanese base area in East Hebei. On October 19, the Central Committee issued a guideline to the Northeast Bureau regarding the strategy for concentrating main forces to compete with the Nationalists for Liaoning and Andong. On October 20, Mao Zedong drafted a telegram from the Central Military Commission to Lin Biao and Xiao Jinguang: “(1) Both of you should go to Shenyang as soon as possible.” On October 23, the Central Committee instructed the Northeast Bureau: “Do everything possible to occupy all of the Northeast.” Gao Gang said: “The ‘hooks (buttocks)’ rely on the Soviet Union. As long as we block the few openings in the sea and land in front of us, the Northeast will be ours!” Lin Biao arrived in Shanhaiguan on October 25, and the Northeast Bureau sent a train to meet him, arriving in Jinzhou on the 28th, and in Shenyang on the 29th to join the Northeast Bureau led by Peng Zhen.

On October 30, 1945, Chiang Kai-shek appointed Du Yuming as the Supreme Commander of the Nationalist Army in the Northeast (Commander of the Northeast Security) and gradually deployed Nationalist elite troops to advance into the Northeast, most of whom were equipped with American-style equipment and trained by the U.S. military.

On October 30, 1945, Mao Zedong sent a telegram to Peng Zhen: “Where is Lin Biao now?” On the same day, Liu Shaoqi drafted and issued a telegram from the Central Committee of the Communist Party to Lin Biao and Xiao Jinguang: “Where are you now? The Central Committee’s previous telegram requires you to immediately proceed to Shenyang. Have you received it? What are your thoughts? We have not received a reply for a long time and are very anxious. The American and Chiang Kai-shek armies are urgently planning to land at Yingkou and Huludao, and the Soviet army may find it difficult to repel them. Our army must resolutely prevent Chiang’s army from entering the Northeast. Under these circumstances, the strategic position of Jidong is no longer as important as Shenyang. We hope you will rush to Shenyang overnight to command the operations.” Therefore, the planned Central Bureau of the CCP for Jirel was never established. On October 31, 1945, the Central Committee of the CCP sent a telegram to the Northeast Bureau: “Decide that our party’s troops and the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army will officially form the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army, with Lin Biao as the Commander-in-Chief.”

On November 21, Lin Biao indicated that “we should prepare to abandon Jinzhou and the area north of it by two or three hundred miles, allowing the enemy to stretch and disperse, then choose weak points to strike.”

From February 13 to 14, 1946, Lin Biao commanded the 1st Division and 7th Brigade of the Northeast Democratic United Army to initiate the Battle of Xiushuihezi. The troops used his invented “One Point, Two Sides” and “Three-three System” tactics for the first time, annihilating over 1,600 enemy troops equipped with American weapons and suffering 946 casualties.

Setbacks and Reversal of Fortunes

On April 4, 1946, the elite Nationalist troops advanced into the Northeast, launching the Second Battle of Siping and the Battle of Benxi against the 100,000-strong Northeast Democratic United Army. The Northeast Democratic United Army fought a defensive battle similar to the “Fifth Encirclement Campaign” in the former Soviet Central Base Area. Under the attacks of the Nationalist troops commanded by Sun Liren, the Democratic United Army suffered continuous defeats. On May 18, Lin Biao, seeing the unfavorable situation and the delay in receiving the order to withdraw from Mao, “privately” ordered a retreat. Subsequently, Chiang Kai-shek controversially issued an order to cease pursuit. From June 7 to late October, there were no battles on the Northeast battlefield.

On June 16, Lin Biao was promoted to Secretary of the Central Committee of the Northeast Bureau and concurrently served as Political Commissar of the Northeast Democratic United Army, consolidating the party, political, and military power in one hand. On July 7, the expanded meeting of the Northeast Bureau passed the “July 7 Resolution,” gradually establishing roots in the rural areas of Northeast China. Combined with the later grievance movement, the military’s strength was greatly enhanced.

From December 17 to April 3 of the following year, the “Four Defenses of Linjiang” and “Three Down to the South” campaigns took place. Lin Biao targeted Du Yuming’s “south first, then north” strategy. When the Nationalist troops attacked southern Manchuria, the Northeast Democratic United Army attacked the Nationalist troops in northern Manchuria. When the Nationalists shifted their focus to attack northern Manchuria, Lin Biao’s forces attacked southern Manchuria, coordinating the Northeast Democratic United Army’s north-south response. This caused the Nationalists to be caught off guard. Combined with the hard-working and enduring nature of the CCP’s soldiers and Lin Biao’s outstanding tactics, Du Yuming’s offensive plan ended in failure, with over 23,900 Nationalist troops killed or wounded and over 54,000 captured.

The Three Seasons Offensive and the Liaoshen Campaign

The Three Seasons Offensive

From May 13 to June 30, 1947, Lin Biao commanded the Northeast Democratic United Army to launch a strategic counteroffensive, initiating the “Summer Offensive” against 48 Nationalist armies. Targeting the dispersed defense points of the Nationalist troops, he mainly used the tactics of surrounding the city and cutting off supplies, resulting in over 23,000 Nationalist troops killed or wounded and over 60,000 captured. After the failure of the Third Battle of Siping, Lin Biao and Liu Yalou learned from the experience and summarized the “Four Fast and One Slow” tactics, and Lin further developed the “Four Teams One Unit” tactics based on Long Shujin’s combat experience.

From September 14 to November 3, Lin Biao commanded the Northeast Democratic United Army to launch the “Autumn Offensive” with long-distance penetration and raiding as the main tactics, killing or wounding over 36,000 Nationalist troops and capturing over 26,000. From December 15 to March 15 of the following year, Lin Biao led the Northeast Democratic United Army in the “Winter Offensive,” annihilating over 156,000 Nationalist troops and compressing them into several disconnected strongholds in Changchun (about 110,000 under Zheng Dongguo), Shenyang (over 200,000 under Wei Lihuang and Liao Yaoxiang), and Jinzhou (150,000 under Fan Hanjie). The Nationalist forces in the Northeast relied on the fortifications of major cities and hoped to replicate the victory of the Third Battle of Siping. On January 1, 1948, the Northeast Democratic United Army was renamed the Northeast People’s Liberation Army, with Lin Biao as Commander and Political Commissar. On August 14, an independent leadership organ for the Northeast Field Army was established, with Lin as Commander.

On May 24, 1948, the Northeast People’s Liberation Army’s 1st Division and 6th Division attempted to attack Changchun City, which only held one airfield. Given that Changchun City had been meticulously fortified as the headquarters of the Kwantung Army during the Chinese Anti-Japanese War and had external reinforcements, on the 29th, Lin Biao sent a telegram to the Central Military Commission: “… After the battle on the 24th, we repeatedly considered it and discussed it at the meeting of the Northeast Bureau Standing Committee. Considering that the division and corps commanders’ confidence in Changchun is not very high,” he suggested surrounding Changchun with part of the troops and transferring the main forces to the outer line. On the 30th, Lin Biao convened a meeting of leaders from the Northeast Bureau and Northeast Military Region, and the meeting decided to adopt the strategy of encircling Changchun. On June 1, Lin Biao issued a telegram from the “East General Headquarters” to decide on the encirclement and strict blockade of Changchun. “Food banned from entering” and “people banned from leaving” were imposed to create a situation where the militia would fight for food and the city would run out of supplies as soon as possible. This policy, combined with the Nationalist troops seizing civilian food, ultimately led to a large number of civilians starving to death. On the 11th, Lin Biao, Luo Ronghuan, Gao Gang, Liu Yalou, and Tan Zheng, in their capacity as leaders of the Northeast Field Army, ordered the release of trapped Changchun refugees, “To assist the refugees leaving the city, we should mobilize local party and military forces, organize relief efforts in every possible way, and provide assistance with manpower and horse-drawn carts for those elderly, weak, sick, and disabled.” “To restore the influence and gain the people’s support.” On October 16-19, the Nationalist troops in the city defected and surrendered.

The Liaoshen Campaign

After much delay, Lin Biao decided to adopt Mao Zedong’s plan to first attack Jinzhou rather than his own plan to first attack Changchun. Mao’s plan was riskier, as if Jinzhou could not be captured in a short time, the Nationalist forces would attack from the east and west, both internally and externally, and the liberation army would be unable to take away heavy artillery, reversing the situation significantly. Lin Biao’s hesitation faced multiple criticisms within the CCP after the September 13 Incident.

From September 12 to November 2, Lin Biao commanded over 700,000 Northeast Field Army and militia to attack over 550,000 Nationalist troops in the world-renowned Liaoshen Campaign. From October 24 to 28, in the Battle of Liaoxi, Lin Biao fully utilized his invented “Three Situations and Three Methods” and “Three Fierce Tactics,” particularly the “Fierce Pursuit” tactic, boldly instructing his troops to “shoot wherever there is gunfire, shoot more where gunfire is dense, and continue shooting until the gunfire is no longer heard.” He quickly entangled the retreating Liao Yaoxiang’s corps, resulting in the Northeast Field Army annihilating over 100,000 Nationalist troops in two days and nights. In the Liaoshen Campaign, the Northeast Field Army annihilated over 470,000 Nationalist troops, suffering over 69,000 casualties and occupying the entire Northeast.

The Pingjin Campaign and Southern Operations

From November 29, 1948, to January 31 of the following year, Lin Biao unified command of the Northeast Field Army and the North China Military Region troops to launch the Pingjin Campaign[10]. He first took advantage of the opportunity for Liu Yalou to negotiate with the Nationalist forces’ garrison commander Chen Changjie, creating the illusion that the siege command post and main forces were all in the north of the city, which induced Chen Changjie to move his main forces to the north of Tianjin, leaving the central city defenses weak. Lin then utilized the characteristic of the railways running north-south through Tianjin, directing the main forces to advance from the east and west in the central part of Tianjin, capturing the city in 29 hours[71]. The Pingjin Campaign annihilated 521,000 Nationalist troops, with their own casualties totaling 39,000.

On March 11, 1949, the Northeast Field Army was renamed the Fourth Field Army of the People’s Liberation Army (abbreviated as “Fourth Field Army”). From April to June of the following year, Lin Biao unified command of the majority of the Fourth Field Army and allied forces, participating in or initiating the Anxin Campaign, Yisha Campaign, Xiang-Gan Campaign, Heng-Bao Campaign, Guangdong Campaign, Western Hubei Campaign, Guangxi Campaign, and Hainan Island Campaign, capturing the five provinces of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Guangxi[10]. During the later stages of the Heng-Bao Campaign, Lin fell ill and directed operations from a stretcher[76].

Writer Zhang Zhenglong noted: “Previously, historical books on the mainland described the Fourth Field Army’s advance southward as ‘sweeping away all obstacles.’ But in my interviews, I found that the real history was very harsh. Heatstroke, dysentery, scabies, rotten buttocks, night blindness… these were very common, and in some units, non-combat casualties accounted for as much as half. This kind of cruelty was sometimes even more terrifying than the war itself; some soldiers were not afraid of dying in battle but could not endure the discomfort of adapting to new conditions. During one forced march, a soldier used his last ounce of strength to break away from the ranks, pulling the pin on a grenade to end his own life because he could no longer endure the pain” [77]. However, Lin also said: “Don’t be afraid of fatigue causing death, because dying from fatigue is always much less costly than being delayed and suffering losses” [78].

On July 1, 1949, in response to the decision of the Seventh Plenary Session of the Second Central Committee of the Communist Party of China that “the period of focusing on rural work has ended, and the focus of the party’s work is now on cities, while still considering the rural areas in the new period,” Lin Biao presented a different opinion in his report[73]. Li Xiannian, Huang Kecheng, and Du Rensheng all gave high praise to this report[79]. Mao Zedong and the Central Committee quickly replied, agreeing and instructing other major new areas to follow suit[80].

(To be continued, please see the next article)