Hua Guofeng (Part 1):Why Leaders Rebel

In the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), there has only ever been one person who held the top three leadership positions simultaneously: Party Chairman, Premier of the State Council, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was also the Minister of Public Security, First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee, and Political Commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region, making him the person with the most concurrent leadership positions in the CCP’s history after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. He was also the main planner of the only successful coup in CCP history, the Huairen Hall Incident, which ended the decade-long Cultural Revolution. However, just over two years later, he was ousted by Deng Xiaoping, falling from a wise leader to a forgotten figure. He was the true pioneer of China’s reform and opening-up, yet he remains almost unheard of in contemporary Chinese history. Who is he, and why hasn’t he received the recognition he deserves?

On October 6, 1976, just over a month after Mao Zedong’s death, the General Office of the CCP Central Committee, in the name of the top-ranked Vice Chairman Hua Guofeng, notified members of the Politburo Standing Committee to attend a meeting at Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai. The main agenda was to discuss the publication of the fifth volume of Mao Zedong’s Selected Works and the location of Mao’s memorial hall. This meeting was actually a long-planned trap. Wang Dongxing, Director of the General Office and actual commander of the Central Guard Regiment, had his men lying in wait, arresting high-ranking CCP officials Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao as they arrived, and Mao’s widow Jiang Qing was later arrested at her residence. Mao’s followers, such as Qi Benyu, Xie Jingyi, and Mao Yuanxin, were also quickly brought under control. The entire coup took only 35 minutes, marking the end of Mao’s Cultural Revolution team in what became known as the Huairen Hall Incident, shocking China and the world.

This coup, planned by Hua Guofeng, Ye Jianying, and Li Xiannian, became a pivotal moment in Chinese history. It not only effectively ended the ten-year Cultural Revolution but also significantly influenced China’s subsequent trajectory. As the main planner of the coup, Hua Guofeng ascended to the peak of power, once being hailed as a wise leader. How did this once obscure figure in CCP history rise to prominence and then fade away?

Hua Guofeng was not originally named Hua. His birth name was Su Zhu, styled Chengjiu. He was born on February 16, 1921, into a merchant family in Jiaocheng County, Shandong Province. Hua Guofeng was a pseudonym he adopted after joining the CCP, which eventually became his official name after long use. This practice was common among the CCP’s senior members. For instance, the CCP elder Peng Zhen was originally named Fu Maogong, and his pseudonym became his recognized name. Similarly, Kang Sheng was originally named Zhang Zhongke.

Hua Guofeng was the youngest of four children. His father passed away when he was seven, and he was raised by his mother. He received formal education in his early years and attended Jiao Cheng County Commercial Vocational School. Here, I need to clarify a rumor: some media have falsely claimed that Hua Guofeng was Mao Zedong’s illegitimate son. This is completely baseless. This rumor originally arose from speculation about Hua Guofeng’s rise to power, later exaggerated by some media into a wild story. In fact, Hua Guofeng’s background and family history are very clear and have no connection to Mao.

After the full-scale outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japan in 1937, the CCP took advantage of the Nationalist Army’s frontline resistance to seize territory in the rear under the guise of anti-Japanese efforts. They established the so-called Jin-Sui Border Region at the border of Shanxi and Suiyuan provinces, where Hua Guofeng’s hometown was located. In 1938, at the age of 17, Hua Guofeng joined the CCP’s Jiao Cheng County Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force and changed his name to Hua Guofeng, derived from the abbreviation of the Chinese Anti-Japanese National Salvation Vanguard. He later joined the CCP. From 1939 to 1945, the young Hua Guofeng was engaged in revolutionary activities in his hometown, serving as a CCP county party secretary and political commissar of the county armed forces, among other roles. At that time, CCP county party secretaries were different from today’s officials, as the CCP governed the base areas with military control, making the role largely nominal and purely operational, with relatively low-level responsibilities.

In the winter of 1948, as the CCP gained victories in the civil war and occupied large territories, they transferred 50,000 cadres from the North China base to the south to take over the cities. Hua Guofeng was among these cadres. In August 1949, Hua Guofeng was appointed Secretary of the CCP Xiangyin County Committee in Hunan Province. This position was now substantive, but still a minor local leadership role. At this time, Deng Xiaoping was already the First Secretary of the CCP Central Plains Bureau and Vice Chairman of the Southwest Military and Political Committee, one of the five major regional chiefs in the CCP, on a completely different level from Hua Guofeng. I make this comparison because it relates to Hua Guofeng’s later fate.

Hua Guofeng’s political career in Hunan was pivotal for his future because Hunan was Mao Zedong’s hometown, making it a politically significant region. After Mao became the supreme leader, Hunan’s status in the CCP’s political landscape rose significantly. To illustrate a lesser-known detail, among all the railway lines in China, the top-ranked Line One is the route from Changsha to Beijing.

In June 1951, Hua Guofeng was transferred to be the CCP Secretary of Xiangtan County, Hunan, Mao’s birthplace. This transfer was crucial for Hua Guofeng’s political capital. In 1955, when Mao returned to his hometown, Hua Guofeng, as the county party secretary, had the opportunity to meet Mao. Hua Guofeng, sincere and unpretentious, left a very good impression on Mao.

As I mentioned in a previous video, after securing his rule, Mao was most wary of the powerful factions within the party, always guarding against them. He preferred people like Hua Guofeng, who had shallow roots within the party, were clearly not part of any faction, and were obedient and honest, posing no threat to his authority. At that time, Hua Guofeng was a loyal follower of Mao. So in 1955, when Mao launched the agricultural cooperatives to re-collectivize farmers’ land, Hua Guofeng implemented it rigorously. For this, Mao praised him as a model at the grassroots level, having him present Xiangtan’s rural cooperative experiences at CCP Central Committee meetings, thus supporting Mao’s ultra-left policies. As a reward, Hua Guofeng quickly rose through the ranks, becoming Vice Governor of Hunan Province within three years at the age of 37, emerging as a rising political star.

Although Hua Guofeng’s political career can be described as smooth sailing and enviable, he also had a fatal flaw: he had no foundation in the military or in politics. In his early years in the Communist army, he was always engaged in grassroots political work and never served as a single-command general. The CCP, being a party that seized power through violence and still emphasizes the notion that “political power grows out of the barrel of a gun,” places great importance on having a foundation within the military.

Hua Guofeng’s political career was relatively short, and he didn’t have the time to form his own factions and cliques. He didn’t have factional support to rely on, so it can be said that Hua Guofeng’s fatal flaw was that he had only one backer—Mao Zedong. This backer was both powerful and fragile.

In 1959, the famous Lushan Conference in CCP history was held. Peng Dehuai was directly toppled for criticizing Mao’s errors in the People’s Commune and the Great Leap Forward in his “letter of ten thousand words.” At that time, the Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee, Zhou Xiaozhou, was also toppled for supporting Peng Dehuai. Zhou Xiaozhou was an intellectual who graduated from Beijing Normal University and had served as Mao’s secretary for a period. However, Zhou Xiaozhou was quite straightforward and spoke even more sharply than Peng Dehuai. For instance, Zhou Xiaozhou publicly questioned whether Chairman Mao had the threats Stalin had in his later years, directly comparing Mao to Stalin. This hit Mao’s sorest spot, so naturally, Zhou Xiaozhou’s end wasn’t good. In 1966, Zhou Xiaozhou committed suicide by taking sleeping pills.

Those who had served as Mao’s secretaries generally had poor fates. Mao was always very ruthless with the people around him because they knew too many of his secrets and were well-acquainted with his character. A great leader could not tolerate such people. Subsequently, Zhou Xiaozhou was classified by Mao as part of Peng Dehuai’s anti-party clique and soon fell, implicating many leaders in Hunan. Hua Guofeng, who did not belong to any faction within the party, thus benefited and was quickly promoted to Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and concurrently served as Secretary of the Xiangtan Prefectural Committee of the CCP. He strictly followed Mao’s instructions to organize socialist education. Every time Mao returned to Hunan, Hua Guofeng was always by his side, earning great merit. In 1964, Hua Guofeng personally oversaw the construction of the Mao Zedong Memorial Hall in Shaoshan, which was completed in three months. His efforts to glorify the leader naturally earned Mao’s approval.

Shaoshan was as important to Mao as Liangjiahe is to Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping’s current promotion of Liangjiahe is essentially learned from Mao. After the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, the Hunan Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government were also seized by the rebels, and Hua Guofeng was sidelined, stripped of his power. However, under Mao’s personal intervention, he was soon reinstated in 1967, serving as Vice Chairman of the Hunan Revolutionary Committee. During this period, Hua Guofeng continued to oversee the expansion of the Shaoshan Revolutionary Base according to Mao’s intentions. Being a leader who diligently served Mao without any personal ambition, it was not surprising that Mao had a good impression of him.

After the Cultural Revolution began, Mao continuously toppled Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Dehuai, Peng Zhen, Xi Zhongxun, Bo Yibo, and many other veteran cadres, creating a power vacuum at the top. At this time, Mao urgently needed to promote new trusted individuals to fill this vacuum. Hence, Hua Guofeng, who had no factional affiliations and was a faithful follower of Mao, quickly ascended the fast track of political advancement.

In 1969, Hua Guofeng became a Central Committee member. In 1970, he was appointed First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee and concurrently served as Political Commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region, officially becoming a regional leader. On December 18, 1970, during an interview with American journalist Edgar Snow, Mao Zedong specifically praised Hua Guofeng: “Several prominent figures have emerged in Hunan Province. The first is Hua Guofeng, the current First Secretary of the Hunan Provincial Committee.”

After the Lin Biao incident in 1971, Mao accelerated the promotion of new personnel to counterbalance Zhou Enlai. In August 1973, at the CCP’s 11th Central Committee First Plenary Session, Hua Guofeng was elected a member of the Politburo on Mao’s nomination. In October of the same year, he concurrently served as Minister of Public Security. When Hua Guofeng entered the central leadership, it was a time of intense struggle between the Cultural Revolution faction and the elders’ faction within the CCP. The conflict between Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, and other Cultural Revolution faction members with Deng Xiaoping and Zhou Enlai intensified, leading to Deng Xiaoping’s second ouster.

Throughout these power struggles, Hua Guofeng maintained a neutral stance, not aligning with any side, which became his advantage. Eventually, after Deng Xiaoping’s ouster, Hua Guofeng was appointed Vice Premier of the State Council and Minister of Public Security in 1975, formally entering the core of power. Although Mao vigorously promoted Hua Guofeng, he only used him as a pawn for power balance and never intended him to be his successor.

Mao’s greatest fear was the emergence of a Khrushchev within the party who would denounce and desecrate his legacy after his death. Thus, after Lin Biao’s death, Mao trusted none of his old comrades. His initial choice for a successor was Jiang Qing, his wife, who, after all, would not undermine his legacy. Mao promoted many new Cultural Revolution elites to ultimately support Jiang Qing. However, Jiang Qing’s incompetence and limited abilities led to poor relations with almost all of the elders, particularly with Deng Xiaoping and Ye Jianying, causing her to lose popular support.

Reluctantly, Mao thought of his nephew, Mao Yuanxin, during the later stages of the Cultural Revolution, intending to groom him as his successor. Mao Yuanxin was appointed as the Liaison Officer of the Politburo, First Secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Committee, and Political Commissar of the Shenyang Military Region. However, Mao Yuanxin’s foundation was even weaker than Jiang Qing’s, lacking both capability and seniority. His only asset was being Mao’s nephew. But ultimately, the party’s leadership succession couldn’t be directly inherited like an imperial dynasty.

In this context, Mao considered Hua Guofeng. Hua Guofeng had always been an honest, good-natured person without his own faction or wings, making him the ideal puppet to control. Mao intended to use Hua Guofeng as a transitional figure, with Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, and others providing support, ultimately paving the way for Mao Yuanxin to come to power. Thus, under Mao’s strategic plan, Hua Guofeng unexpectedly became the successor.

After Zhou Enlai’s death on January 8, 1976, Mao, realizing his time was limited, immediately nominated Hua Guofeng as acting Premier of the State Council to preside over central work. To clear the way for Hua Guofeng, Mao also stripped Deng Xiaoping of all positions a few months later, retaining only his party membership. On April 7, 1976, the Central Committee issued a notice appointing Hua Guofeng as First Vice Chairman of the Central Committee and Premier of the State Council. At this point, Hua Guofeng officially became Mao’s successor.

On April 30, 1976, Hua Guofeng accompanied Chairman Mao to meet with New Zealand’s Prime Minister Robert Muldoon. After Muldoon left, Chairman Mao kept Hua Guofeng to discuss the domestic situation. Chairman Mao wrote three notes for Hua Guofeng, which read: “Follow the past policies, take it slow, don’t rush,” “I trust you to handle things, if there are problems, find Jiang Qing.” The third note, “I trust you to handle things,” became the most powerful evidence for Hua Guofeng’s succession to power. However, Chairman Mao’s main point was in the latter sentence: “If there are problems, find Jiang Qing.” Chairman Mao’s intention was very clear: although Hua Guofeng stood at the forefront, major decisions still had to be listened to by Jiang Qing.

Led by Jiang Qing, the new Cultural Revolution elites indeed understood Chairman Mao’s thoughts very well and acted with impunity, completely disregarding Hua Guofeng. At that time, the Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party had only four members: Hua Guofeng, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Ye Jianying. Hua Guofeng was essentially weak and isolated. The concept of the “Gang of Four” that we are familiar with today was actually created by Chairman Mao himself. During the Cultural Revolution, he vigorously promoted these rebels but worried that they would form new factions and cause splits within the Party. So, in May 1975, at a Politburo meeting, he publicly warned Jiang Qing: “Don’t form a Gang of Four.”

Chairman Mao foresaw that after his death, the senior cadres might be dissatisfied. So, on June 15, 1976, while arranging his affairs, he said to Hua Guofeng, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and others present, “I have done two things in my life. One is fighting against Chiang Kai-shek for decades, driving him to those few islands. The other thing you all know is launching the Cultural Revolution. Not many people support this; many oppose it. These two things are not finished. This legacy has to be passed on to the next generation. How to pass it on? If it can’t be done peacefully, it will be passed on amidst turmoil, possibly even in a bloody storm. What will you do? Only heaven knows.” It was evident that Chairman Mao himself knew that it would be difficult to settle the aftermath of his actions.

Among the so-called “Gang of Four” left behind by Chairman Mao, Jiang Qing was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee. Although she had no specific power, she was undoubtedly the core figure of the Gang of Four because she was Chairman Mao’s wife. Wang Hongwen was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and Vice Chairman of the Central Committee. Zhang Chunqiao was a member of the Politburo Standing Committee, Vice Premier of the State Council, and Director of the General Political Department of the People’s Liberation Army. Yao Wenyuan was a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, responsible for national propaganda. Under Chairman Mao’s protection, the Gang of Four held significant power in key positions. Therefore, it was natural for them to look down on Hua Guofeng, who rose later. In their view, Hua Guofeng was just a temporary caretaker. So, after Chairman Mao’s death, they quickly took actions to threaten Hua Guofeng’s power.

The day after Chairman Mao’s death, Wang Hongwen, without Hua Guofeng’s consent, unilaterally issued a directive in the name of the Central Committee, requiring all provinces to report directly to the Central Office under his control if any major issues arose. This effectively bypassed Hua Guofeng, making regions directly obedient to himself. The head of Tsinghua University, Chi Qun, an ally of Jiang Qing, said in a speech at the school that they should prepare for more acute struggles and ordered Tsinghua’s militia to be on standby. Meanwhile, Jiang Qing, disregarding Hua Guofeng’s opposition, insisted on keeping Mao Yuanxin in the Central Committee to manage Chairman Mao’s archives. As Chairman Mao’s liaison officer, Mao Yuanxin had no reason to stay in Beijing after Chairman Mao’s death and should have returned to Liaoning. Jiang Qing’s insistence on keeping Mao Yuanxin emphasized his princely status, using his power to command vassals. This was a direct threat to the newly ascended Hua Guofeng.

Even more alarming, Zhang Chunqiao’s brother, Zhang Qiuchao, deputy director of the General Political Department’s propaganda department, was secretly reported to have been in contact with the Sixth Tank Division of the Beijing Military Region, plotting something. Mao Yuanxin, as the political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region, also dispatched the deputy commander of the Shenyang Military Region, Sun Yugui, to move a tank division from the Shenyang Military Region to Beijing under the pretext of assisting Beijing’s defense. This was secretly reported to Ye Jianying. Ye Jianying, who had long presided over the work of the Military Commission, actually controlled military power at the time. Under his intervention, these plots to move troops did not succeed. The emperor had just died, and they were already mobilizing troops without authorization—wasn’t this rebellion?

Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, Jiang Qing, and Mao Yuanxin’s series of power grabs forced Hua Guofeng, the centrist, into a corner, pushing him completely to the opposite side. Although Hua Guofeng was always an honest person, he was not stupid. He quickly realized he was in a perilous situation. Although Chairman Mao had promoted him, he was not part of Jiang Qing’s faction. He understood the consequences of power struggles. If he did not take preemptive action, as a commander with no solid foundation in the Central Committee, he might end up like Liu Shaoqi. Deng Xiaoping had already been ousted. To eliminate the Gang of Four, Hua Guofeng had only Ye Jianying, the powerful faction, to rely on.

After Lin Biao’s death, Chairman Mao, out of necessity, let Ye Jianying take charge of the daily work of the Military Commission and also served as the Vice Chairman of the Party. He held high status and significant power and was the only person Hua Guofeng could rely on at the time. However, Hua Guofeng and Ye Jianying did not have deep interactions. How could he win Ye Jianying’s support? Zhang Genshen, the Secretary of the Provincial Party Committee, who had known Hua Guofeng since their revolutionary days and had a very good relationship with him, visited Hua Guofeng many times after he stepped down. According to Hua Guofeng’s account, Zhang Genshen wrote an article in 1999 titled “Listening to Hua Guofeng Talk about Crushing the Gang of Four,” detailing Hua’s coup process.

On September 11, 1976, three days after Chairman Mao’s death, an anxious Hua Guofeng secretly met with Vice Premier Li Xiannian under the pretext of going to the hospital for a checkup, expressing his intention to solve the Gang of Four problem subtly. Why seek out Li Xiannian? As a senior cadre, Li Xiannian had close ties with Deng Xiaoping. After Deng Xiaoping’s fall, Li Xiannian also suffered, being ordered to recuperate. He had worked closely with Hua Guofeng for a long time and had a good relationship with him. Therefore, Hua Guofeng hoped he could act as an intermediary to persuade Ye Jianying, who held military power. Without Ye Jianying’s support, Hua Guofeng had no chance of success.

For Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, and other senior cadres, who had suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution and had been manipulated by Chairman Mao, the Gang of Four, representing the Cultural Revolution, were sworn enemies. The reason they hadn’t erupted was solely because Chairman Mao was still alive. Now that Chairman Mao had died and Hua Guofeng was willing to take the lead to solve the Gang of Four issue, they were more than willing to support it. So, Ye Jianying quickly agreed.

While striving for the support of the elders, Hua Guofeng made another preparation. He personally went to persuade Wang Dongxing, the then director of the General Office of the CPC Central Committee and the actual controller of the Central Security Regiment. Surprisingly, Wang Dongxing quickly agreed. Wang Dongxing was a confidant of Mao Zedong before his death, personally promoted by Mao, and was responsible for Mao’s security for a long time. He was the undisputed chief steward of the Central Security Regiment. By logic, he was the least likely to arrest Jiang Qing. Why did he agree to defect?

Although Wang Dongxing was Mao’s man, his relationship with Jiang Qing had always been bad. As I mentioned earlier, Jiang Qing was ambitious but lacked ability. She relied on Mao’s favor and was arrogant and domineering, disregarding almost everyone. She treated people like Wang Dongxing as household servants, often making him furious. Although Wang Dongxing was a Politburo member and the director of the General Office, he was frequently scolded by Jiang Qing, which caused him to harbor resentment. Moreover, in the CCP, with the rise and fall of different leaders, Wang Dongxing’s position became precarious after Mao’s death. If Jiang Qing or someone else came to power, he would be in a dire situation. Therefore, seeking refuge with a new leader was his best option.

Thus, when Hua Guofeng approached Wang Dongxing, he quickly agreed to join. With Ye Jianying’s coordination, key figures such as Beijing Military Region Commander Chen Xilian, Beijing Municipal Party Secretary Wu De, Beijing Garrison Commander Wu Zhong, and Minister of the International Liaison Department Geng Biao also joined Hua Guofeng’s camp. The addition of these powerful figures gave Hua Guofeng an absolute advantage over the Gang of Four. Although the Cultural Revolution’s newly privileged group, led by Jiang Qing, held high positions, their biggest flaw was their lack of foundation and military power. Therefore, once the elders and military leaders defected, their defeat was almost certain.

On September 21, 1976, after secret talks with Ye Jianying, Hua Guofeng decided to resolve the issue by force, adopting a method of taking action first and reporting later. They initially planned to act after October 10, but on October 4, Ye Jianying, fearing delays, proposed to Hua Guofeng to strike first and quickly. Subsequently, they agreed to act on October 6. On that day, Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing finalized the action plan, relying mainly on the Central Security Regiment commanded by Wang Dongxing.

At 3 p.m. on October 6, Wang Dongxing had the General Office of the Central Committee issue a notice, requiring Politburo Standing Committee members to attend a meeting at Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai at 8 p.m. that evening. When Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan arrived at the conference room, they were immediately controlled by the Central Security Regiment. Wang Dongxing announced that they were under investigation. Jiang Qing, who did not attend the meeting, was arrested at her residence, Spring Lotus Chamber in Zhongnanhai. Meanwhile, Jiang Qing’s associates in Beijing, including Qi Benyu, Xie Jingyi, and Mao Yuanxin, were also arrested. They were secretly imprisoned in Zhongnanhai’s underground chamber until they were transferred to Qincheng Prison after their trial. This coup, due to its surprise, lasted less than an hour, and the Gang of Four and all the remaining Cultural Revolution group left by Mao were captured.

Subsequently, Hua Guofeng held an emergency meeting of the Politburo at Yuquan Mountain in Beijing, where Ye Jianying lived. Under the intimidation of armed forces, the Politburo unanimously passed a resolution that night, officially appointing Hua Guofeng as the Chairman of the Central Committee and the Central Military Commission, to be confirmed later by the plenary session of the Central Committee. During the subsequent trials, Jiang Qing and Zhang Chunqiao were sentenced to life imprisonment, Wang Hongwen received a life sentence, Yao Wenyuan was sentenced to 20 years, and Mao Yuanxin to 17 years. Thus, Mao’s Cultural Revolution legacy was completely eradicated, and Hua Guofeng officially became the supreme leader.

Although Ye Jianying was a major supporter and contributor to this action, it must be acknowledged that the reason the Huairen Hall coup succeeded without major resistance or turmoil was fundamentally because of Hua Guofeng’s legitimacy. Without Hua Guofeng, this event would not have been possible. As the old Chinese saying goes, “Without a legitimate name, words will not be heeded.” Although Hua Guofeng did not have the ability to control the whole situation, he was the legitimate successor appointed by Mao, the highest leader with recognized legitimacy. His power seizure and purge in a centralized system carried natural authority that no one could question. If this event were initiated by someone else, whether it was Li Xiannian, Ye Jianying, or Wang Dongxing, it would have been seen as a rebellion. Whether it could garner support and success would have been uncertain. If Ye Jianying could rebel, then other powerful figures like Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, and Wang Zhen could also do so. Why should they listen to Ye Jianying?

Therefore, Ye Jianying’s evaluation of Hua Guofeng was very appropriate. He once said Hua Guofeng was extraordinary in his actions, benevolence, and decisiveness. Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan were not significant; the main issue was Jiang Qing. As Mao’s widow, only Hua Guofeng had the resolve to arrest her. Ye Jianying also mentioned that he never thought of or dared to suggest arresting Jiang Qing. Even if Zhou Enlai were alive, he would not have dared to do so. Even Deng Xiaoping might not have dared to act. Therefore, it is no exaggeration to say that in the Huairen Hall incident that changed China’s course, Hua Guofeng was undeniably the key contributor. Without him, the coup could not have succeeded, and Jiang Qing and others could not have been quickly removed from the historical stage. It is uncertain how much longer the Cultural Revolution would have continued.

（This article is sourced from the YouTube channel: Er Ye Story: https://www.youtube.com/@Tankman2020）